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Abstract 
 
This study applies a modified bureaucratic policy process model to analyse contemporary 
South African – Japanese relations, particularly in regards to a proposed Economic 
Partnership Agreement, and the experiences of Japanese agencies within South Africa. 
 
South Africa and Japan are major trade partners, and the Japanese government has a 
significant presence in the African aid scene via the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD), and through the works of the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA). South African – Japanese relations have been documented in a modest but 
respectable fashion by a range of researchers, including Alden, Skidmore and Osada. 
 
The bureaucratic policy process model has been used in an array of studies on international 
relations and decision making, notably by Graham Allison. However, it has not been 
previously applied to South African – Japanese relations. As a result, there is a dearth of 
information on how bureaucratic dynamics affect Japanese – South African relations. In 
response to this, a modified bureaucratic policy process model is used to analyse 
contemporary South African – Japanese governmental relations. 
 
A literature review of primary and secondary sources is undertaken, consisting of a historical 
review of South African – Japanese relations. Following this, a brief overview of 
contemporary literature on South African – Japanese relations is performed. This includes 
both secondary sources and primary sources relating to government bureaucracies current 
priorities and strategies. Material on TICAD is included in this section. 
 
Interviews with government officials from both the Japanese and South African governments 
are carried out using a modified snowball sampling system. The interviews provide insights 
into the different bureaucratic organization’s priorities and programmes, as well as their 
relationships with other organizations. 
 
From this data, two emergent themes are addressed: the failure of a contemplated Free Trade 
Agreement / Economic Partnership Agreement and the way in which Japanese agencies, 
particularly JICA, operate within the South Africa context. 
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It is found that the FTA failed due to welfare concerns from the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry, as well as greater complications relating to trade agreements in general. 
These greater complications stem from the involvement of regional bodies such as the South 
African Customs Union. Japanese agencies are found to be constrained within South Africa 
by a lack of resources as well as by the independent and somewhat sceptical attitude of South 
African government agencies towards Japanese aid efforts. 
 
It is proposed that the relevance of extra national bureaucracies to the decision making 
process surrounding the FTA has implications for deploying the bureaucratic policy process 
model, which has generally only considered national bureaucracies in discussing how 
decisions are made. It is further suggested that South African trade deals are complicated by 
the country’s location within the South African Customs Union and the South African 
Development Community, and the consequent need to consult and negotiate with third parties 
who are likely to be impacted by such deals. 
Finally, it is suggested that because both South Africa and Japan face significant, but different 
economic challenges, they should prioritise improving their economic relations. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie het ’n aangepaste burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel gebruik om die 
hedendaagse betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan te ontleed, veral wat betref ’n 
voorgestelde ekonomiese vennootskapsooreenkoms tussen die twee lande en die ervarings 
van Japannese agentskappe in Suid-Afrika. 
 
Suid-Afrika en Japan is groot handelsvennote, en die Japannese regering handhaaf ’n 
beduidende teenwoordigheid op die Afrika-hulptoneel deur middel van die Tokiose 
Internasionale Konferensie oor Afrika-ontwikkeling (TICAD) en die werk van die Japannese 
Internasionale Samewerkingsagentskap (JICA). Verskeie navorsers, waaronder Alden, 
Skidmore en Osada, het die betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan al op beskeie dog 
aansienlike wyse beskryf. 
 
Die burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel is al in ’n rits studies oor internasionale betrekkinge en 
besluitneming gebruik, in die besonder deur Graham Allison. Tog is dit nog nooit voorheen 
op betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan toegepas nie. Dus bestaan daar weinig inligting 
oor hoe burokratiese dinamiek die betrekkinge tussen hierdie twee lande raak. In antwoord 
hierop is ’n aangepaste burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel dus gebruik om die hedendaagse 
staatsbetrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan te ontleed. 
 
Eerstens is ’n literatuuroorsig van primêre en sekondêre bronne onderneem wat uit ’n 
historiese oorsig van betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan bestaan het. Daarná is ’n oorsig 
van kontemporêre literatuur oor die verhoudinge tussen die twee lande onderneem. Dít het 
sowel sekondêre as primêre bronne met betrekking tot die huidige prioriteite en strategieë van 
staatsburokrasieë ingesluit. Hierdie afdeling sluit ook materiaal oor TICAD in. 
 
Onderhoude met staatsamptenare van die Japannese sowel as die Suid-Afrikaanse regerings is 
met behulp van ’n aangepaste stelsel van sneeubalsteekproefneming gevoer. Die onderhoude 
bied insig in die verskillende burokratiese organisasies se prioriteite en programme, sowel as 
hul verhoudings met ander organisasies. 
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Twee temas wat uit hierdie data na vore gekom het, is vervolgens bespreek: die mislukking 
van ’n beoogde vryehandel-/ekonomiese vennootskapsooreenkoms, en die funksionering van 
Japannese agentskappe, veral JICA, in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. Daar word bevind dat die 
vryehandelsooreenkoms misluk het weens welsynsbesware van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Departement van Handel en Nywerheid, sowel as groter komplikasies met betrekking tot 
handelsooreenkomste in die algemeen. Hierdie groter komplikasies hou verband met die 
betrokkenheid van streeksliggame soos die Suider-Afrikaanse Doeane-unie. Voorts blyk 
Japannese agentskappe in Suid-Afrika aan bande gelê te word deur ’n gebrek aan hulpbronne, 
sowel as Suid-Afrikaanse staatsagentskappe se onafhanklike en effens skeptiese houding 
jeens Japannese hulppogings. 
 
Die studie doen aan die hand dat die relevansie van bykomende nasionale burokrasieë in die 
besluitnemingsproses oor die vryehandelsooreenkoms bepaalde implikasies inhou vir die 
gebruik van die burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel, wat meestal slegs rekening hou met enkele 
nasionale burokrasieë se rol in besluitneming. Voorts blyk dit dat Suid-Afrikaanse 
handelstransaksies bemoeilik word deur die land se lidmaatskap van die Suider-Afrikaanse 
Doeane-unie en die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap, en die gevolglike behoefte 
om oorleg te pleeg met derde partye wat waarskynlik deur sulke transaksies geraak sal word. 
 
Laastens word aangevoer dat aangesien Suid-Afrika en Japan met beduidende dog 
verskillende ekonomiese uitdagings te kampe het, die verbetering van ekonomiese 
betrekkinge tussen die twee lande nou voorrang behoort te geniet. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 .  Contextualisation and rationale for the study 
 
This thesis had its genesis as a response to certain gaps within the literature on Japanese – 
South African relations. Very little work has been done on the bureaucratic dimensions of this 
relationship, and some of the work in this field is relatively dated. This thesis seeks to address 
this by both updating the literature in a modest fashion, and by examining Japanese-South 
African relations using a hitherto underutilized approach, namely that of the bureaucratic 
policy process.  
 
A review of the literature on Japanese-South African relations indicated that much of the 
work in the field is relatively dated. Since the last major review of this field by Christopher 
Alden and Hirano Katsumi in 2003, events have taken place which may have reshaped the 
relationship somewhat. These include the election of a new government in Japan, the 
continued rise of China and its increased involvement in Africa and, possibly, the earthquake 
in north east Japan. 
 
However, it has also become clear that the current literature does not effectively examine the 
relevant bureaucracies involved in the relationship. The extant literature focuses on broad 
state-state relations, with little reference to the interactions between the agencies and 
organizations that make up the governments on both sides. For example, Skidmore's (1999; 
2004) work discusses the relationship exclusively at the level of state-state relations, with 
little reference to the national bureaucracies on both sides. Similarly, Nel (2005) discusses the 
state of South African-Japanese trade and economic relations, but again he uses an approach 
that assumes the existence of the State as a unified rational actor, not a conglomerate of 
bureaucracies and sub-national actors.  
 
Studies have been done on the way in which Japanese bureaucracies inform foreign policy, 
but these have usually been in the context of Japanese-United States relations, or foreign 
policy in some other sphere. One example of this kind of scholarship, The Foreign Policy of 
Modern Japan, edited by John Scalapino, (1997) is a comprehensive and authoritative source 
on Japanese bureaucracy, with detailed chapters on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
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and what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
1
. Unfortunately, it is quite 
dated and is written from a US perspective. 
 
In this tradition, there is a distinct school of writers who argue that bureaucracies are 
unusually important in Japanese politics. In Japan's Political System Robert E. Ward 
emphasizes the importance of the Japanese bureaucracies in decision-making. As he explains, 
“bureaucracy in Japan is deeply involved in politics for several reasons” (Ward 1978: 166). 
Among these, he mentions that “such involvement is a solidly entrenched part of the Japanese 
tradition” (Ward 1978: 166). 
 
Kazuki Iwanaga notes that this point has been extended to an argument that the bureaucratic 
policy process mode of analysis is particularly suited to Japan. He cites Inouye as claiming 
that “due to structural differences in the political system and the way it is operated, Japanese 
politics is more amenable than American politics to the application of the concept of actors 
presented by the bureaucratic politics model” (Inouye 1987, quoted in Iwanaga 1993: 21). It 
should be noted that there is a debate over this matter. Iwanaga takes issue with Inouye's 
argument, dismissing it as hastily developed (Iwanaga 1993: 22). Similarly, other analysts 
argue that “the dominance of the Japanese bureaucracy in the political process has been 
grossly exaggerated” (Pempel, T. J. and Fukui, Haruhiro, cited in Haley 1987: 344). 
 
However, even if this scepticism is justified and Japan is not peculiarly amenable to 
bureaucratic analysis, so little has been written about this aspect of South African – Japanese 
relations that it would appear to be a grossly underused departure point. The value of a 
bureaucratic policy approach to foreign policy is well documented by writers such as Allison 
(1971), Allison and Halperin (1972) and Hilsman (1990), as the theoretical section of this 
thesis will show, but with the exception of one study by Chris Alden (2002), very little work 
using this level of analysis has been done in relation to Japanese-South African relations. 
Furthermore, even though Alden has examined this aspect of the relationship, he has not 
developed it as an explicit framing device to the level that this thesis will.  
 
The value of a bureaucratic approach to this relationship lies in the way it can make the 
intricacies of decision-making more intelligible. As the theoretical chapter of this thesis 
                                                 
1
 Subsequently renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
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demonstrates, bureaucracies can significantly affect the way in which foreign policy is made 
and carried out. Although the impact of high level decision-makers cannot be underestimated, 
it must be understood that much of the minutiae and complexity of foreign policy is impacted 
by bureaucratic structures as result of the various agendas, modes of operation and concerns 
that they bring to the issue. Consequently, while documenting the specifics of these 
bureaucracies has value in itself, by understanding the bureaucratic dynamics involved it may 
also be possible to formulate answers to questions around Japanese-South African relations 
that have significant explanatory heft. 
 
In short, there is a deficiency of work on and understanding about the way in which 
bureaucratic dynamics affect the relationship between the two countries. These bureaucratic 
dynamics encompass the specific linkages, interactions and priorities of the bureaucracies 
involved in this relationship. In other words, which bureaucracies work together the most? 
What are their priorities? What do they see as their responsibilities? How does this affect the 
relationship? Understanding these bureaucratic dynamics will generate new insights into 
Japanese-South African relations,  
 
However, it has been necessary to carefully delineate the topic of study. Conventionally, the 
bureaucratic policy process analytical approach is generally used in relation to specific case 
studies or issues. While this study was not initially developed around a case study, economic 
ties were used as a departure point for initial investigations. This was thought to be one of the 
most interesting aspects of the relationship, largely because it is one of the most developed 
points of contact. Japan and South Africa have a significant history of trade
2
, and this has 
continued to remain a significant factor. 
 
As of 2011, after China and the United States, South Africa's third largest export destination 
was Japan (Department of Trade and Industry 2011). According to the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, [MOFA] this trade largely consists of minerals and automobiles (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2011). In a paper on Japanese – South African trading patterns, Sandrey notes 
that “Japan was South Africa's single most important export destination in 2005. These 
exports are concentrated in precious stones and metals [platinum] and motor vehicles” 
(Sandrey 2007: 1).  
                                                 
2  For a history of Japanese-South African trade, see Osada (2002) and Morikawa (1997). For a discussion of 
more recent trading patterns, see Skidmore (2004) and Sandrey (2007). 
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A brief review of recent trade data supports these assertions. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, 
precious metals (C14) are by far the largest export category from South Africa to Japan. 
These exports grew significantly from 2001, reaching a peak in 2008, right before the global 
recession. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1.2, South Africa largely imports vehicle components (C23) and 
assembled vehicles (C17).  
 
This data also suggests that trade relations resemble a fairly typical “North-South” 
relationship, with South Africa exporting significant amounts of raw materials, and Japan 
exporting finished goods. There is some heterogeneity to this trading pattern, however, as 
evidenced by South Africa's import of vehicle components, largely for assembly into 
automobiles. Some of these vehicles are in fact exported to Japan, although this kind of trade 
has not grown as rapidly as that in platinum ore. 
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These trade figures must be placed against a historical backdrop of trade relations. Japan's 
involvement in the South African economy has a significant history, with commentators such 
as Morikawa (1997) seeing Japan's activities in Africa as being heavily oriented around 
protecting and maintaining access to South Africa's mineral resources. Post-1994 this 
relationship has remained important, with Japan maintaining a position as one of South 
Africa's top trade partners. As Skidmore noted in 2004, “Japan has consistently been South 
Africa's third- or fourth-largest trading partner in recent years” (Skidmore 2004).  
 
However, despite this history and these trade relations, South Africa has recently downplayed 
relations with Japan, in favour of continued South-South co-operation and building ties with 
China. Indeed, in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation [Dirco]'s 
strategic plan for the time period 2010 – 2013, Japan received barely a mention (Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation 2010). Skidmore also noted this pattern, 
suggesting that “While South Africa views Japan as a strategic country and an important 
trading partner, it can be argued that Japan is not yet viewed as a strategic partner for South 
Africa” (Skidmore 2004:2). The distinction that Skidmore makes here is important, and is 
rooted in documentation from the Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] dating back to 
2001. As she explains:  
 
“For a country to be considered a strategic partner, there has to be a clear convergence 
of interests on issues related to both development and multilateral and geopolitical 
strategies. In this regard, its economic potential is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the designation. A strategic country is a country that does not share similar 
perspectives on the issues given above but is of major significance in the global 
economy” (Skidmore 2004: 3). 
 
Taken together with the most recent Dirco strategic plan, this would suggest that although 
Pretoria is naturally aware of Japan's significant economic capabilities, closer ties have not 
been a major strategic priority recently, and this has not changed recently. 
It must be emphasised that this is a relatively recent state of affairs. Traditionally, Japanese 
corporations have had a significant presence in the South African economy, generally via 
subsidiaries such as Toyota and Nissan. During apartheid, the Japanese government avoided 
completely severing ties with South Africa (despite pressure to do so), and in the immediate 
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post-Apartheid time frame the Japanese government offered significant aid packages to South 
Africa. 
 
More recently, in 2012, the Japanese government approached the South African government 
with a proposal to sign an Economic Partnership Agreement, which would include a Free 
Trade Agreement. This proposal was unsuccessful, but this proposal, and the reasons for its 
failure, became a major part of the findings of thesis. 
 
At an intellectual and rhetorical level, Japanese aid initiatives on the continent are driven by 
the Tokyo International Conference on African Development [TICAD], which has been held 
five times since 1993. The latest conference, TICAD V, took place in mid-2013. 
 
This multilateral conference on aid and development issues in Africa represents an important 
forum for South Africa and Japan to engage around African developmental issues. TICAD 
includes delegates from different African countries, the United Nations, the European Union 
and of course, Japan. Some commentators have suggested that this is due to a desire to 
generate political support for Japanese initiatives within the UN Security Council (Skidmore 
2002; Dwinger 2010). An interrogation of these motives is not part of this thesis, but it is 
useful to bear in mind when discussing Japan's aid projects on the continent. 
 
These projects are generally carried out by JICA, the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency. Established in 2008 as an umbrella body for Japanese aid initiatives, JICA claims to 
be the world's largest bilateral aid agency, with an annual budget of over 10 billion US dollars 
(Japan International Cooperation Agency 2008).  
 
South Africa's concerns in international relations can broadly be seen as developmental and 
Afro-centric, with a strong emphasis on South-South co-operation. In the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation’s 2013 Strategic Plan, Minister Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane wrote that  
 
“Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of a better 
Africa in a better world. Our destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern 
African region. Regional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa’s 
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socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity 
and security” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2013: 2). 
 
Further on she stated:  
 
“Partnerships with countries of the South continue to be critical to advancing not only 
South Africa’s own development needs, but also that of Africa and to create political, 
economic and social convergence for the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and 
the marginalisation of the South. We will promote the strengthening of South-South 
cooperation and support the Agenda of the South through participation in the activities 
of all South-South fora” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
2013: 3). 
 
By virtue of its central role in conceiving and implementing the TICAD process, it is clear 
that Japan has some interest in aid issues in Africa
3
. This creates an interesting space in which 
to explore the interactions of the two states. However, in doing so it is important not to lose 
sight of the potential problems that can arise during the foreign aid process. Indeed, aid 
relations between South Africa and Japan have quite a troubled history, and some of the 
dimensions of this are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
By contrast with these significant trade and aid relations, South Africa and Japan have 
virtually no points of contact in security matters (Alden 2002: 379 – 381). 
 
Consequently, this project will discuss trade and aid issues between South Africa and Japan. 
They are developed, important and on-going aspects of the relationship between the two 
countries.  
 
In order to reliably interrogate these issues, it has become necessary to modify the 
bureaucratic policy process' analytical model somewhat. This is because discerning the true 
agendas and interests of a bureaucracy requires extremely deep insight into their discussions, 
decision-making processes, and internal culture. Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
                                                 
3 Sato (2005) discusses the history of Japanese aid initiatives, which started as what was effectively a 
reparations programme in Asia, but later expanded to include African nations. For a discussion of Japanese 
aid in Africa and South Africa, see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3 of this thesis. 
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for example, involved large numbers of interviews, analysis of thousands of documents and 
enormous amounts of research. In addition, it was only possible because of the extraordinary 
levels of access and trust that high level officials granted to the researchers involved (Allison 
1971). This project's scope is somewhat less ambitious – it seeks to gain an understanding of 
the linkages, interactions and priorities of the various bureaucracies involved in the 
relationship. This is simpler and more feasible than attempting to uncover the deep and often 
not entirely obvious agendas and interests that bureaucracies have. Concentrating on these 
aforementioned bureaucratic dynamics lends this project both practicality and epistemological 
soundness, by comparison with attempting a comprehensive bureaucratic policy analysis of 
the relationship. 
 
1.2 Problem formulation and Research Questions 
 
The importance of bureaucracies in international relationships has been well documented by 
writers such as Allison and Hilsman. Bureaucratic dynamics clearly affect foreign policy and 
international relations. However, it is unclear how this link expresses itself in terms of South 
African-Japanese relations. This leads to the primary research question: 
 
How do bureaucratic dynamics, such as organizational linkages, dynamics and priorities 
affect the relationship between South Africa and Japan? 
From this, two additional questions emerged during the research process: 
 
How have Japanese agencies within South Africa adapted to the specific pressures, demands 
and peculiarities of working within this country? 
 
How did bureaucratic dynamics affect the proposed Economic Partnership Agreement? 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
In chapter 2 a discussion is provided of the three major paradigms of international relations, 
namely Liberalism, Realism and Critical Theory.  
 
Following on from this, the chapter discusses the bureaucratic policy process, which has been 
adopted as the central theoretical model for this work. Graham Allison (1971) has extensively 
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documented the relevance of bureaucracies in generating policy in international relations. In 
his landmark work, Essence of Decision, he developed a model known as the bureaucratic 
policy process model, which sought to explain decision making during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in terms of the bureaucratic organizations within the Soviet and US governments. 
Working from this, he argued that bureaucracies have a clear impact on policymaking. Allison 
noted that, in contrast to the generic, singular ‘national interest’, different bureaucracies have 
different interests. They see their organizational ‘mission’ as being paramount to the nation’s 
security and interests. Different organizations also tend to see different aspects or “faces” of 
issues (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48). 
 
All of this results in a more complex view of the policy and decision making process. Instead 
of seeing policy and decision making as a centralised, rational process, typified by the rational 
actor model, theorists such as Allison (1971) and Hilsman (1990) see it as a complex, 
contested process involving different agendas, concerns and inputs from the various 
government organizations involved. 
 
Chapter 2 considers the three major models of Japanese foreign policy. The first, developed 
by Calder (1988), is known as the reactive state, wherein Japan tends to formulate its foreign 
policy in response to external pressure. The second, held by writers such as Heginbotham and 
Samuels (1998) and Nester (1991) is the notion of Japan as neo-mercantilist state. This model, 
which falls within the realist paradigm, holds that Japanese foreign policy is driven by the 
need to maximise its economic power. 
 
The last major model discussed is that of Japan as a middle-power. Developed by the critical 
theorist, Robert Cox (1989), this model considers Japan as a moderately powerful nation 
which seeks to define new norms and standards for international relations. This model is also 
deployed by thinkers such as Cornelissen (2012). 
 
None of these three theoretical models are explicitly adopted for the purposes of this thesis, 
although they are referenced in relation to specific phenomena. Rather, the central theoretical 
concern of this thesis is how to apply the bureaucratic policy process to certain contemporary 
issues in South African-Japanese relations. The key topics within this relationship that will be 
addressed within this framework are the attempted Economic Partnership Agreement, and the 
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way in which South Africa acts as an ‘operating environment’ for Japanese government 
agencies – namely, how it impacts on their activities, strategies and operations. 
 
1.4 Research design and methodology 
 
This research project involved qualitative research into the relationship between ‘bureaucratic 
dynamics’ and the relationship between South Africa and Japan. ‘Bureaucratic dynamics’ was 
conceived of as a set of independent variables consisting of: stated organizational priorities, 
relationships between government organizations, and organizational perceptions of other 
organizations. The relationship of these dynamics to the nature of the South African – 
Japanese relationship was then investigated. 
 
The research process was two-fold. Firstly, a literature review was conducted. Secondly, a 
series of interviews with officials from relevant government agencies was carried out. 
 
The literature review involved large amounts of secondary and primary sources, in order to 
generate grounded, informed questions for the interview. The theoretical paradigm concerning 
the bureaucratic policy process was largely built upon works by Graham T Allison (1971) and 
Roger Hilsman (1990).  
 
In relation to Japanese-South African relations, historical works by Masako Osada (2002), 
Themba Sono (1993) and Jun Morikawa (1997) represented the anchors of the literature 
review. Works by Christopher Alden (2002), Kweku Ampiah (1990, 2003, 2005) and Natasha 
Skidmore (1999, 2004) discussing more contemporary relations were used to bring this 
historical view up to date. 
 
The primary sources consulted included documentation from both Japanese and South African 
government agencies, including the DTI, Dirco, MOFA and METI. In particular, strategic 
policy documents and TICAD documentation helped inform the interviews by generating an 
overview of the various organization’s stated policy objectives and priorities. 
 
The centrepiece of this study consisted of semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
key Japanese and South African government organizations, selected via a modified snowball 
sampling method. This was buttressed by additional correspondence with auxiliary 
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organizations whose relevance emerged during the study, as well as primary and secondary 
documentation. 
 
Semi-structured interviews are “organised around a set of predetermined questions” while 
“[o]ther questions emerge from [the] dialogue” (Whiting 2008: 36). 
 
By contrast with this method, Leech explains that structured interviews tend to be used most 
in mass opinion surveys, and are best suited to situations where the researcher knows a lot 
about the topic, and is seeking very specific information. On the other hand, unstructured 
interviews are “more conversations than interviews” that are “best used as a source of insight, 
not for hypothesis testing” (Leech 2002:665). 
 
This format was chosen because it was necessary to both maintain a focus on the topic at hand 
(the linkages, interests and agendas of the various institutions) while avoiding excessive 
prejudgement on what themes may emerge within this context. 
 
During these interviews certain broad topics were developed from the beginning. However, 
significant additional themes and issues emerged during the interview process. 
 
1.4.1 Sampling 
 
In selecting organizations to contact, at least one significant divergence from the original 
sampling scheme took place. Originally, the intention was to seek out individuals from both 
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry. The data from their interviews would then be compared, in the hopes of discovering 
differences between the two organizations. However, logistical considerations resulted in one 
interview conducted with an employee from the Japanese Embassy in Pretoria. As a result of 
this, instead of analysing MOFA and METI separately, the scope of the study was altered, and 
the Japanese Embassy was introduced as an organization in its own right. The Japanese 
Embassy does not generate its own policy prescriptions, naturally, and the majority of 
employees in the Japanese Embassy are seconded from other departments, such as METI. The 
specific interviewee at the Japanese Embassy was in fact an employee of METI, who was 
attached to the Embassy. Another interviewee was seconded from a METI think tank to the 
Development Bank of South Africa.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 13 
 
 
At the individual level, the initial intention was to use 'snowball' sampling, so from each 
interview further leads would be developed and additional sources sought out. Snowball 
sampling is “[a] technique for finding research subjects. One subject gives the researcher the 
name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on” (Vogt, 1999 
quoted in Atkinson and Flint 2001: 2). This method is often used in the social sciences for 
hard to reach populations, such as drug addicts or gangsters (Atkinson and Flint 2001: 1 – 2). 
However, its applicability is much broader than this: it has been used with groups ranging 
from nurses involved in medical administration errors (Shuh-Jen Sheu et al 2007) to Israeli 
backpackers (Noy 2008). 
 
A slightly more mathematical explanation of the process is given by Leo Goodman, which 
involves selecting a random sample of relevant individuals, and asking each individual to 
name x number of other individuals with certain parameters (viz., those that the researcher is 
interested in). These new individuals are contacted, and also asked to name x individuals with 
the same parameters. Repeated individuals are eliminated from the list, and the process is 
repeated until the sample size is large enough (Goodman 1961: 148). 
 
It was thought that this sampling method would lend itself well to this project for two reasons. 
Firstly, this study concerns itself with a small number of organizations, each of which will 
have a limited number of people working in this field. Consequently, interviews were held 
with a select number of people of interest, most of who are professionally connected by at 
least one or two degrees. Consequently, any relevant individual should be well aware of the 
work done by at least some of their colleagues and counterparts, and as a result would be well 
positioned to suggest other pertinent individuals to interview.  
 
Secondly, this method would help overcome concerns around access to the relevant 
individuals. It was anticipated that accessing the relevant individuals would present some 
difficulty, largely due to gate-keeping issues. In order to mitigate this, snowball sampling was 
used predicated on the logic that individuals within government agencies would be more 
inclined to respond favourably to approaches for interviews when the researcher was 
introduced or recommended to them by a colleague or counterpart. Indeed, this may have 
particular relevance for interviewing Japanese subjects. As one researcher has noted, “With 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 14 
 
living authors or indeed with any Japanese of distinction, it is generally best to do things the 
way any Japanese would have to do it, by obtaining a proper introduction” (Smith 2005). 
 
Admittedly, snowball sampling is not an entirely unproblematic approach. The key weakness 
foreseen was that of potential selection bias (Atkinson and Flint 2001: 4).  One way to avoid 
this difficulty was to compare the sample that emerged with what was known about the 
population before starting the interviews. In the case of this study it was important that a good 
balance of employees from the different agencies was selected.  
 
Ultimately, a 'pure' snowball sampling method was not used. This was largely due to logistical 
constraints. Approaching one individual, completing an interview and then seeking further 
individuals based on their recommendations, arranging the new interviews and then following 
up on their responses would have resulted in a significant amount of time elapsing between 
interviews. Additionally, most of the subjects were located in Pretoria, whereas the researcher 
was based in the Western Cape. As a result, it was more efficient to travel to Pretoria once 
and do multiple interviews over a short period of time. 
 
As a result of these factors, a 'quasi-snowball' approach was used. Multiple individuals were 
approached telephonically or via email, in parallel. In this initial stage some of these 
individuals did in fact recommend other individuals for interviewing, and these 
recommendations were followed up. In other cases, the researcher was referred to people that 
he had already interviewed. This helped confirm the validity of the initial sampling. Whether 
people are recommended to the researcher before or after their interview, their relevance as a 
subject remained the same. A retroactive recommendation helps confirm that they were in fact 
a relevant subject for the study. This 'reverse snowball' effect suggested that the individuals 
selected were in fact good subjects for interviews. 
 
1.4.2 Interviews 
 
Six organizations were selected, and nine individuals were personally interviewed, in seven 
interviews. (Some interviews involved two individuals at once.) One preliminary interview 
was undertaken with the Japanese Consulate in Cape Town with the intention of gaining an 
initial appraisal of the organization of the Japanese diplomatic corps in South Africa, as well 
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as developing leads on further individuals for interviews.  
 
Interviews ranged in length from slightly under an hour to nearly two hours, depending on the 
amount of time available. Most interviews were slightly longer than an hour.  
The initial plan called for recording the interviews and creating transcripts of the interviews, 
in order to ensure maximum clarity and accurate coding. However, early interviewees 
indicated that they would prefer it if the researcher did not record the discussions, and in 
response to these concerns notes were taken by hand. Following each interview a summary of 
the interviews was written up, using the notes. 
 
The first interview was with the Japanese Consul in Cape Town during May 2012, and it was 
followed by a series of closely spaced interviews one month later. All of these later interviews 
took place in Pretoria between the 4
th
 and the 7
th
 of June in the same year. 
 
During the research project, six different organizations were surveyed. Representing the 
Japanese government, these were the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), JICA, the 
Japanese Embassy and its satellite Consulate in Cape Town. An additional interviewee was 
included who was not a direct member of any of these organizations, in the form of a TICAD 
advisor who had been seconded to the South African Development Bank of South Africa. The 
DBSA was not included in the study, but his interview helped shed light upon the dynamics of 
the Japanese agencies operating within South Africa. 
On the South African side, the DTI and Dirco were included in the study.  
 
Upon completing the interviews, additional information was sought out from two more 
organizations: the SACU Secretariat and COSATU. These organizations were selected based 
on their emergence as relevant actors during the interviews. They both responded to brief 
email inquiries with information on their relationship to the issues raised. 
A copy of the original interview questions is available in Appendix A. 
 
1.5 Limitations and delimitations 
 
One of the major limitations of this thesis involves the complexity of the analysis involving 
the interface of theoretical concerns and actual findings. As is discussed in Chapter 2, there 
are multiple contested models of Japanese foreign policy, namely the reactive, neo-
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mercantilist and middlepower models. Making strong claims as to the validity of any of these 
models as a result of the fieldwork in this study would be misguided for two reasons. The first 
is that of analytic complexity. There are many elements of Japanese-South African relations 
that resonate with the different theoretical models presented. Mineral exploration and mining 
is often quite legibly discussed from a neo-mercantilist perspective, as in the analysis by Van 
Der Spuy and Glinzler (2003). Aid initiatives such as the Tokyo Conference for International 
Development (TICAD) could be seen as a departure from the reactive state, or, alternatively, 
as an example of Japan rising to the challenge of middlepowership. As a result of such 
analytical complexity any claims as to the validity of any of these models are extremely 
limited, and have been heavily caveated. Furthermore, the limited scope and depth of the 
fieldwork in this study means that it would irresponsible to claim that any given model is 
comprehensively rebutted or supported by this thesis. 
 
Another difficulty of interaction between theoretical and practical findings lies in that of the 
demands of the bureaucratic policy process model. As is noted later, the full bureaucratic 
policy process model is demanding, in that it requires tremendous amounts of insight into, and 
data about, different bureaucracies. The broad logic of the bureaucratic policy process has 
been adopted: Bureaucratic dynamics affect international relationships and understanding this 
process is important. However, this thesis does not and cannot claim to be an exhaustive and 
complete account of the different bureaucracies. 
 
This thesis was specifically delimited to only include employees from government 
organizations within South Africa. Although the South African Treasury and the Presidency 
have an impact on policy, they were explicitly excluded from the study due to logistical and 
gatekeeping issues. Additional funding and time would have allowed for the inclusion of 
these organizations, and would have strengthened the findings of this thesis. However, this 
was not possible. 
As a result of this decision, the findings in this paper must be approached with caution. They 
are based on an incomplete sample of the bureaucratic organizations involved within foreign 
policy, and as a result cannot be treated as comprehensive or authoritative. Rather, they 
should be seen as indicative findings, or partial findings. For ease of explanation and 
discussion, this paper often speaks in general terms of South African – Japanese relations, but 
the limited scope of the study must be kept in mind. This may be a particular factor in relation 
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to discussions around ODA and aid, since the Treasury may be significantly involved in this 
field.  
 
Initially, the research project planned to interview employees from both MOFA and METI, 
and to analyse them separately as organizations in their own right. 
 
However, logistical considerations resulted in one interview being conducted with an 
employee from the Japanese Embassy in Pretoria. As a result of this, instead of analysing 
MOFA and METI separately, the scope of the study was altered, and the Japanese Embassy 
was introduced as an organization in its own right.  
 
Further limitations included a limited number of subjects. Ideally, interviewing multiple 
employees from each organization would have resulted in a denser, more comprehensive view 
of each bureaucracy. Unfortunately, time constraints meant that it was difficult to arrange 
multiple interviews at each organization, and still interview all of the remaining organizations. 
At some organizations two people were interviewed (in the same interview), while at others 
only one interviewee was available. 
 
Finally, this thesis was conceived in early 2012, and much of the research was done in the 
same time frame. As a result, developments, resolutions and statements from TICAD V, held 
in June 2013 have not been included, and these may impact on some of the findings. 
 
1.6 Thesis layout 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the various theoretical paradigms that have come to 
inform scholarly discussions of Japanese- South African relations. It addresses the broad 
theoretical paradigms of Liberalism, Realism and Critical Theory, but it also discusses the 
implications of the bureaucratic policy model for foreign policy, as well as various models of 
Japanese foreign policy. 
 
Chapter 3 is a background chapter that also serves as a literature review. This section 
examines the historical debates, trends and changes in Japanese-African relations in general, 
and in Japanese-South African relations in particular. 
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Chapter 4 contains the findings and analysis resulting from the interviews. It begins with a 
review of the various agencies and organizations involved in the study, examining their stated 
priorities and agendas. This is intended as a precursor to the main findings of the thesis, which 
examine how certain bureaucracies have operated within and impacted on South African-
Japanese relations. 
 This chapter is anchored on two main points. The first involves a discussion of South Africa 
as an operating environment for Japanese agencies, and how they have had to adapt to 
working in South Africa. Issues of 'ownership' in aid discourse are discussed, and how this 
may impact upon the work done by Japanese aid agencies in the country. 
 
The second point discusses a proposed South African – Japanese Economic Partnership 
agreement, and the concerns, perceptions and policies of the various role-players involved, 
including the South African Customs Union [SACU] secretariat. During the study it emerged 
that this bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement had been proposed by the Japanese 
government, but had not been successful. This was subsequently taken up as one of the major 
issues of the study, and it was possible to develop a clearer picture of how the decision 
making process unfolded, who the key players were, and why the ultimate decision was made 
not to take up the EPA.  
 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion. It briefly recaps the major findings, and discusses their theoretical 
implications, as well as the implications for future Japan – South African relations. It also 
makes some tentative recommendations as to future courses for organizations on both sides, 
as well as possible future avenues of study that have emerged from the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual issues 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings upon which the rest of 
the thesis is constructed. It begins with a discussion of the chief competing paradigms in 
International Relations, namely Realism, Liberalism and Critical Theory. It then moves on to 
a discussion of the Bureaucratic Policy Process model, which is foregrounded due to its 
importance to this thesis.  
 
Next, the chapter reviews some of the most popular claims and assumptions in the field of 
Japanese foreign policy analysis. This is done by presenting the debate between the three 
main models of Japan's foreign policy: Japan as a 'reactive state', a 'neo-mercantilist state' or a 
'middle-power'. Conveniently, these three models each fall within a different major paradigm. 
The reactive state model borrows heavily from liberal notions of domestic actors and 
institutionalism. Neo-mercantilism has been developed by realists to account for problems 
with the conventional, structural realist account of Japanese foreign policy, while the notion 
of Japan as a middle power has the flavour of critical theory, based upon its development as a 
'map' for Japan to chart a course within the hegemony of the United States. 
 
Following this review of the debate between the major models of Japanese foreign policy, the 
implications of these theoretical issues for this thesis are assessed. The only theoretical model 
that is explicitly and continuously adopted for the purposes of this thesis is the bureaucratic 
policy process model, although specific elements of the various models are highlighted for 
examination in later sections of the thesis. 
 
2.1 Realism 
 
In his chronological survey of international political theory, Hedley Bull discusses the rise to 
prominence of the realists during the 1930s and 1940s. He argues that this was broadly as a 
reaction to liberal approaches, which had fallen out of favour as appearing naïve during the 
violent international environment of the 1930s and 1940s. In Bull’s account, realists sought to 
“rediscover the lessons of the past…the positive functions of state sovereignty, secret 
diplomacy, the balance of power and limited war” (Bull 1972: 60). 
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These “lessons of the past” were first expounded by writers such as Thucydides of ancient 
Greece, and Machiavelli of Italy, so they were by no means original to the 20
th
 century
4
.  
However, in the early and mid-20
th
 century they came into vogue again as a way of thinking 
about international relations. 
 
How, then, do realists perceive the world? Steve Smith states that “[f]or realists, the 
international political sphere is one of necessity, regularity and danger” (Smith 1995: 10). 
Realists subscribe to a view that the world is an anarchic and dangerous environment in which 
states must all strive to further their interests in the face of hostile competition. As Forde puts 
it, “among states, power is the predominant currency and self-interest the predominant 
motivation” (Forde 1995: 143).  
 
In the realist account, states are autonomous, rational and self-interested entities, who seek to 
maximize their own power. At best, any state hopes to achieve domination of the world order. 
At worst, it wishes to simply avoid annihilation by its rivals. 
 
It should be understood that there is some nuance to this rather pessimistic view of the 
international order. Smith notes that: 
 
“[S]ome classical realists, such as Kennan, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, did sometimes 
speak of the international sphere as one suitable for moral reasoning, but they also spoke 
of the preponderance of power-political considerations and warned against the dangers 
of a moral foreign policy.” (1995: 10) 
 
In other words, morals are all very well, but ultimately they are superseded by state interests. 
Of course, states do co-operate with each other from time to time. Realists do not deny this. 
However, in a realist account, they only co-operate with each other to the extent that their 
interests dictate. This notion is encapsulated in the words of the British statesman Lord 
Palmerston: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (Henry John Temple 1848, 
quoted in Heath 1969). 
                                                 
4 See Forde (1995) for a discussion of Machiavelli and Thucydides’ respective takes on realism. 
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One of the consequences of realist thinking is that it results in an account of states that are all 
highly similar. There may be superficial differences, but in reality all states are driven by the 
same motives, and have the same ultimate nature – that of a self-serving unit, beholden to no 
one but themselves. They may vary in capabilities – one state may be a strong hegemon, 
while another may be a weak vassal – but they ultimately have much the same motives and 
tools. It is merely their relative ability to impose their will in any given situation that varies 
from state to state. 
 
As Linklater explains, this relationship between capabilities and functions was elaborated on 
extensively by the structural or neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, but for the time being it is 
important to highlight the notion that for realists, states differ primarily not in their motives 
but in their abilities and powers (Linklater 1995: 253). 
 
Ultimately, a realist posits a world in which all states strive to further their own interests. Co-
operation and institutions may emerge, but these never supersede the laws of self-interest. 
 
Post-war Japan has been viewed as a particular challenge to realism, due to its seeming lack 
of interest in deepening its military capacities (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). In response 
to this problem, realists such as Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) have deployed an 
alternative explanation known as neo-mercantilism. Neo-mercantilists hold that Japan's 
behaviour can still be understood as realist provided one confines this to the economic realm. 
Their argument is that post-war Japan no longer sees power in terms of military capabilities 
but as a function of economic power. As a result, Japan's behaviour, while seemingly atypical, 
is in fact driven by the desire to maximise its economic capabilities and to protect its domestic 
economy and industrial base. 
 
2.2 Liberalism 
 
As a theoretical basis liberalism is an extremely wide departure point, which means that using 
it as a theoretical construct requires extreme parsimony and care. Indeed, Jorgensen notes that 
liberalism is such a broad field of thought that “some simply identify liberalism with Western 
civilization” (Jorgensen 2010: 57). 
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However, even when one confines the discussion to issues of international relations theory, 
liberalism remains a “rich tradition of thought” (Jorgensen 2010: 57). Indeed, Jorgensen 
identifies at least three strands of liberalism in international relations theory. These are 
interdependence liberalism, republican liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism (Jorgensen 
2010: 63 – 65). 
 
Each of these has significant depth, and there is inadequate space to fully unpack all these 
aspects of liberalism here. However, it may be possible to briefly highlight some of the key 
features of liberal theory in international relations. 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, there are two elements of liberalism that need to be 
highlighted. The first is its philosophical emphasis on progress. The second, and perhaps the 
most important, is its explanatory emphasis on the linkages between sub-national politics, and 
international politics. This second element is significant due to its implications for the value 
of a bureaucratic analysis in assessing foreign policy. 
 
Philosophically, liberal approaches to IR are normative, rather than explanatory. Liberalism is 
based on a fundamental notion of progress and improvement in human affairs. That is not to 
say that liberalism holds progress as a given, but rather that liberalism holds that humans can 
“obtain progressively better collective outcomes” (Sterling-Folker 2006: 55). 
 
Indeed, for Sterling-Folker, liberalism is “the exploration of what prevents progress from 
being achieved, with the underlying assumption being that progress could be realized if we 
could uncover the barriers to collective action and promote their resolutions” (2006: 55). 
 
The second underpinning element of liberal IR theory lies in the way that it treats states. 
Liberal IR theory emphasises the genesis of state policy and interests by appealing to the 
interest groups, organizations and institutions that affect or generate policy.  
 
For Moravcsik, “The central insight distinguishing Liberal international relations theory is 
that states are embedded in domestic and international civil society…which places structural 
constraints on the behaviour of the state by shaping the underlying preferences on which its 
foreign policy is based” (1992: 22).  
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Similarly, Jorgensen explains that “liberals focus on state-society linkages and claim the 
existence of a close connection between on the one hand domestic institutions and politics and 
on the other international politics. These two spheres…do not exist separately and should not 
be analysed separately” (2010: 58). 
 
In the liberal case, states are not the only actors worth considering. Indeed, according to some 
theorists, it is not clear that they can be meaningfully thought of as autonomous actors at all.  
Moravcsik argues that “[T]he state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly 
subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social 
actors” (2008: 518). 
 
Consequently, in the liberal analysis states are no longer internally inscrutable entities that 
differ only in their external properties – rather, they each have their own attributes, all of 
which arise from the demands of the various groups and individuals that reside within them. 
This is particularly important in light of the concept of bureaucratic policy processes in 
international relations, which also seeks to challenge the notion of the state-as-monolith. The 
value of this aspect of liberal theory lies in how well it links with a bureaucratic policy 
process analysis of South African-Japanese relations. After all, Moravcsik's “social actors” 
(2008: 518) could well include the different agencies and organizations of and within the 
South African and Japanese government.  
 
As is explained further on, one of the most prominent models of Japan – that of the “reactive 
state” - resonates with the liberal perspective on statehood, institutionalism and the way in 
which social actors generate policy.  
 
2.3 Critical Theory 
 
Bohman (2005) identifies critical theory as having both “a narrow and a broad meaning in 
philosophy and in the history of the social sciences.” He discusses the history of critical 
theory in the ‘narrow sense’, as originating in the Frankfurt School, a group of Marxist 
thinkers and scholars from Western Europe. Beginning in 1929 with the opening of the 
Institute for Social Research, Bohman explains that the notion of critical theory originated in 
this Frankfurt School, but came to encompass a broad family of social science theories, all of 
which shared a couple of basic tenets. 
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In its broad sense critical theory can be thought of as a set of theoretical approaches which 
both interrogate and reject the underlying assumptions of received theories, such as realism 
and liberalism. This is not a 'miscellaneous' category. Rather, it is a family of theories oriented 
on the notion that “theories of the social world can have the ideological effect of aiding the 
perpetuation of arrangements that benefit some members of humanity while disadvantaging 
others” (Linklater 2007: 55). Examples of these theories include neo-Marxism and feminism.  
 
In effect, the argument of critical theory is that conventional theories both reproduce and 
perpetuate themselves by failing to interrogate the world of IR in a normative sense. For 
example, by assuming the existence of anarchy and struggle between states as a given, realist 
theories in fact help to perpetuate such a system. This is closely linked to the notion of 
‘knowledge’ abetting power, in a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Robert Cox, one of the major 
critical theorists, famously claimed that “Theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose” (1981: 128). 
 
One of the fundamental distinctions that Robert Cox attempts to make is that between 
problem-solving, on the one hand, and critical theory, on the other. In his account, problem-
solving theory “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for 
action” (Cox 1981: 128). 
 
From this, it attempts to “make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing 
effectively with particular sources of trouble...the general pattern of institutions and 
relationships is not called into question” (Cox 1981: 129). 
 
For Cox, this was problematic, and he argued for an alternative approach, which would 
question the validity of these “institutions and relationship[s]” (Cox 1981: 129). 
As Linklater explains:  
 
“Cox argued that problem-solving approaches take the world for granted and ask how it 
can be made to function as smoothly as possible. This method informs neo-realism, 
which maintains that international anarchy is unalterable which asks how order can be 
maintained in the face of geopolitical competition and rivalry...By contrast, critical 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 25 
 
theory asks how current global arrangements came into being and whether they are 
changing, not least because of political contestation and struggle” (Linklater 1995: 55). 
 
Similarly, Bieler and Morton state that “Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation with the 
maintenance of social power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to 
questioning the prevailing order of the world” (Bieler and Morton 2004: 86). 
 
Linklater has coined the term “emancipatory project” (1995: 48), to describe this process of 
challenging and questioning the status quo. This “emancipatory project” is at the heart of 
critical theory. 
 
Another key contributor to the field of critical theory is Alexander Wendt, one of the 
foundational scholars in the field of social constructivism. First coming into vogue in the 
1980s, social constructivism was seen as an intellectual response to the new, “fluid and open” 
realities of the post-Cold War era (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 209 – 210). In his pivotal and 
much cited paper on this theory, Alexander Wendt (1992) discusses the way in which the 
concept of national self-help within an anarchic system is an institution, which has arisen 
from previous state interactions and experiences. For Wendt, an institution is “a stable set or 
“structure” of identities and interests” (1992: 399), and self-help, as presented by realists, is 
one of these institutions. Consequently, instead of accepting self-help as an a priori necessity, 
Wendt argues that it represents an institutionalised response to the problem of an anarchic 
society. For Wendt, there are three different ways in which anarchy can become 
institutionalised:  The Hobbesian anarchy of all-against-all, the Lockean anarchy of equal but 
sovereign nations, and finally the Kantean anarchy, in which different states work together 
towards an equal and free society. None of these types of anarchy are a given fact of the 
international world. Rather, they arise out of the collective reality that states construct, by 
their responses to the world. In effect, the (anarchic) world is not ‘as states find it’. Rather, it 
is “what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992).  
 
As a critical theorist and neo-Marxist, Cox' chief preoccupation is with hegemony, the ways 
in which it shapes discourse, and how it might be challenged. This, in turn, is based on the 
works of Antonio Gramsci, the early 20
th
 Century Marxist. As Gupta explains, Gramsci was 
reacting to the rise of fascism in Italy, and sought to understand how such a defeat for 
Communism could have taken place. Consequently: 
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“It is this…idea of hegemony that provides the key to Gramsci's formulation that the 
strength of a system lies not in the apparatus of violence, but in the acceptance by the ruled 
of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers and which, filtered through a 
series of layers of consciousness, emerges as the common sense” (Gupta 1988: 1621). 
 
This approach is deeply rooted in the logic of ‘historical materialism’, which, as Cox explains, 
[by contrast with the realist perspective],” has a concern with the relationship between the 
state and civil society” (1981: 134). Cox has adopted this notion from Gramsci’s thought, and 
indeed, he writes that: “Gramsci contrasts historical materialism, which recognises the 
efficacy of ethical and cultural sources of political action, with what he called historical 
economism or the reduction of everything to historical and material interests” (1981:134) 
 
As Bieler and Morton (2003) point out, Cox’s work is strongly influenced by Gramsci’s 
notions of hegemony.  In his seminal paper Social Forces, States and World Orders – Beyond 
International Relations theory, Robert Cox discusses at length the connection between “social 
forces”, “forms of state” and “world orders” (1981). One of the central elements of his 
argument is that “Changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which, 
in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the generalisation of changes in the 
structure of states alters the problematic of world order” (Cox 1981: 138). 
 
Cox is not presenting a linear account of international relations, however, and he stresses that 
“The relationship among the three levels is not, however, simply unilinear” (Cox 1981: 138). 
Rather, it is a multi-directional effect. States may respond to international events by 
reorganising themselves, which can lead to the unleashing of new social forces. Alternatively, 
new technology can lead to new modes of production, which results in a restructuring of 
society, and thus a new international world order.  
 
One of the best examples, for Cox, is: 
 
“the incorporation of the industrial workers…as participants within western states from 
late-Nineteenth century, accentuated the movement of these states  toward economic 
nationalism and imperialism…which brought about a fragmentation of the world 
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economy and a more conflictual phase of international relations” (Cox 1988: 138). 
 
Within this framework, Cox argues for a ‘triangle of forces’, comprised of ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions. These three elements interact with each other in a 
multidirectional fashion (Cox 1981: 135 - 136). None can be stated to be analytically prior, 
but for the sake of this discussion, it is institutions that are of particular interest. For Cox, 
“Institutionalization is a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order” (1981: 136). 
Institutions “reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least 
initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations” (136). 
 
Importantly, “there is a close connection between institutionalization and what Gramsci calls 
hegemony” (137). 
 
In addition to developing critical theory, Robert Cox has also made significant contributions 
to theoretical discussions of Japanese foreign policy. Cox has appropriated notions of 
'middlepowership' in order to consider how Japan might relate to an American hegemony, 
either by supporting it or, conversely, by challenging it via carving out an alternative path 
within the ‘world order’. 
 
As is explained later on, Cox' discussion of Japan as a middle power is not merely 
categorising it as 'neither big nor small'. Rather, he is seeking a specific analysis of Japan's 
potential role within (or against) the current world order. He explicitly discusses and analyses 
several separate future scenarios in the light of world hegemony, and their implications for its 
continuation or failure. 
 
2.4 The Bureaucratic Policy Process 
 
In Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Graham T. Allison (1971) 
dissects the Cuban Missile Crisis using different theoretical models. The value of this process 
comes from his ability to make cogent observations about the predictions and explanatory 
value of the different models by applying them to the same questions around US decisions 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
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The first model, the Rational Actor Model, is well known. In this model states are presented 
as a unitary body that makes choices in a unified, rational fashion. They seek to maximise 
their gains, and they use such tools as they have at their disposal to do so (Allison 1971: 10 – 
12). 
 
This model has its advantages. In particular, it provides an easy 'short cut' when thinking 
about why certain options were chosen, or not. It allows researchers and analysts to quickly 
consider what a given government is likely to do in a certain situation, and enables the 
generation of neat narratives of actual and possible events. As Allison explains, in the context 
of international military strategy “it provides an inexpensive approximation by letting the 
analyst think about what he would do if he were the enemy” (Allison 1971: 19).  
 
However, Allison also presents alternative models. These two models are the Organizational 
Process Model and the Bureaucratic Policy Model. They both seek to explain the actions of 
any given state as the aggregate result of the bureaucracies and agencies that comprise it, 
although they emphasize different aspects of these governmental sub-units. 
 
The implications of this point are significant. In the broader theoretical paradigm, this places 
both these models squarely within the liberal paradigm. This kind of model largely derives its 
basic postulates from liberalism. A realist perspective tends to discount sub-state actors, due 
to the modelling of the state as a single unified actor. However, a liberal theory of 
international relations considers sub-state groups as essential actors, and their behaviour is an 
indispensable part of explaining the behaviour of the state. Consequently, it is possible to 
trace a direct lineage from the liberalism as an overarching paradigm, to the bureaucratic 
policy process as a theoretical model. As Welch points out: 
 
“The crucial respect in which Model II represents a revision of Model I, therefore, is its 
understanding that governmental behavior is constrained by the routines of the 
organizations of which the government is composed" (Welch 1992: 117). 
 
Historically, this kind of approach is heavily informed by earlier research into organizational 
choices, processes and dynamics. This began in management and business studies that 
attempted to explain how firms made decisions as a result of internal dynamics. These studies 
were subsequently expanded on and applied to international relations. The 20
th
 century giant 
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of social science Herbert Simon is widely credited with developing some of the key ideas that 
would lead to this mode of analysis (Hudson and Vore 1995: 211, Allison 1971: 71). 
 
In his critique of Allison's work, Freedman explains that “In Model II, or the Organizational 
Process Model, policy is seen to be the output of large, inertial organizations” (Freedman 
1976: 435). 
 
However, as he points out, this Model later ends up being effectively merged with Model III, 
the Bureaucratic Policy Process, stating that “the...alternatives appear to have been narrowed 
down...with Model II having suffered a take-over bid from Model III” (Freedman 1976: 435). 
Indeed, in another paper by Allison and Halperin, they simply speak of “a bureaucratic 
politics model”, having comfortably folded the two into one (1972: 43). This is perfectly 
allowable, as the differences between them are not large. Model III seeks to emphasise policy 
as the outcome of an active, contested political bargaining process between different agencies 
and interest groups, whereas Model II concentrates on stylistic concerns – how the different 
bureaucratic styles, approaches and processes affect policy formation. In other words, the 
differences are a matter of emphasis – the bureaucracies as actors versus the bureaucracies as 
institutions. 
 
Consequently, it is acceptable for us to accept this merger, and proceed using the Bureaucratic 
Policy Process Model.  
 
One key feature of this approach is the emphasis it places on the specificities of any given 
situation. To understand a decision, one must understand the decision makers who make it 
and the context in which they operate. As Hudson and Vore explain “First and foremost, the 
decision-making approach of [Foreign Policy Analysis] breaks apart the monolithic view of 
nation-states as unitary actors” (Hudson and Vore 1995: 210). 
 
Similarly to Hudson and Vore's notion of 'breaking apart the monolith', Hilsman deploys an 
extended metaphor of states as 'boxes' to explain the bureaucratic policy model. In the 
Rational Actor Model:  
 
“[T]he analyst does not need to know what goes on inside the boxes. Working outside 
the boxes, analysts can deduce the nature of their intentions from how they act on the 
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world scene and so design policies for their own state to counter the movies the others 
or to adjust and adapt to them. Some scholars, however, have been unhappy...and have 
opened up the boxes to see if a better explanation of state behavior can be developed by 
studying what goes on inside” (Hilsman 1990: 53). 
 
Hilsman then goes on to discuss what happens when an analyst opens the American and 
British 'boxes', and the implications that this has for foreign policy analysis of these two states 
(1990: 53). Thus, many actions can be explained in terms of the sub-national individual or 
agency that carries it out, rather than as another decision by the unified state.  
 
Aside from the fact that many actions are carried out by sub-national groups with their own 
organizational styles, it is also important to recognize that policy is very often the result of a 
bargaining process between different bureaucracies and agencies. Agencies have their own, 
specific interests and agendas. These include “maintaining autonomy and organizational 
morale, protecting the organization's essence, maintaining or expanding roles or missions, and 
maintaining and increasing budgets.” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48)  
 
Additionally, “[m]embers of an organization come to believe that the health of the 
organization is vital to the national interest. The health of the organization, in turn, is seen to 
depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary 
capabilities” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48). Finally, they often “come to see different faces 
of the issue” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48). As a result, these different organizations with 
different priorities and perspectives will be forced into a bargaining process, the outcome of 
which strongly shapes or decides what policies will be adopted.  
 
Of course, a government is a hierarchical structure, but it is not perfectly so, and high level 
decision makers can be utterly frustrated by bureaucracies and agencies lower down in the 
system. The important point to understand is that decisions made by national leaders must still 
be carried out and executed by departments and bureaucracies that can and do thwart higher 
level decisions, either intentionally or as a result of simple disinterest and resistance to a 
policy that may not align with their agendas or interests. Even where there is no particular 
controversy over a course of action, it must still be implemented by bureaucracies which all 
bring their own concerns and issues to the process. In a bureaucratic policy analysis of the 
American decision-making process in the time frame leading up to the first Gulf War, Holland 
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points out that while President George H Bush had very specific objectives and ideas about 
the war, these still had to be transmitted and executed via the chain of bureaucracy. In her 
own words, “even where there is minimal slippage between a president's choice and its 
implementation, the [bureaucratic policy process] model alerts us to the efforts the president 
must go through to get the executive bureaucracies to deliver” (Holland 1999: 221 – 222). 
 
In short, bureaucratic power often goes beyond simply frustrating or facilitating the decisions 
of heads of state. A vast amount of policy is generated by decisions made within agencies and 
bureaucracies. Bureaucracies often make key decisions, either because such decisions have 
been effectively ceded to them by default, or because making such decisions falls explicitly 
within their remit as laid down in applicable legislation. 
 
Beyond the contested bargaining process, and the very real power of the bureaucracy, another 
key concept in this type of analysis is that of bounded rationality. In the classical model the 
actor is always rational, and always chooses the best option for maximising their preferences 
after thoroughly evaluating every option available. However, this is not in fact how human 
decision-making really works. Always engaging in a perfectly rational, exhaustive and 
thorough evaluation of all choices is the kind of behaviour that we might expect from Spock 
of Star Trek fame, rather than a human being. Rather, the first 'good enough' option is usually 
chosen, often after a short and hasty period of evaluation. This system is known as satisficing, 
and it is largely driven by the fact that decision makers operate in real time, with limited 
opportunities to evaluate multiple options. As Hudson and Vore (1995: 211) put it, “People 
satisfice rather than optimize”. 
 
Hilsman presents a good example of this kind of analysis in his discussion of the chain of 
events within the US government that led to the dropping of the atomic bomb at the end of 
World War 2.  
 
Hilsman makes the initially counter-intuitive argument that the 'decision' to drop the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima was not really a 'national decision' at all, but rather the outcome of pure 
bureaucratic momentum and inertia. Within the logic of the US government at the time, once 
there was a bomb, the next logical action was to drop it. According to Hilsman there was no 
serious debate or consideration of the matter within the US government – the bomb had been 
constructed, so the next question was “Where to drop it?” as opposed to “Should we drop it?” 
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The building of the bomb was a matter for serious consideration that concluded with an 
important decision by President Roosevelt, whereas the use of the bomb was largely seen as a 
technical matter that was dealt with by a committee who spent most of their time considering 
the most appropriate location for its use
5 
(Hilsman 1990: 66 – 68). 
 
These two examples are instructive. They both neatly undermine the central decision maker 
hypothesis of the Rational Actor Model.  
 
With Hilsman's history of the decision to drop of the atomic bomb, we can see how 
bureaucratic inertia and momentum can simply carry through a certain course of action, in the 
absence of any clear higher level directives. 
 
2.4.1 Limitations of the bureaucratic policy process 
 
Having established the value of the bureaucratic policy process model, it is important to 
understand its limitations. Despite exciting analyses such as those by Hilsman and Allison, it 
is important not to overstate the explanatory value of this approach. As Iwanaga notes, "the 
bureaucratic model of decision making has suffered from a variety of critiques" (1993: 20).  
One of the first problems that arise is that this model has been developed and used extensively 
within an American context. Freedman points out that:  
 
"[A]nalysts examining other industrial countries will find this model extremely culture-
bound." (Freedman 1976: 436). This is a significant issue, which cannot be dismissed lightly. 
This paradigm cannot be transposed in an orderly or easy fashion, as large amounts of the 
work done in this field is only valid in its original context. Studies on, say, the culture of the 
US State Department have minimal relevance in a discussion of Japanese – South African 
relations. Consequently, using this model in a new context will require caution, and it will be 
necessary to be restrained about the conclusions that are developed using this approach. 
 
                                                 
5 Hilsman claims that “1 hour of a 6 hour session was devoted to the question of dropping bombs on 
Japan”(1990: 67). He then presents a potted history of the Manhattan Project in which he contrasts the 
'national decision' to make the bomb, which was characterized by vigorous discussion, lobbying and a final 
definitive decision by President Roosevelt with the almost perfunctory nature of the 'decision' (or non-
decision) on whether to drop the bomb (Hilsman 1990: 66 – 68).   
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It should be mentioned at this point that this element of the bureaucratic policy process has 
already been theoretically predicted by liberalism. As mentioned earlier, liberal theorists see 
the state as being subject to the various interest groups and organizations that comprise it. 
This emphasis on the sub-units that comprise the state means that liberal theorists necessarily 
vest a great deal of importance in understanding the specificities of any given state. 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that this same issue has emerged within the bureaucratic 
policy process. Specificity is a key element of the liberal paradigm and its sub-theories. 
 
Another issue is the bureaucratic policy model's disregard for the importance of executive 
decision-making. Although this critique has been developed within the American context, this 
issue undoubtedly carries over to other political systems. Even though bureaucracies must a) 
carry out executive decisions and b) sometimes get to make them (as Hilsman points out), the 
simple fact is that bureaucracies are not usually delegated to make key decisions in foreign 
policy matters. Indeed, as Iwanaga notes, it has been suggested that the more important the 
decision, the more likely it is to be directly a matter for the President (or other top decision 
maker). By contrast, bureaucrats usually have greater autonomy in less important matters 
(Iwanaga 1993: 22). 
 
Of course, Hilsman challenges this notion with his account of the 'decision' to drop the atomic 
bomb. However, it is possible to argue that this is not in fact an adequate counter-example. 
The 'decision' to drop the bomb became automatic because Roosevelt did not pay particular 
attention to the issue. It is precisely because the President did not intervene and make a 
"national decision" (Hilsman 1990: 66 - 68) that it became a matter for the bureaucracy. In 
effect, there was no 'national decision' because the President did not choose to make a second 
'national decision'. 
 
A second set of problems lies in the practicality of using this approach. In order to understand 
a decision or policy, the theory goes, we need to understand the bureaucracies involved in. 
However, gaining the kind of insight and understanding of these policies that will allow us to 
ascertain, with confidence, how the nature of these bureaucracies led to the nature of the 
policies involved is a challenging task. It requires deep insight into bureaucratic policies, 
cultures, objectives, agendas and interests. Ascertaining these is a complex task, and working 
from there to an explanation of specific policies and actions adds an entire new layer of 
complexity. 
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In order to handle these issues, it has been necessary to refrain from making overly definitive 
conclusions about the bureaucracies involved. Rather than attempting to ascertain 
bureaucratic agendas, objectives and interests, it has become necessary to consider 
bureaucratic dynamics. By this, I refer to the interactions, linkages and relationships between 
the different organizations involved. Additionally, by understanding their stated priorities and 
how they intend on pursuing them, it becomes possible to learn about these bureaucracies 
without overreaching in the conclusions that can be developed about them. 
 
2.5 Model 1: Japan as the reactive state 
 
It is necessary to preface this discussion of the “reactive state” model of Japan by briefly 
explaining its genesis within the liberal paradigm.  Naturally, the debate over Japan as a 
reactive or proactive state does not entirely fall within the liberal theoretical paradigm.  Potter 
and Sueo (2003: 321) cite Green (2001), for example, as weighing in on the debate with the 
conclusion that Japanese foreign policy is that of reluctant realism.  
 
However, the explanations for Japan's reactivity, as put forward by Kent Calder, owe a great 
deal to liberal models of the state and its institutions. As mentioned previously, liberal 
theorists often view the state as a complex array of actors and forces, which seek to control 
the state apparatus for their own ends (Moravcsik 2008: 518). Consequently, many of the 
explanations for Japan's alleged reactivity bear a strong liberal institutionalist flavour, and this 
results in the location of this theory within the liberal paradigm. Calder's method is fairly 
clear – he observes a phenomenon (Japan's reactivity) and he seeks explanations for it within 
Japan's institutions and internal politics. 
 
In the scholarly literature, one of the most powerful explanatory theories of Japanese foreign 
policy is that put forward by Calder of Japan as a reactive state. In a discussion of Japanese 
economic policy, Calder characterises the reactive state as responding to external pressure or 
gaiatsu, rather than generating its own initiatives due to its own strategic impulses. 
Specifically, "the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy 
initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to 
outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely" 
(Calder 1988: 519). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 35 
 
 
Calder is not claiming that Japan never acts strategically, or that it acts without concern for its 
own interests. However, he is arguing that Japan very rarely generates any major initiatives. 
Rather, it waits until external events or pressures require it to respond. Calder notes that small 
European and East Asian states are often seen as reactive, but that Japan is a significant 
outlier – its historical and demographic profile, in Calder's view, is closer to that of states such 
as Germany, rather than Austria or Taiwan. In a careful comparison, he notes that “the 
Japanese state has been consistently more cautious in taking international initiatives than most 
major European governments” (Calder 1988: 520). Consequently, its hesitation to combine its 
demographic and economic strength into forceful international diplomacy was a source of 
some confusion for observers of Japan's trajectory through the Cold War. Indeed, during the 
1970s and 1980s it appeared possible that Japan was about to begin forging an aggressive, 
independent path, and would emerge as a world power, with a substantially larger military 
and possibly even nuclear weapons. However, despite being one of the largest world 
economies for some decades, Japan has never made such a transition. 
 
Calder does acknowledge that this general lack of initiative is offset by a certain flexibility, 
which allows Japan to respond when external pressures become significant. This is facilitated 
by the existence of 'cross-cutting interests' in which domestic groups make alliances with 
international groups. Calder cites Japanese flexibility over trade negotiations with the US as 
support for this notion. "On the one hand, it finds independent initiatives difficult. Yet, on the 
other hand, it is often pragmatically flexible under outside pressure" (Calder 1988: 537). 
 
It is important to note that Calder's explanation of the reactive state is centred on Japanese 
foreign economic policy. However, the concept of Japan as a reactive state has gained 
popularity among analysts in the field, with papers being written on various aspects of Japan 
as a reactive state in fields such as maritime strategy (Manicom 2010) and bilateral relations 
with Vietnam (Hirata 1998). Indeed, as Hirata notes “The dominant view of Japan's 
international behavior is that it is essentially reactivist” (Hirata 1998: 1). At this stage it is 
worth noting that not all analysts are entirely convinced by Calder's account of Japan's 
reactive state – indeed, Hirata (1998) specifically challenges the notion that Japan is 
particularly reactive in its relations with Vietnam, arguing that Japanese policy only shifted 
from an initial period of proactivity to a reactive mode due to pressure from the United States. 
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In a more recent discussion of Japan's foreign policy, Calder (2003: 606) lists four major 
explanations for it being a reactive state. The first three are all internal to Japan, and are 
essentially variations on the theme of political culture and institutions giving rise to Japanese 
foreign policy being reactive. The last is external, in that it claims that Japan's reactive nature 
is a product of its environment.  
 
The first explanation holds that, following the brutal defeat of Japan in World War 2, 
Japanese popular sentiment towards international relations has becoming retiring and pacifist, 
eschewing an assertive, major international role. 
 
The second is institutionalist, and it points to the Japanese Constitution and the structure of 
the military as the major causes for Japan's lack of international assertiveness. 
 
The "third, constructivist school of interpretation provides a hybrid explanation, emphasizing 
institutionalized norms that allegedly determine the parameters of foreign-policy behavior and 
domestic foreign-policy debates" (Calder 2003: 606). 
 
Finally, the last argument that Calder presents is partially external to Japan, in that it holds 
that the international environment keeps Japan from undertaking major initiatives, in 
conjunction with the institutionalist argument noted earlier (Calder 2003: 607). 
 
Clearly, a significant number of the conventional explanations involve Japanese institutions 
and society. What, then, are these institutions, and how do they keep Japan in a reactive state? 
According to Calder, one of the most important domestic causes for Japan being a reactive 
state is that "the fragmented character of state authority in Japan makes decisive action more 
difficult than in countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States or Fifth-
Republic France" (Calder 1988: 528).  
 
Calder acknowledges the power of MITI and the Ministry of Finance (1988: 529), but argues 
that this is limited to specific areas where they have clear authority and technical proficiency. 
By contrast, "on broad, complex questions of economic management...ministerial jurisdiction 
is often unclear, and internal conflict over how to proceed is often strong" (Calder 1988: 529). 
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One of the major elements of the constructivist explanation lies in the Japanese electoral 
system. The Japanese electoral system is designed in such a fashion that it favours politicians 
who can consistently cobble together small groups of supporters into an alliance. This makes 
it crucial that politicians remain responsive to their electorates, and encourages politicians to 
forge alliances with interest groups. Calder explains that 
 
"Japan's system of medium size electoral districts forces as many as five members of the 
largest political parties...to run against one another in the same electoral district; thus, 
extremely small shifts in the total vote become critical to a candidate's election 
prospects. As a result, LDP legislators tend to be highly sensititive to constituency 
pressure, especially from relatively well-organized grassroots pressure groups such as 
agriculture and small businesses" (Calder 1988: 530 – 531). 
 
This issue abuts directly onto a second but related cause, which is the limited foreign policy 
expertise of top politicians. As noted, the most prominent and powerful Japanese politicians 
tend to specialise in domestic politics and interest groups. This effect naturally becomes 
prominent at the Prime Ministerial level, with most incumbents having limited foreign policy 
expertise. 
 
As mentioned previously, the last reason put forward for Japanese reactivity involves its 
external environment. This is not exclusively external to Japanese politics – rather, "it is the 
degree of stability that prevails in the world surrounding Japan, and how favorable the actions 
of major foreign powers such as the United States and China are to Japanese interests" 
(Calder 2003: 607) in conjunction with the fact that "Japanese institutions are so poorly suited 
for proactive foreign policy" (Calder 2003: 607) that results in Japan maintaining its reactive 
state. As a result, this claim cannot be said to be purely external, but rather another hybrid 
school of thought – it is Japan's environment, in conjunction with its institutional inertia, that 
results in its reactivity.   
 
Calder assesses Japan's continued existence as a reactive state in a more recent paper, written 
in 2003. He argues that Japan is in a transitional period, and that the reactive state has come 
under pressure. Among other causes for this he argues that "A new electoral system, in place 
since 1994, is giving politicians strong incentives to cultivate broad popular support, and to do 
so through active foreign-policy initiatives" (Calder 2003: 611). 
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In this vein Calder points to various Japanese initiatives as examples of deviations from the 
reactive state. For example, Japan is the single largest aid donor in Asia, and was the first 
country to resume development assistance to China post-Tiananmen Square, despite US 
unhappiness over this. Additionally, Japan attempted to start an Asian Monetary Fund in 
1997, although this intitiative was abandoned as a result of pressure from the US (Calder 
2003: 611 – 612). 
 
He argues that despite these failures of national government led foreign policy initiatives, 
NGO, local government and big business foreign policy initiatives have been somewhat more 
successful. 
 
However, Calder concludes that despite these developments, and despite the transitional 
nature of Japanese politics, "the dominant pattern in Japan’s relations with Asia at the national 
level remains a more futile one of reactive diplomacy and stalled initiatives" (Calder 2003: 
614). 
 
This is primarily for domestic reasons. "Just as the reactive-state literature has long 
maintained, the important remaining constraints on Japanese diplomacy, as the burden of 
history recedes, are Japan’s own domestic institutions" (Calder 2003: 614). 
 
However, this is not to dismiss the importance of US pressure: 
 
"U.S. diplomacy can usually forestall Japanese initiatives and force Japan back into the 
paradigm of the reactive state, to the extent that the United States moves to preempt or 
to oppose nascent Japanese initiatives...Where U.S. opposition is absent, however, it is 
much easier and more attractive politically for Japan today to become more proactive 
than usual" (Calder 2003: 615 – 616). 
 
If read correctly, the reactive state literature is convincing, although it has come under attack 
by various analysts as being incomplete or inadequate. For example, Hirata (1998) argues that 
while the reactive model is valid some of the time, it has been overused, and fails to 
adequately deal with counter-examples. 
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“The main problem with the reactivist model is its premise that changes in Japanese foreign 
policy occur only as a result of gaiatsu
6
. This model neglects proactive policy initiatives by 
Japan and instead postulates that the reactive, passive, minimalist style prevails at all times 
any places. Previous studies, however, prove that Japan does indeed take indigenous initiative 
to pursue its interests” (Hirata 1998: 6). 
 
Hirata's criticism in this area is, perhaps, somewhat harsh. A model of Japan as a reactive 
state does not have to hold that Japan is always reactive, all the time. Indeed, Calder laces his 
discussion of his model with caveats (Calder 1989). It is perfectly coherent to view Japan as a 
mostly reactive, or usually reactive, without denying the existence of interruptions to, or 
departures from the reactive state. 
 
Of more consequence, perhaps, is Hirata's argument that 
 
“Another significant problem of the reactivist model is its failure to clearly delineate 
Japanese foreign policy at times when Japan does not face gaiatsu, particularly from the 
United States” (Hirata 1998: 7). 
 
This critique is perhaps more convincing, given that while Japan does undoubtedly come 
under pressure from the US, this is not always the case. Attempting to account for Japan's 
foreign policies and actions in areas where the US is not involved may require looking further 
afield for other theoretical models. TICAD presents a particular case. Although past Japanese 
aid projects have been notionally linked to its role in the US led Cold War alliance
7
, it is not 
clear at all that current Japanese aid is tied to US aspirations or projects on the continent. 
 
Aside from Hirata, there are additional challenges to the reactive model, many of them 
coming from the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Potter and Sueo (2003) summarise some of 
the key challenges in their paper “Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive?” Among 
others, they cite scholars such as Hirata (1998), Hook et al (2001), Green (2001), Yeung 
(2001), and Miyashita and Sato (2001) as posing various challenges to the reactive state 
thesis. After reviewing these challenges, they consider a few alternative explanations for 
                                                 
6 As noted previously, gaiatsu means external pressure. 
7 Morikawa (1997: 13) sees Japanese aid efforts in Africa in relation to the Cold War and the general effort to 
'win' African countries from the Communist bloc. Sono (1993) contests this notion. 
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Japanese foreign policy, ranging from Green's reluctant realism (2001), to quiet diplomacy 
(Hook et al 2001) to indirect leadership (Blechinger and Legewie 2000). 
 
Many of the complaints of the 'proactive' school are similar to those advanced by Hirata.  
 
However, perhaps the one major thread that can be discerned is that these arguments often 
emphasise Japanese leadership in Asia as being different from that of the US hegemon, but by 
no means non-existent. These authors emphasise modes of Japanese diplomacy such as 
building consensus, quiet diplomacy behind the scenes and multilateralism.  For example, 
Potter and Sueo select the following passage written by Dennis Yasutomo to highlight this: 
 
“Japanese multilateral diplomacy in the late 1990s, though low-key, is not stagnant. We 
can still identify activism. The question is whether this activism constitutes leadership. 
If we define leadership as setting the international agenda and establishing the rules of 
the game, Japan has a long way to go. However, it can try to establish footholds in 
niches such as multilateral institutions, the Asian region, and the environment"  
(Yasutomo 1995: 145 quoted in Potter and Sueo 2003: 319). 
 
However, despite these various explanations – including one from Green that holds that Japan 
is in fact pursuing a realist policy, albeit haltingly – Potter and Sueo note that there appears to 
be a clear consensus that Japan has not embarked on a path involving a vigorous and unified 
foreign policy . This is for two reasons. The first is financial: 
 
"The enormous loss of domestic economic resources and the pressures created 
by massive official debt mean that there are fewer official economic resources to 
commit to foreign policy objectives, especially in the case of foreign aid. Japan lost its 
prestige position as the top bilateral donor to the USA in 2001, for the first time in a 
decade, a change with significance beyond development assistance itself." (Potter and 
Sueo 2003: 328) 
 
Potter and Sueo note that this goes beyond merely constraining the amount of resources that 
can be applied to foreign policy. In their account, Japan has lost a great deal of prestige since 
the East Asian Miracle has been called into doubt. As is noted in Chapter 3, TICAD 
documentation holds up the Japanese model of development as a role model for developing 
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nations, but the longstanding stagnation of Japan's economy naturally makes such calls seem 
less than convincing. 
 
The second reason is that Japan still lacks any clear domestic sources for a vigorous and 
unified foreign policy.  The institutional and domestic issues that Calder and others have 
expounded upon in such depth still remain. Without changes in these factors, Japanese foreign 
policy will remain at best hindered, and at worst, paralysed. 
 
Naturally, the reactive – proactive debate is not the only school of thought on Japanese 
foreign policy.  There are alternative explanations for, and models of Japan's general foreign 
policy stance. The next model comes from the realist school of thought, and seeks to recast 
Japan's military diffidence as a result of its focus on economic might, rather than an 
abandonment of the independent pursuit of power. 
 
2.6 Model 2: Japan as a neo-mercantilist state 
 
As Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) point out, Japan's reactive state presents a challenge to 
structural or neo-realists, given its refusal to develop a military capability commensurate with 
its economic and technological status. They systematically undermine the structual realist 
model's applicability to Japan by dint of appeal to multiple counter-examples demonstrating 
that Japan has failed to develop a significant autonomous military capability. The implication 
of this failure to develop the military is significant. As Heginbotham and Samuel explain, 
according to structural realists "States prefer to maintain independent military capabilities" 
(1998: 174). In an anarchic environment, states that are capable of doing so prefer to forge 
their own militaries instead of relying upon their allies. After all, allies can potentially defect, 
and even the closest alliance can fracture or be found wanting in a crisis. In an uncertain 
world, a state can only truly rely on its own capabilities.   
 
However, Heginbotham and Samuels are not challenging the structural realist argument in 
order to generate a constructivist or institutionalist account of Japan's reactive nature. Nor are 
they abandoning the realist paradigm altogether in order to develop an argument sited within a 
liberalist or critical theory space. Rather, they make the case for an alternative realist model, 
that of mercantile realism. In mercantile realism, economic strength and the maintenance of 
domestic manufacturing and an industrial base are the key goals of the state, which are often 
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pursued instead of greater military power. They argue that Japan has followed this strategy 
and has essentially abandoned military force as a major part of its strategic toolbox. They 
make this argument by appeal to a discussion of Japan's pursuit of close economic ties with 
China, despite the fact that China poses a potential military threat to Japan, as highlighted by 
perennial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, and the anti-Japanese rhetoric that inevitably 
follows.  
 
There is certainly recent empirical evidence supporting their assertions that Japan has 
simultaneously pursued close economic ties with China, despite territorial disputes. Since 
Heginbotham and Samuels wrote their paper, Japanese – Chinese trade has not slacked off, 
and neither have the geopolitical disputes. As Calder (2003: 609) notes: "Following China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001, Japanese manufacturing 
investment began surging into China in unprecedented fashion, centering on the auto 
industry." Indeed, it would appear that this pattern has continued since then, with a major re-
emergence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue in 2012. China has also utilised its control of 
global rare earth metal supplies to exert pressure on Japan, with a temporary ban on exports of 
rare earth metals to Japan in 2010 (Armstrong 2011).  
 
The Japanese government has responded to this Chinese manoeuvre by drafting a strategy that 
calls for seeking alternative supplies of rare earth metals in locations such as Africa and India, 
but despite this, there is no evidence that Japanese corporations are generally seeking to 
decrease their investments in China, or that Japanese policymakers intend on substanially 
decoupling the two economies. In fact, in 2011 Japanese FDI to China surged dramatically, by 
"nearly 50 per cent" (Dickie 2012). 
 
This surge in investment took place after the Chinese engaged in rare metal production cuts 
due to the Senkaku Islands dispute, which provides supporting evidence for Heginbotham and 
Samuels' claim that Japanese policymakers do not generally seek to limit trade with China, 
despite geopolitical rivalries.  
 
By contrast, when it comes to the United States, Heginbotham and Samuels argue that Japan 
maintains protectionist policies and trade barriers even when they risk harming their military 
alliance. Heginbotham and Samuels conclude their discussion of this phenomenon by stating 
that 
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"From the beginning of the U.S. occupation in 1945 until today, Japanese strategists have 
been more willing to accept U.S. military on their soil than they have U.S. bankers or 
manufacturers" (Heginbotham and Samuel 1998: 200). 
 
This mercantile realism is perhaps the most significant realist perspectives on Japan's 
involvement in Africa, and it serves to provide a significant, alternative perspective to 
Calder's reactive state. Indeed, other analysts such as Nester (1991) have argued that: 
 
 “Japan's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa provides a textbook case study of its foreign 
policy toward every developing region.' Tokyo has followed a "neomercantilist" strategy of 
concentrating on securing Japan's regional geoeconomic interests while skirting any 
political entanglements…The result is a classic dependency relationship whereby the 
African country increasingly relies on Japanese goods, services, and capital for its 
economic livelihood, while Tokyo minimizes its own potential dependence on that country 
by spreading its economic bets across the developing world” (Nester 1991: 31). 
 
Where reactive state proponents generally see Japan as a being constrained by its internal 
institutions and political culture, realists in fact argue that it is still operating under the age old 
precepts of power-seeking and fear of its peers. However, they have recast 'power' as a matter 
of economic, rather than military might. 
 
2.7 Model 3: Japan as a middle power 
 
The last perspective on Japanese foreign policy is that of middlepowership. Robert Cox 
(1989)
8
 appropriates notions first developed by John Holmes in relation to Canada's role as a 
'middle power'. Holmes argued that while nations such as the US and the Soviet Union had 
dominated the creation of the post-war international order, Canada had also been a role player 
in this system, and had influenced the state of the post-war international order in specific 
ways, most notably through supporting the establishment of mechanisms that would regulate 
and harmonise global relations in order to allow them to pursue their interests. This notion is 
perhaps best encapsulated by Cox' argument that: 
                                                 
8  This perspective on Japan as a middle power is not unique to Cox, and Japan has been depicted as a middle 
power by other scholars such as Yoshihide Soeya (2012, 2005). 
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"International organization is a process, not a finality, and international law is one of its 
most important products. The middle power's interest is to support this process, whether 
in the context of a hegemonic order or (even more vitally) in the absence of hegemony" 
(Cox 1989: 826 – 827). 
 
It should be noted that for Cox this process can be clearly distinguished from the way in 
which hegemons seek to impose their will on the world. As he explains, “Commitment to the 
process of building a more orderly world system is quite different from seeking to impose an 
ideologically preconceived vision of the ideal world order” (Cox 1989: 827). 
 
This distinction is important, for this particular discussion of Japan as a middle power can 
only clearly be understood in the context of Cox’ occupation with hegemony and world order 
as concepts within neo-Gramscian thought.   
 
As a neo-Gramscian and critical theorist, Cox considers Japan as a potential middle power in 
order to ask how such a middle power might challenge hegemony within the current world 
system.  In order to construct a ‘post-hegemonic world’, Cox argues that certain ‘normative 
goals’ need to be attained: “(1) greater social equity and (2) a greater diffusion of power” 
(1989: 834) 
 
Where a hegemon seeks to mould world order to become aligned with its interests, middle 
powers are somewhat more modest – they wish to carve out a niche in this hegemony within 
which they can operate safely. International law is of value to middle powers because it 
creates a space within which they can operate and advocate for their own interests, without 
directly challenging powerful states that outstrip them in military and economic might (Cox 
1989: 824). 
 
Cox claims that middlepowership comes with certain requirements: 
 
"An ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a 
sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness 
and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world 
system are the critical elements for the fulfilment of the middle-power role" (Cox 1989: 
826 – 827). 
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It is important to distinguish between Cox' notion of middlepowership as a matter of 
behaviour and goals, as opposed to middlepowership as a matter of size, wealth and concrete 
capabilities. 
 
As Cornelissen notes: 
  
“One approach to middlepowership lays emphasis on its enumerative components: a 
middle power is one that possesses a certain level of military and economic capability 
and on an international scale, occupies a middling position.  A second, contrasting 
approach defines middle powers by what they do and their role in the international 
system, rather than by what they are.  It accentuates in other words the behavioural 
aspects of states (Hamill and Lee, 2001)” (Cornelissen 2004: 4). 
 
In this case, Cox is quite clearly taking the second approach. While he does discuss Japan's 
candidature as a middle power as a function of its military power and wealth, he in fact argues 
that Japanese capabilities are not in line with middlepowership  – it is too rich and, in his 
estimation, too militarily powerful for this (1989: 837)
9
. Indeed, Cox goes so far as to say that 
“By no standard of capabilities can Japan be considered in the middle range” (Cox, 1989: 
837).  
 
Despite this, Cox (1989: 838) believes that Japan clearly has potential as a middle power. He 
believes that that the fundamental determinant of Japanese middlepowership (or otherwise) 
lies in its development assistance, United Nations initiatives and involvement in regional 
conflict resolution.  
 
This is visible in two respects. The first is its lack of commitment to a significant military 
force. Japan's distancing from major conflicts is readily apparent, as the earlier discussion of 
its defensive military posture and limited direct involvement in the Gulf War demonstrate so 
clearly. The second is in its commitment and interest in international institutions (Cox 1989: 
                                                 
9 Cox goes into some detail over how different accounting systems result in different values for Japanese 
military expenditure. I would argue that while Japan's military capabilities are quite large, this is almost 
incidental. This capability is more a function of Japan's wealth and technological sophistication rather than 
any coherent attempts at constructing significant military capabilities. 1% of GDP is a relatively small 
amount to spend on the military, but if that GDP is extremely large – as in Japan's case – then a powerful 
military is the ultimate result. 
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837). Perhaps the best general evidence for Japan's status as a middle power lies in its United 
Nations initiatives. Japan's record of United Nations activism and its relevance to Japanese 
diplomacy in Africa is briefly discussed in the literature review of this thesis, and is taken up 
by Cornelissen (2004) in her discussion of Japan as a middle power in relation to its African 
foreign policy. For the sake of this discussion it is enough to note that Japan has consistently 
dedicated a significant amount of diplomatic effort to improving its position in the United 
Nations, particularly in its attempts to secure a position on the United Nations Security 
Council. 
 
Additionally, Japan's contributions to international development assistance have been 
historically  significant. Indeed, during the 1980s it led the world in expenditure on 
humanitarian aid and development assistance (Cox 1989: 838).  Again, Cornelissen takes this 
up in her consideration of Japan's middle power role in Africa. 
 
However, in contrast to Japan's contribution to international institutions, and its distancing 
itself from major modern conflicts, Japan's autonomy from the United States is perhaps more 
questionable. Indeed, as Cox points out, this is also one of the debates that has emerged in 
relation to Canada's status as a so-called 'middle power', with one school seeing Canada as a 
satellite state, while another stresses Canadian autonomy  (Cox 1989: 824). 
 
Certainly, during the Cold War Japan was very firmly aligned with the US, and while it does 
not always accquiesce to US demands, its reluctance to embark on independent initiatives, as 
spoken of by Calder, is a significant problem for its status as a middle power. It is debatable 
whether Japan has yet attained the neccessary independence to exert the middle power role 
that Cox speaks of. Some Japanese aid initiatives such as TICAD could certainly be seen as 
an attempt to fulfill this role. Their effectiveness in this regard is unclear, however. 
 
Cox concludes his paper by engaging in a long discussion of the changes in Japanese political 
culture that would have to take place in order for Japan to truly embrace a role as a middle 
power. He generally concurs with the notion that at the time of writing Japan had not 
demonstrated enough independence from the US in constructing its foreign policy, and argues 
that ultimately, 
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“For Japan to embrace middlepowermanship would require a transformation in its 
political culture, a repoliticization of Japanese society. Past experience seems to negate 
this possibility” (Cox 1989: 856). 
 
The implications of this should be noted. At the time of writing, Cox was not proposing that 
Japan has effectively or entirely taken up a middle power position. Rather, he held that in 
certain aspects it conformed to the behaviour expected of a middle power, while in others it 
had not yet taken up the mantle of middlepowership. 
 
Cornelissen (2004) adopts Cox' concept of middlepowership and attempts to apply it in the 
realm of Japanese foreign policy in Africa. Cornelissen does so in an attempt to break free of 
the reactive – proactive debate.  Arguing that “looking at Japanese foreign policy by the 
degree of proactivism or reactivism it exhibits does not provide sufficient understanding of 
the nature and motivations of Japan’s engagement with the African continent” (2004: 12), she 
turns to middlepowership in search of an explanatory model. Cornelissen makes the claim that 
Japanese actions in Africa are in line with middlepowership in that they fall in line with 
conception of a middle power as a catalyst, or a creator of new norms and values within the 
international system. According to her, Japanese initiatives on the continent can be seen as a 
middle power initiative in two ways, both fall of which within Japanese development 
assistance efforts. The first is in how Japanese ODA attempts to promote notions of the 'Asian 
miracle' as a development model for Africa and the rest of the developing world. The second 
lies in the Japanese promotion of notions of 'ownership' and 'self-help' within their 
development assistance programmes (Cornelissen 2004). 
 
2. 8 Application and synthesis 
 
Thus, we can see three different models of Japanese foreign policy, springing from different 
theoretical perspectives. Conveniently enough, these models each fall into the different 
paradigms. The reactive state borrows heavily from liberal theory, particularly in its stress on 
internal institutions such as the Constitution, and the importance of sub-national interest 
groups and the political system in forming a seemingly passive foreign policy. The neo-
mercantilist state speaks to notions of realism and, indeed, was developed by realists who 
were dissatisfied by the way in which conventional realist accounts explained (or failed to 
explain) Japan's overall foreign policy stance. Finally, the middle-power notion, although not 
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initially clearly part of critical theory, has been developed in relation to Japan, by Robert Cox, 
one of the pre-eminent critical theorists in the person of. Thinkers such as Soeya (2005, 2012) 
and Cornelissen (2004) have also adopted the notion of Japan as a middlepower. However, 
Cox’s emphasis on hegemony, and middlepowership as an alternative to hegemony, suggests 
that in relation to Japan this model can be thought of as a critical theorist perspective.  
 
The first two models are perhaps the most immediate, in the sense that they attempt to explain 
Japanese foreign policy to date whereas Cox' original account of Japanese middlepowership is 
more of a prediction than an explanation. However, Cornelissen's deployment of this concept 
in contemporary Africa adds explanatory heft to the notion of Japan as a middle power.  
 
Applying the logic of these different theoretical notions to Japanese – South African relations 
is an extremely complex project. To begin with, it must be made clear that the analyses in this 
thesis are conducted using the bureaucratic policy process model. This is not because the 
other paradigms are ineffective, but because parsimony requires a perspective that results in 
limited variables and considerations. There are many elements of Japanese-South African 
relations that resonate with the different theoretical constructs presented above. Mineral 
exploration and mining is often discussed from a neo-mercantilist perspective, as in the 
analysis by Van Der Spuy and Glinzler (2003). Aid initiatives such as the Tokyo Conference 
for International Development (TICAD) could be seen as a departure from the reactive state, 
or, alternatively, as an example of Japan rising to the challenge of middlepowership. 
 
Even when this level of parsimony is applied, the project remains complex. Despite this, a 
few notions can be immediately carried through and applied. Firstly, if we accept the 
implications of the bureaucratic policy model, it would appear that what exists between Japan 
and South Africa is not simply a bilateral relationship between two perfectly unified entities. 
Rather, we have complex relationships between two allied groups of organizations. 
 
To continue Hilsman's earlier 'box' metaphor, what do we find inside the South African and 
Japanese boxes? 
 
Within the South African government there is the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, and the Department of Trade and Industry. Similarly, within the Japanese 
government, there are several different organizations. At the level of government Ministries, 
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foreign affairs of state are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), while trade 
and the economy fall under the purview of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI). When operating abroad, MOFA and METI both occupy space within the Japanese 
Embassy.  
 
Aid is handled by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) while the Japan 
External Trade Organization (JETRO) attempts to promote Japanese trade relations, and 
Foreign Direct Investment into Japan. JICA and JETRO operate as independent government 
agencies, receiving funding and direction from various Ministries, but not operating as direct 
subordinates of them. All these organizations come equipped with their own goals, priorities 
and operating styles.  
 
The earlier example of the way in which the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb was so strongly 
framed by institutional concerns is highly suggestive. It is anticipated that, just as in these 
cases, South African and Japanese bureaucracies have their own institutional ideas, agendas, 
interests and approaches that strongly impact on the relationship between the two countries. 
Decisions and policies are at least partially made as a result of the particular inter-agency 
dynamics and contests. 
 
Indeed, Schwartz' account of the bureaucracies within the Japanese government strongly 
supports this notion. According to him “[T]he Japanese bureaucracy is riven by 
sectionalism...with their compartmentalized structure (tatewari gyosei, or “vertical 
administration”) every bureau, division and section jealously protects its jurisdiction over 
some particular policy domain.” (Schwartz 1998:20) 
 
He then quotes Muramatsu Micho as stating that “What actually exists is not bureaucracy, but 
bureaucracies...The interests of every ministry and agency are different, and they participate 
on the stage of political competition.” (Schwartz 1998: 20) 
 
According to Schwartz this territorial mentality has been particularly inflamed by an increase 
in “broad, complex problems that straddle or fall outside traditional administrative 
boundaries, sparking heated turf battles” (Schwartz 1998: 20). Citing a litany of cases, he 
argues that these conflicts and factionalism have actually weakened the bureaucracies within 
the government system. Politicians have managed to seize the opportunities presented by 
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playing different bureaucracies off against each other in these turf wars (Schwartz 1998: 20 – 
21). 
 
This discussion of factionalism within the Japanese government resonates strongly with 
Allison's account of policy as the result of a contested bargaining process. This is particularly 
interesting because it would suggest that the theory of the bureaucratic policy process does in 
fact correspond with findings in the field.  
 
Within the context of this study, this kind of topic will have to be approached gingerly, and 
with care. Certainly, any conclusions must be made with caution. However, it may be 
possible, through careful inquiry, to probe the question of whether there are indeed any 
divisions between different Japanese government bureaucracies within South Africa. 
Conversely, the same inquiries may be made of the DTI and Dirco. How unified are they in 
generating policy and carrying out their mandates? To what level do they seek to actively co-
ordinate policy? 
 
On a similar note, different organizations within the same government often see different 
aspects of any given issue. Applying this to the situation at hand, it becomes clear that in 
order to understand where, say, the DTI stands on Japanese relations with South Africa, it is 
very important to understand their position within the South African government, their 
priorities and mission, and how this relates to their specific positions on Japan as a trading 
partner. It is important not to make assumptions, such as “Because Japan is a major trading 
partner, they are important to the DTI.” The DTI is no doubt cognizant of Japan's relative 
importance as a trade partner, and as a result they may strongly prioritize closer relations with 
Japan. On the other hand, they may see Japan as a long term stable trading partner that is no 
longer in need of particular cultivation. If the DTI is busy prioritizing China as the 'next big 
thing', they may be generally leaving the questions of closer ties with Japan to Dirco or other 
parties. 
 
Similarly, it is important to understand the nature of JICA's relationship with its counterparts 
and co-agencies, and how JICA's internal priorities affect their position on South Africa. 
Again, this requires close study and developing significant insight into the organizations 
involved. 
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Another issue for consideration is that of the relationship of bureaucracies to elite decision 
makers. As mentioned earlier, the prominence and relevance of bureaucracies in the decision-
making is often seen in contrast or in tension with that of elite decision-makers. Where 
executive power is prominent, the relevance of bureaucrats recedes, and vice versa. 
 
As a result, inquiry into this element of the relationship may also prove fruitful. How do the 
different bureaucrats and diplomats view their relationship to elites? How much intervention 
by the executive branches of the respective governments is there in South African – Japanese 
relationships? How does this affect the autonomy and effectiveness of the bureaucracies 
involved? 
 
Perhaps one of the chief theoretical debates is that between the “reactive state” and the 
“mercantile realist” perspectives on Japan's activities. This is particularly relevant in South 
Africa, where Japan has a long history of seeking natural resources to fuel its domestic 
manufacturing economy. Historically this has been a significant issue, with an extensive 
debate over Japan's role in Africa during colonial times, and its relationship to the Apartheid 
regime. Examination of the evidence may well lead to some revelations in this regard. 
 
An additional theoretical issue that may be worth inquiring into is that of the limitations to the 
reactive state. Calder (2003) mentioned initiatives by Japan that appear to represent departures 
from the reactive state. The TICAD process and JICA's aid activities may be fresh examples 
of the reactive state beginning to give way to a new mode of activity. Alternatively, they 
could be considered in the light of Japan as a middle power. Indeed, at first glance the 
generation of new forms of discourse and dialogue that has been one of the results of TICAD 
seems to resonate with the conception of middle power states as generating new international 
norms and practises. 
 
2.9 Concluding remarks 
 
In conclusion, the theoretical toolbox for examining Japanese foreign policy is well stocked, 
and there are a plethora of paradigms, perspectives and models that can be applied. This 
chapter has reviewed the chief paradigms in International Relations (Liberalism, Realism and 
Critical theory) and placed the chief explanatory models for Japanese foreign policy within 
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these paradigms. In addition, the chapter has explained the pertinence and value of the 
bureaucratic policy process model, which will be the central theoretical framework of this 
thesis. Reference to specific models of Japanese foreign policy, such as the reactive state and 
neo-mercantilism will be made from time to time as particular elements of these theories 
resonate with the findings of the thesis. However, this thesis does not seek to explain all its 
findings in terms of any one of these models. The key analytical map for this thesis will be the 
bureaucratic policy process model. However, despite its value, it is a demanding and complex 
method of analysis. Consequently, while it will be used as the central theoretical framework 
of this thesis, it has been necessary to apply it as a general guide to the process of 
understanding South African and Japanese bureaucracies, rather than a rigid and unyielding 
formula.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review – Japanese engagement with South Africa 
 
This chapter begins by providing a brief history of the Japanese economy and foreign policy, 
from World War 2 onwards. Next, this chapter discusses the literature on Japanese-South 
African relations, beginning with historical accounts of the relationship. Tracing diplomatic 
and trade relationships from their earliest precursors, it examines the ambivalence and 
complexities that marked Japanese – African relations during the Cold War. Historically, this 
debate is generally oriented around the morality and expediency of Japan's role in South 
Africa. On the one hand, analysts such as Jun Morikawa see Japan as collaborating with 
colonial powers and contributing to the survival of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. On 
the other hand, writers such as Masako Osada and Themba Sono see Japan in a more benign 
light, arguing that its responses were driven by economic necessity. Of course, these 
viewpoints are not mutually exclusive, but the general debate over the morality of Japan's 
actions remains. Broadly, it can be seen that Morikawa is Japan's fiercest critic, while Sono 
defends its record in Africa. Osada holds roughly the middle ground in this debate, although 
she leans towards the argument that Japan acted out of economic necessity.  
 
Moving on from these historical debates, this review unpacks the dimensions of Japanese 
post-Cold War policy in Africa, particularly as this is expressed through the Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development.  Finally, this chapter discusses post-
Apartheid ties between South Africa and Japan, in particular the ways in which the 
relationship between Japan and South Africa shifted following the end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of Apartheid.  
 
3.1 Japanese foreign policy: A brief history 
 
Following its defeat in World War 2, Japan was occupied by the United States for seven 
years. During the course of the Occupation the victorious Allies implemented significant 
reforms. Notably, Japan was left with a pacifist Constitution that banned the maintenance of a 
standing military and prohibited stationing any troops abroad. Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution reads: 
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“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”  (1946: 
Chapter 2) 
 
Although imposed by an outside power, pacifism was not an unpopular proposition in Japan. 
Following the devastation of World War 2, the Japanese populace was generally eager to 
avoid future military conflict, and anti-militarism has remained a popular sentiment in 
Japanese political culture (Berger 1993). 
 
The Occupation ended with the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952. From this point on, Japanese 
foreign policy was largely dominated by its relationship with the US. Instead of breaking with 
the US and forging an independent path, Japan opted for a role as a junior partner within the 
US-led alliance during the Cold War. Under the US security umbrella the Japanese 
government bent its efforts towards rebuilding and developing its economy, while 
maintaining an extremely truncated military force.
10
 In order to keep its place beneath the US 
security umbrella, Japan agreed to provide and fund bases for US troops. This approach is 
often referred to as the Yoshida doctrine, after Yoshida Shigeru, an early post-War Prime 
Minister of Japan, and a major figure in Japanese political history (Tang 2007: 118 – 119). 
 
This approach paid dividends, with the Japanese economy growing at a phenomenal rate from 
the 1950s to the 1970s. As the economist Takatoshi Ito notes, "at the height of the postwar 
miracle, Japan's real GDP expanded four fold in fifteen years, from 1958 to 1973" (Ito 1996: 
206). In the early 1970s Japan's 'miracle' came under pressure due to the “Nixon shock” 
caused by the US leaving the Bretton Woods gold standard, followed by the oil shock of 
1973. Sinha points out that:  
 
                                                 
10 Despite Article 9 banning any standing military force, Japan does have the Japanese Self Defence Force 
(JSDF). It is equipped with a broad array of military hardware, and can be seen as a military in all but name 
– however, it maintains a highly defensive posture and structure. While its budget is high in absolute terms 
(61 billion dollars in 2012) it is still kept at approximately 1% of GDP, which is substantially less than the 
US (4.7%) or China (2.2%). See Mizokami 2011 
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“Events following the October 1973 cutback in supplies to the West shook the very 
foundations of the high growth economy of Japan whose extreme vulnerability, due to 
her great dependence on imported fuel and particularly oil, earned her the nickname of 
the 'Fragile Blossom” (Sinha 1974: 335). 
 
However, despite these obstacles the economy underwent a further boom in the 1980s, fuelled 
by cheap credit and surging real estate prices. This boom was unsustainable, and by the 1990s 
the markets had collapsed and Japan's economy stagnated (Itoh 2010). Since then the 
economy has failed to regain its earlier dynamism. This is exacerbated by a rapidly ageing 
population. Indeed, Japan has been described as “the fastest-ageing society on Earth” (Tricks 
2010), with one of the highest median ages of any nation on the planet. 
 
Perhaps one of the most severe threats to the Yoshida was the first Gulf War of 1990. Japan 
came under serious pressure to assist in repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a critical 
source of oil for Western nations as well as Japan. Despite calls to send troops, Japanese 
policymakers opted to confine themselves to a financial contribution of $13 billion dollars to 
the Allied coalition. Once hostilities had ended, Japan also sent mine sweepers to the Gulf 
(Tang 2007). 
 
However, as Tang points out, these contributions were not met with applause or gratitude. 
Instead, Japan was criticised heavily for “shirking its international responsibilities” (Tang 
2007: 121 – 122). As a nation heavily reliant on Middle Eastern energy, Japan was expected 
to contribute significantly to the Gulf War, and its failure to send troops was seen as 'free 
riding' on the efforts of the US and other nations. 
 
Since then, Japanese foreign relations have been further complicated by the rise of China as a 
major power, and a threatening North Korea. The commitment to the Yoshida doctrine of 
non-involvement has slipped further, with Japan contributing a modest number of troops to 
the occupying forces in Iraq, following the Iraq war of 2003. (Watts 2003) 
 
3.2 African – Japanese relations: A historical review 
 
Themba Sono provides a unique and detailed history of Japanese – African relations, going 
back to the days of feudal Japan and the first Africans brought to South East Asia by their 
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Portuguese slavers. His discussion of pre-20
th
 century Japanese – African interactions is 
unique in its depth and detail (Sono 1993). 
 
Following the forcible ending of Japan's period of isolation in 1853 by the American mission 
led by Commodore Matthew Perry, Japan embarked on a rapid project of modernisation and 
Westernisation. This led to contact with Africa, which at the time was largely dominated by 
European powers, following the scramble for Africa. In Sono's discussion of Japan's 
involvement of colonial Africa, he stresses the contrast between the colonising European 
powers, and Japan's so-called “clean hands” approach, during which they limited themselves 
to trade, as opposed to colonisation and exploitation (Sono 1993: 97). During the pre-war 
period the Japanese were able to make significant commercial gains in Africa. The European 
powers, alarmed by this competition, then attempted to exclude them from the commercial 
sphere. Sono demonstrates this turn of events by discussing the Japanese / Indian / East 
African cotton trade in some detail (cf. Ampiah 1990). 
 
Proceeding to more recent times, Sono discusses the history of Japanese relations with 
African countries following World War 2. He notes the general tendency of Japan to pursue 
its economic interests in Africa, and defends it against charges of collaborating with colonial 
powers at the time. 
 
In her book Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Realities and Economic Realities in 
Relations between Japan and South Africa (2002), Masako Osada provides an excellent 
history of Japanese - South African relations before and during Apartheid.  This book is 
hinged on two key concepts: sanctions, and the 'honorary whites' status of Japanese in 
Apartheid South Africa. She re-treads much of the same material in her article “Japanese-
South African Relations during the Apartheid Era” (2003). Sanctions and Honorary Whites is 
particularly valuable for the way it provides a clear and methodical examination of relations 
between Japan and South Africa during the Apartheid era. This is by contrast with Sono's 
work, which attempts to document relations between Japan and all of the countries in Africa. 
 
Osada begins with a discussion of trade ties in the period before WW2. She documents a 
surge in trade during World War I, followed by a rapid retraction as Japan found itself unable 
to compete with European products, due largely to the 1913 Immigration Act (Osada 2002: 
37). Following the Great Depression of 1929, Osada notes that “the Union suddenly became 
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more conciliatory towards Japan's requests for more favorable treatment of its citizens in 
South Africa” (2002: 39), and that this resulted in some concessions in migration procedures 
in favour of Japanese citizens. Despite strong tariff barriers, trade increased and when 
Australia entered into a trade war with Japan in 1937, SA-Japan trade received a strong boost 
(Osada 2002: 42). However, as World War 2 got under way relations froze over, and South 
Africa officially declared war on Japan in December of 1941, immediately after Pearl 
Harbour (Osada 2992: 43). 
 
Providing an alternative source of data, Kitagawa engages in a short discussion of the 
Japanese perspective on this trade by examining Consular Reports from the same period. He 
notes that in the era from 1912 – 1932, Japanese firms faced significant obstacles to market 
penetration in South Africa. This was largely due to the 1913 Immigration Act, which 
prevented Asians from settling in or doing business in South Africa (Kitagawa 2003: 28). 
 
Jun Morikawa's review of Japanese-African relations is distinct from Osada and Sono's in two 
regards. Firstly, he is strongly critical of Japanese actions in the context of Colonial Africa 
and the apartheid regime. Secondly, he sees post-1950s Japan as having constructed a 
completely bifurcated, economically oriented policy in Africa. Although Sono and Osada both 
acknowledge this, Morikawa has developed this concept to a much greater degree. 
 
In Morikawa's account this dual-track policy differentiated between the newly independent 
states (Black Africa) and the remaining colonies as well as South Africa (White Africa). In 
order to deal with the tension resulting from maintaining relations with these mutually 
antagonistic groups a strategy was developed in which Black Africa was soothed with 
platitudes and development aid while White Africa was appeased and human rights abuses 
were ignored in favour of trade. He locates this strategy very firmly within the context of the 
Cold War and Japan's place as a subordinate ally of the United States of America. This was 
based on the “guiding principle” of "anti-Communism and economic expansionism" 
(Morikawa 1997: 10). 
 
In pursuit of this, Japan followed a strategy of “supporting colonial regimes, and securing rare 
metals” (Morikawa 1997: 120). Both Sono and Osada concur on the importance of rare metals 
as a strategic objective (Osada 2002: 106 – 107, Sono 1993: 334). However, Morikawa 
believes that as part of this strategy, Japan made efforts to protect South Africa, a key source 
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of these aforementioned rare metals, from the Communist threat. The divergence from Sono's 
reading of the situation, in particular, must be noted here. Both analysts note that Japan 
needed South Africa's resources, but Morikawa paints Japanese diplomacy as an active 
attempt to support and protect South Africa from anti-colonial sentiment on the continent, as 
part of its strategy of securing a steady supply of critical resources. Sono sees Japan's position 
in this matter as being a necessary evil rather than a 'pro-South Africa' strategy. 
 
Generally, Morikawa believes that Japan tended to favour a 'key states' approach, in which 
important states were identified and used as anchors of Japanese diplomacy and trade in 
Africa. He supports this contention by appeal to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's 
research documents which explicitly discuss the selection of “important” states (Morikawa 
1997: 22), as well as by documenting the patterns of Official Development Aid (ODA) 
distribution to these key parties. Morikawa sees South Africa as being the centre of Japan's 
involvement in “White Africa” (Morikawa 1997: 22 - 23).  
 
Following the 'key state' strategy in 'Black Africa', states were chosen for being “opinion 
leaders, resource holding nations and those necessary for stability in Southern Africa” 
(Morikawa 1997: 22). The list of key states included Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Niger, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Gabon. In this context, Japan 
followed a strategy of maintaining relations with pro-Western countries, securing resources 
and pursuing export markets. (Morikawa 1997: 120) Where Black African countries had 
already 'fallen' to Communism, Japan followed a strategy of “confrontation and dialogue” 
(Morikawa 1997: 13) 
 
An interesting consequence of this argument is that it claims that the Japanese Black Africa 
strategy was fundamentally subordinate to its White Africa strategy. Japan adopted its Black 
Africa strategy as a way of limiting the fallout from its unpopular and morally questionable 
relationship with South Africa. In effect, Japan prioritised its relationship with the 
strategically important apartheid regime over its relationships with the rest of the African 
countries. This can be seen in the fact that one of the criteria for choosing key 'black African' 
states was their importance for maintaining Southern African stability. In other words, black 
African states were chosen at least partly on the basis of their value as a buttress for Japan's 
'white Africa' strategy. This implies that the 'black Africa' strategy was subordinate to and 
defined by the 'white Africa' strategy. 
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During this time Japan was also particularly interested in gaining support from African 
nations for its bid to gain seats in the United Nations Security Council. This was another 
aspect that underscored the importance of mollifying 'black Africa' in order to gain their 
support for Japanese United Nations initiatives. 
 
One of the key points of contention over the history of Japanese involvement on the African 
continent is in its moral standing. Themba Sono, Jun Morikawa and Masako Osada all discuss 
the difficulties that Japan experienced in maintaining relations with both Black and White 
Africa, and they all acknowledge the internal tension of Japanese policy towards Africa. 
However, their readings of Japan's motivations and the attached moral calculus of treating 
with the Apartheid government differ greatly. This issue became particularly pertinent 
following the oil crisis of the mid 70s, with Ampiah and Nester (1989) documenting the 
specifics of Japan's global response to this event in detail. Morikawa and Sono both see Japan 
as being jolted into a sudden (re)action by this event, but again they differ in their 
interpretations of Japanese actions at the time. Indeed, this debate is a constant theme 
throughout their writings, both on Japanese policy in broader Africa, and on Japanese policy 
in South Africa. The same broad debate over expediency and morality is reproduced in the 
discussion of Japanese-South African relations. 
 
As Osada explains, during Apartheid, Japanese policy towards South Africa suffered from 
significant internal tension. On the one hand, South Africa was a pariah state that the Japanese 
government wished to stay detached from. On the other hand, South Africa was an incredibly 
useful source of important raw materials, including minerals such as platinum and manganese, 
which are considered critical for modern industry. South Africa was also a market for 
Japanese goods (Osada 2002: 106 - 107).  
 
In effect, the Japanese government wished to maintain trade ties with South Africa, while 
distancing itself from apartheid policies. This distancing was necessary in order to deflect 
criticism from African countries, whose disapproval of Japanese ties with such an odious 
regime threatened Japan's UN ambitions. 
 
In practice this was carried out through various mechanisms. As Seiro Kawasaki explains, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa by Japanese companies was officially 
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forbidden. In addition, Japan maintained a long standing arms embargo on South Africa 
(Kawasaki, 2002: 28). These measures were by no means comprehensive or impenetrable. 
Businesses such as Toyota were allowed to establish independent South African subsidiaries. 
Japanese firms transferred patents, technology, processes and management expertise to South 
African firms, who supplied capital and local expertise. This circumvented bans on FDI, 
while allowing Japanese corporations to invest in South Africa. Despite the arms embargo, 
dual-use technology was exported without let or hindrance, and this was particularly useful to 
the apartheid regime (Morikawa 1997: 130 - 132). 
 
This tension between wanting or needing South Africa as a trading partner and wishing to 
distance Japan from South Africa as a pariah state is often said to be expressed through the 
policy of seikei bunri, or the separation of business and politics.  Osada argues that while the 
Japanese government did, in fact, wish to trade with South Africa, and was unwilling to 
engage in serious sanctions against the apartheid government, seikei bunri is a separate and 
specific concept developed to deal with economic difficulties around maintaining trade with 
Taiwan despite pressure from the People's Republic of China. Specifically, “Japan adopted 
[seikei bunri] to justify its China policy of keeping trade relations with Taiwan without 
recognizing it diplomatically. Therefore, this should not be confused with Japan's standard 
policy” (Osada 2002: 110). 
 
Developing this argument in a separate discussion, Osada points out that “Seikei bunri was 
never an overall official external policy of Japan. Nor did the Japanese government adopt 
seikei bunri as a policy toward South Africa during apartheid” (Osada 2012, personal 
communication). 
 
Osada partly buttresses this argument by appeal to the fact that the Japanese government did 
take up (admittedly limited) sanctions against South Africa, which can hardly be said to be 
following a policy of separating politics and economics.  After all, sanctions are inherently 
political. 
 
Despite Osada's challenge to the narrative of the seikei bunri policy in South Africa, it should 
be noted that many observers of Japan see it as a broadly consistent trend in Japanese foreign 
policy. Ravenhill described Japanese policy as “all things to all people” (Ravenhill 1982 
quoted in Sono 1993). Similarly, Payne (1987) in his discussion of Japanese policy towards 
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South Africa deployed the term as an explanatory device for Japan's muted response towards 
Apartheid. It has also emerged in discussions of Japanese foreign policy in regions ranging 
from ASEAN (Singh 2002: 278) to the Middle East, with one analyst stating that “Over the 
years, Japan's commitment to seikei bunri is unflinching” (Tang 2007: 123). It appears that 
despite the origin of seikei bunri as a means of handling the difficult Japan – Taiwan – China 
relationship, it has become a popular explanation for Japan's methods in handling politically 
difficult choices while still maintaining all-important trade ties. 
 
Of particular note in this discussion is the 1980s, a period during which trade with South 
Africa became more and more controversial. At this time trade between the two nations 
boomed, with Japan becoming a major destination for South African goods. As Kawasaki 
points out:  
 
“In 1981, [Japan] was second only to the United States of America [as an export destination], 
and in 1982, second to none” (Kawasaki, 2002:31). In 1986 and 1987 Japan was South 
Africa's largest trade partner, and this attracted particular censure from the international 
community (Osada 2002: 197). Japan responded with a diplomatic offensive which included 
requests for restraint from companies, sending funds to a small trust that would assist victims 
of Apartheid, and encouraging the ANC to open an office in Tokyo (Osada 2002: 77-78). 
Notwithstanding this public relations blitz, in 1989 Japan was still South Africa's second 
largest trading partner (Osada 2002: 78). Although this took pressure off Japan, the generally 
high volume of trade at this time casts doubt on the sincerity and vigour of Japan's actions. 
 
In this context there were naturally serious questions about Japan's responsibilities and 
obligations as a member of the UN, bound, in principle at least, to treat South Africa as a 
pariah state at the time. Kawasaki documents criticism within the UN, particularly from the 
Ghanaian government, in some detail (Kawasaki, 2002:28-29). 
 
As previously noted, Morikawa is fiercely critical of Japan's involvement with South Africa. 
While acknowledging the importance of resources and trade for Japan, he points to Japan's 
failure to cultivate alternative sources as betraying a lack of political will to act against the 
Apartheid government. Indeed, Morikawa goes even further, and argues that Japan 
aggressively courted South Africa, citing Japanese efforts to increase trade with South Africa 
during the 1970s (Morikawa 1997: 120 - 123) . 
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For Morikawa the oil shock of 1973 raised the stakes, but did not fundamentally change 
anything about Japan's African 'dual Africa' policies. Morikawa dismisses Japanese sanctions 
against South Africa as “mere diplomatic lip-service” (Morikawa 1997: 132). He notes that 
Japan implemented quite effective sanctions against the Soviet Union when it became 
necessary, which in his view suggests that it was not impossible for Japan to implement 
sanctions when it could find the political will to do so. Finally, he picks at the argument that 
South Africa was a critical trade partner by pointing out that many non-essential commodities, 
such as eggs, were traded in large amounts (Morikawa 1997: 79 – 80). 
 
Themba Sono is perhaps Japan’s most vigorous defender in this regard, making the tu quoque 
argument that plenty of other nations (including African nations) were quite happy to trade 
with South Africa and to encourage economic ties where it suited their interests. In his 
account, it would be unfair to single out Japan in any particular fashion for engaging with the 
Apartheid regime at the time (Sono 1993: 344).  
 
In a similar vein, Osada argues that: “Japan’s sanctions measures against South Africa were as 
strict as those by other trading partners for South Africa. At the same time they were 
extremely weak, selective and passive, but no less ineffectual than those taken by other 
nations” (Osada 2002: 110). 
 
According to Osada, Japan's efforts to restrict trade with South Africa, and the related 
sanctions on cultural and sporting activities were overwhelmingly triggered by external 
pressure. Within the concept of Japan as the “reactive state” (Caldwell 1988), Japan never 
initiated sanctions, but only acted when external events made the costs of maintaining ties 
with South Africa too great. 
 
Sono also takes issue with Morikawa's characterization of Japan's African policy as being 
utterly hypocritical.  In Sono's account, following the oil shock Japan shifted from a 'benign 
diplomacy', in which Japan sought economic relations without particular vigour, to an 'active 
resource diplomacy', in which Japan began to pursue ties with African countries in order to 
safeguard access to resources  (Sono 1993: 111 – 113). Sono argues that this policy was 
driven by an understanding of the need to inject a “more human factor in the hitherto 
impersonal relations between the Celestial Empire and the Far Continent” (Sono 1993: 113). 
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This was in order to “create new cultural and interpersonal ties, the so-called heart-to-heart 
changes” (Sono 1993: 114).  Indeed, Sono argues that the Japanese had in fact already been 
very slowly developing a more human centred policy towards Africa from the 1950s, and the 
oil crisis merely accelerated this process. The new active resource diplomacy evolved and 
broadened into a general concern with human security in Africa, as Japan realised that merely 
focusing on the economic dimension of the relationship was inadequate.  
 
Generally, Sono underlines the "distinction between European colonial rule and Japanese 
commercial role in Africa” (1993: 60). He criticizes Morikawa as “confus[ing] this Japanese 
commercial presence with the precolonial role of a collaborator”, (Sono 1993: 60) arguing 
that “all [Japan] did was merely look after her interests” (Sono 1993: 62). 
 
Ultimately, there is no satisfying conclusion to the debate over Japanese involvement in 
Africa. It is clear that Japan was not much worse than other major Western bloc nations, who 
similarly collaborated with the apartheid government in their quest to contain Communism on 
the African continent. Where they did implement sanctions, their effect was limited. For 
example, the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was comprehensive in name rather than 
fact. It did not include import bans on “[s]trategic materials, diamonds, and most forms of 
gold” (Levy 1999: 7), which were a major part of South Africa's export profile. 
 
Having said that, at no point can Japan be said to have shown any kind of leadership or 
initiative in the movement against apartheid. For example, their implementation of sanctions 
in 1986 only came after the European Community led the way (Levy 1999: 7). Perhaps the 
most problematic aspect of Japanese 'sanctions' was the simple fact that they did not usually 
involve any real restrictions on trade, and can more accurately be considered requests for 
restraint from Japanese businesses. (Osada 2002: 178) A 'request for restraint' has none of the 
force of a legal restriction on trade, and really cannot be considered in the same light. 
 
Japanese civil society was largely unresponsive to Apartheid. As Morikawa explains, the 
Japanese anti-apartheid movement was centred on an NGO called the Japan Anti-Apartheid 
Committee (JAAC) (Morikawa 1997). In his summary of their activities, he notes that JAAC 
was able to punch above its weight by networking and campaigning intelligently via the 
media, but that generally, “it was relatively unknown nationwide. This was partly due to 
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organizational weakness, but the greatest problem was the general indifference of Japanese 
society to the issue” (Morikawa 1997: 200). 
 
In any event, during the early 1990s it became plain that apartheid was crumbling, and a new 
dispensation was inevitable. During this transitional period from 1990 to 1994, there were 
multiple visits by keidanren
11
 representatives to South Africa. These missions were privately 
funded fact finding missions in which representatives of major Japanese conglomerates 
visited South Africa in order to gather information for future enterprises.  
 
Ampiah recounts the history of these trade missions in his article Japanese investments in 
South Africa 1992 – 1996: The State, Private Enterprise and Strategic Minerals (2003). He 
takes particular care in unpacking the relationship between the keidanren and the Japanese 
government. Building upon earlier work by Chalmers Johnson, he argues that a key aspect of 
the modern capitalist state is a mutual dependence between the state and business. The state is 
dependent on private capital to acquire strategically necessary materials, while private capital 
relies on the state to assist and protect it in its endeavours. This relationship is particularly 
important in Japan, where resources to sustain the domestic manufacturing sector must be 
acquired from abroad. Consequently, Japanese business relies on the Japanese government to 
provide it with support and assistance in successfully acquiring strategic resources abroad.  
As Van Der Spuy and Glinzler put it: 
 
“Ampiah...succinctly captures Japan's strategy, claiming that since the early 1990s, a 
functional symbiosis seems to be in operation between the Japanese government, 
Japanese bureaucratic apparatus and Japanese private enterprise with regards to 
Southern Africa” (Van Der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 85).  
 
However, Ampiah suggests that this has in fact gone beyond a symbiotic relationship, and in 
Japan the balance of power has tipped in the favour of private business. In his analysis of 
various interactions between the keidanren and the Japanese government he makes the 
argument that the keidanren has successfully used the strategic importance of rare metals as 
leverage to force the government to make excessive concessions. This unequal relationship 
mean that the Japanese state is obliged to extensively subsidise the entry of Japanese mining 
                                                 
11  The keidanren is a large organisation that represents Japanese business, in much the same fashion as a 
Chamber of Commerce.  
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corporations into foreign markets through diplomatic support and Official Development 
Assistance.  
 
In order to address the dimensions of this Japanese ODA to South Africa, and the greater 
TICAD project which encompasses most Japanese aid activities in Africa, it is necessary to 
first briefly review the general history of Japanese ODA, beginning with World War 2. 
 
Makoto Sato (2005) divides the history of Japanese aid into 5 separate phases, stretching from 
1954 to the 2000s. This begins with an initial 20 year phase during which Japan concentrated 
on Asia. Next came a 'post oil shock' phase in the 70s, which saw a modest shift to Africa and 
a concentration on gathering African support for Japan's UN initiatives. The third phase 
involved a massive surge in aid volumes up until the 1980s, which saw ODA volumes 
increase significantly despite Japanese austerity measures (Seddon and Sato 1997: 153).  
 
The fourth phase involved Japan consolidating its position as the apex aid donor. From 1989 
to 2000 Japan was the single largest international donor, eclipsing even the US. This time 
period also saw the genesis of TICAD, and increased "political commitment" by Japan (Sato 
2005: 85). 
 
Finally, the last phase extends from the 2000s until the present, and involves a significant 
retraction of Japanese aid due to its extended economic woes. This phase sees Japan 
attempting to remain relevant as a donor in the face of budget cuts and greatly increased 
volumes of aid from the US, as well as the steady rise of China in Africa (Seddon and Sato 
1997, Sato 2005). 
 
Without necessarily interrogating this history in detail, it is possible to flag certain specific 
shifts and trends, based largely on aid composition, volume and geographic distribution. 
In composition, Japanese aid has a history of being strongly oriented towards loans. Izumi 
Ohno speaks approvingly of this, stating that  "Japan is also unique in offering a relatively 
large share of loans in bilateral aid. Because loan aid can mobilize larger resources (e.g., for 
financing large-scale infrastructure projects or supporting reforms), it can be very effective in 
promoting broad-based growth if combined with a good growth strategy" (2003: 6). 
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However, in recent times this approach has been compromised by pressure from the rest of 
the donor community. Sato (2005) points out that at the Gleneagles G8 summit, Japan 
reluctantly endorsed a loan forgiveness scheme pushed forward by its peers. In Sato's analysis 
this demonstrates that Japan has finally abandoned loan aid as its primary method of ODA. 
In terms of geographical distribution between Asia and Africa, the pattern is fairly clear. 
Japan's early ODA was heavily focused on Asia, and over time, it slowly moved away from 
Asia and into Africa. As Seddon and Sato explain: 
 
"Japanese aid began in the 1950s essentially as post-war reparations to Asian countries. 
Even in 1970, over 98% of Japanese aid went to Asia" (Seddon and Sato 1997: 154).  
 
This pattern changed somewhat as a result of the 1973 oil shock, following which more aid 
was directed to Africa to support Japan's strategic resource accquisition efforts. Under 
pressure from the United States to increase the proportion of its aid to Africa, Japan continued 
to shift its aid allocations throughout the 1980s until the amount of aid going to Africa 
reached a peak in 1989 (Sato 2005: 74). However, in 1990 East Asia
12
 was still receiving 
more aid than Africa, and indeed, it was only as recently as 2005 that Japan sent more aid to 
Africa than East Asia (Hirano 2012: 195). 
 
In terms of volume, Japan's commitment to the ongoing provision of  high levels of ODA was 
largely dictated by its role in the US-Japanese alliance. Post-war Japan did not have a 
significant military presence, due to its pacifist constitution, and consequently it adopted aid 
as a major tool of international diplomacy. In effect, it could not contribute militarily to the 
Cold War, so it took up the slack with strategic aid diplomacy.  
 
By 1991, Japan had become the world's largest aid donor - a position it was to maintain over 
the next five years, despite the end of the Cold War (Seddon and Sato 1997: 153). 
 
However, Japan's dominance of the aid landscape declined, and from 2000 to 2003 the 
Japanese government decided to make significant cuts. In 2001the US replaced Japan as the 
                                                 
12  From the 1970s onwards a large portion of this aid was directed to the People's Republic of China. 
Japanese aid towards Asia is a more complex topic than Hirano's work shows, with the Japanese 
government making a distinction between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and shifting aid flows 
between the two regions over time (Personal Communication, Professor Scarlett Cornelissen, 10 February 
2013). Putting these complexities aside, the point remains that taken collectively, Africa did not receive as 
much annual aid as Asia until quite recently. 
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top international aid donor.  As Ohno (2003) points out, this dwindling ODA budget was the 
result of Japan's extended economic woes. At the same time the US greatly increased its 
international aid bugets under the Bush administration, as part of its international counter-
terrorism strategy. 
 
3.2.1 Official Development Aid to South Africa: The early years 
 
Alden documents the history of post-Apartheid South African-Japanese relations in both the 
first chapter of A Distant Mirror (2003) and The Chrysanthemum and the Protea (2002). In 
particular he unpacks the dynamics surrounding the major ODA packages in the post-
Apartheid government, and the significant frustration and complications that ensued during 
this time period. 
 
As Alden explains, following 1994 the internal Japanese tension about relationships with 
South Africa was resolved. South Africa was no longer an odious-but-necessary trade partner, 
and it would appear that engagement should have become a much more pleasant prospect for 
the Japanese government. At this point, Tokyo – or some of the institutions in Tokyo - 
expected South Africa to fall into the standard ‘aid recipient’ pattern of other African 
countries (Alden 2002: 381).  
 
However, this expectation was not matched on the South African side. Alden notes that 
“Ironically it was not the Japanese who were keen on highlighting the special nature of South 
Africa ...but rather the push came from South African sources.” (Alden 2003: 16) 
He claims that the ANC felt that South Africa, as an economic, political and even military 
outlier on the African continent, was owed special recognition and treatment from foreign 
donors such as Japan. Alden characterises this notion as resulting in a “South African foreign 
policy with a sense of hubris and entitlement that raised expectations as to the state's status on 
the world stage.” (Alden 2002: 16)  
 
At this time, Japan proceeded with two major packages. The first was presented in 1994, 
during the Mandela administration. The second was put forward in 1999, during Mbeki’s 
inauguration (Van der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 89-90). 
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The first package was particularly large. Alden (2003) characterizes it as “consisting of 
US$500 mln export-import loans, US$300 mln in grants and US $500 mln in investment 
credits for Japanese business” (17). The size of the package must be put in context. As Van 
Der Spuy and Glinzler point out,  
 
“When these figures are compared with Japan's total ODA disbursement, they do not 
seem all that large. However, if one compares these figures to the figures for Tanzania, 
South Africa's ODA is almost ten times as large as that of Japan's largest aid recipient in 
Africa prior to 1990” (Van Der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 89). 
 
The contents of this package are of particular interest. As Ampiah (2003) demonstrates, it was 
largely designed to support Japanese private sector investment in South Africa, particularly in 
the extractive industries. Among other elements, the package included $300mn of untied 
funding for Eskom, the power state corporation, and $260.9mn for Transnet, the transport 
parastatal. This was quite clearly intended to support Japanese companies in the extractive 
industry by improving the infrastructure upon which they rely (Ampiah 2003: 67). 
 
In any event, despite being of such an unusual size, the first package was met with disinterest 
and even suspicion by the South African government. The South African government viewed  
the  package as a self-serving public relations exercise, primarily because of the conditions 
that came attached to it, and an insistence on using Japanese firms for much of the work 
(Alden 2002: 379). This first package was also heavily loaded towards yen loans, which is 
consistent with Japan's standard aid practises. The South African government of the time was 
resistant to the notion of taking up large yen loans over concerns that exchange issues would 
cause costs to increase greatly. Interestingly enough, recent fieldwork suggests that this is still 
a problem, with yen loans bringing significant costs along with them (Interview, TICAD 
Advisor, 5 June 2012). 
 
This disinterest was the source of considerable surprise and dismay on the part of the 
Japanese, with Alden stating that “The unwillingness of Pretoria to consider utilising the 
ODA...came as a shock to Japanese officials” (Alden 2003: 17). 
 
Given that Ampiah's analysis of the package suggests that it was largely intended to serve 
Japanese interests, the lukewarm South African response may not be that inexplicable. Alden 
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believes that South African officials were overrating the importance of South Africa in the 
grand scheme of things, but this is not necessarily the case. For recipient countries to demand 
that aid packages meet their needs may not be arrogance so much as a matter of good policy. 
Indeed, discourses and declarations around 'ownership' often argue that recipient countries 
should be the key decision makers in matters of aid, including the composition and type of 
aid. This concept has been developed thoroughly by writers such as Morrisey and Verschoor 
(2003), who demonstrate fairly conclusively that recipient involvement in and control of aid 
processes is an important and necessary part of effective aid regimes. Indeed, 'ownership' 
became a major part of the rhetoric around TICAD, as this review will demonstrate shortly. 
Taking this into account, dismissing South Africa's assertiveness on this issue as 'arrogance' 
is, perhaps, overly hasty. 
 
The second ODA package, in 1999, was at least partially rebuilt to address these concerns, but 
it was still met with a tepid response from South African officials. Alden claims that some of 
this was because of: 
 
“the difficulties experienced during South Africa's extended transition, the economic 
slowdown in Japan and, more generally, continued misunderstanding and 
misinformation fuelled by domestic bureaucratic political considerations between the 
two countries”(Alden 2002: 377). 
 
On the other hand, Skidmore suggests that the general lack of enthusiasm on the part of South 
Africa may also have been because of the Japanese government’s refusal to fund the ANC 
during the apartheid years. Quoting Alden, she notes that Nelson Mandela had approached the 
Japanese government about funding in 1990, despite Tokyo’s attempts to head off any such 
request pre-emptively. The Japanese had declined to assist the ANC with funding, and in her 
analysis this may have resulted in the later disinterest in offers from the Japanese (Skidmore 
2004: 9). 
 
It is difficult to be certain that this was a decisive factor, although the ANC does have a ‘long 
memory’ in terms of choosing allies internationally. States that were ideologically aligned 
with or that built relationships with the ANC during the struggle, such as Cuba, have 
generally found it relatively easy to maintain relationships with South Africa post-1994, while 
nations that were not (such as Israel) have found it harder to build cordial ties. Alden differs 
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strongly from Skidmore on this matter. Indeed, he directly contradicts her account, claiming 
that “far from being a legacy of the past, the difficulties experienced by the Japanese and 
South Africans in shaping a constructive relationship are rooted primarily in domestic 
bureaucratic politics and its impact upon the foreign policy process” (Alden 2002: 366).  
 
This case study is a good example of how considering the sub-state structures can help 
explain issues within South African - Japanese relations. The question is clear - Why did the 
ODA packages fail? Skidmore's explanations, while not being without merit, rely on making 
certain assumptions about the ANC's motives and earlier relationships, without being able to 
convincingly demonstrate the existence of said motives. On the other hand, Alden expresses 
the notion that the institutional arrangements on both sides hampered the package. Alden can 
make this point because of his analysis of MOFA, METI and the manner in which they 
construct aid packages, via a contested bargaining process. 
 
3.3 TICAD: Old wine in new bottles? 
 
Post-Cold War Japanese ODA discourse has been dominated by TICAD, the Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development. TICAD is perhaps the most important 
Japanese diplomatic initiative in Africa, and as a result is essential that Japanese aid efforts in 
Africa be contextualised within this framework. Writing in 2012, Ampiah and Rose see the 
TICAD process as a major break from Japan's previous African aid initiatives, which, in 
accordance with Morikawa's reading, were centred on securing Japan's natural resource 
collection efforts in Africa, and persuading African countries to mute their criticism of Japan's 
collaborationist tendency (Ampiah and Rose 2012: 154). 
 
Ampiah (2005) and Lehman (2005) both discuss the history of the first three TICAD 
iterations. A comparison of their approaches provides some interesting insights into the 
history of this process.  
 
Cornelissen (2012) discusses the ramifications of TICAD IV in some detail. Like Ampiah 
(2005), she sees it as a departure from the patterns of previous TICADs. However, she also 
sees TICAD IV as a reaffirmation of Japan's commitment to Africa as an important source of 
natural resources. Cornelissen alerts us to the fact that TICAD IV, while developed in 
consultation with African states, is firmly underpinned by Japanese "domestic and strategic 
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priorities” (2012: 201). Cornelissen further notes that with TICAD IV, Japan has developed 
its strategy of linking its African diplomatic and economic initiatives with developing Africa's 
ability to exploit its natural resources (2012: 211 - 212). 
 
Kweku Ampiah (2005) and Howard Lehman (2005) recount the history of TICAD through its 
first three iterations. Ampiah begins by tracing it back to its inception in 1991 and points out 
that, “despite the international inflection of the TICAD process, there is no doubt that it is the 
invention of Japan, and it is the Japanese government which orchestrates it” (Ampiah 2005: 
98). In a separate, more recent paper he argues that “The transformation in Japan’s relations 
with Africa since the 1990s manifests a clear departure from the nature of Japanese foreign 
policy towards the region in the previous decades” (Ampiah 2012: 171). 
 
Lehman concurs with the notion of TICAD as being a Japanese creation, but also argues that 
TICAD's formation was motivated by a desire for Japan to forge a different path from the 
Washington Consensus governed programmes of the World Bank and the IMF. Although 
Lehman notes that the Japanese ODA charter calls on recipient states to “agree to promote 
democratization, the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the securing of basic 
human rights,” (2005: 426) he claims that “The divergence between Japan’s objective of a 
development assistance strategy and that of the World Bank is significant” (Lehman 2005: 
426). Relying heavily on work by Stein and Ohno, Lehman makes the case for TICAD as a 
means by which Japan could undertake a development agenda that would be distinct from the 
extant World Bank inspired programmes. In Lehman's account, some of the unique features of 
TICAD are its emphasis on self-help and the importance of the Asian experience in 
development (Lehman 2005: 425).  
 
As he puts it, “TICAD became a vehicle by which Japan could respond to the pressures of 
globalization by strategically and financially positioning itself as an independent and 
influential leader” (Lehman 2005: 427). 
 
This notion is not exclusive to Lehman. Izumi Ohno makes the claim that:  
 
“Japan does not wholly accept the mainstream thinking by Western aid community 
about development. Japan continues to believe that East Asian development experience, 
which is widely regarded as a “success story,” and to which Japan itself made 
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significant contribution through aid, trade and investment, has also been a good model” 
(Ohno 2003: 4). 
 
In his history of TICAD I – III Ampiah unpacks the bureaucratic dynamics that underpinned 
the TICAD process, explaining how the different Japanese government ministries were 
involved in the process (Ampiah 2005).  
 
He depicts the construction of TICAD as a collaborative process, demonstrating how different 
organizations such as METI, MOFA and the Ministry of Finance all brought their own 
interests and concerns to the process. Ampiah notes that the keidanren, possibly backed by 
METI, maintained its focus on the economic benefits of Africa, and determined to maintain 
its investment focus on South Africa. Meanwhile, on matters such as preferential access to 
Japanese agricultural markets, METI and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
maintained a protectionist stance. (Ampiah 2005: 100). 
 
Discussing TICAD I, he notes that the most novel theme expressed was “Asian experience 
and African development” (Ampiah 2005: 102). This was the notion that African countries 
could learn from Asia, by following the precepts of rational macroeconomic policy and 
maintaining political stability. Additional investment in education and human resource 
development would help African countries to develop.  
 
Lehman sees TICAD I as being more image than effect, with little of substance being 
achieved. Despite this lack of concrete action, "African countries got a positive impression of 
Japan’s initiatives and aid philosophy" (Lehman 2005: 429). Lehman believes that this public 
relations aspect was of particular value to Japan's UN initiatives, in particular the campaign 
for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Although this campaign did not 
bear fruit, Japan was still successful in other fields. Lehman notes that: 
 
"In 1996, Japan relied on Africa’s bloc voting to win the Asian region non-permanent 
seat on the Security Council, the election of Shigeru Oda as Justice of the UN 
International Court of Justice, and the election of Sadako Ogata as head of the UN High 
Commission for Refugees. But more importantly, these initiatives underscored Japan’s 
willingness to pursue its strategic objectives by positioning itself as an alternative to the 
dominant ODA institutions" (Lehman 2005: 430). 
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In his account of the motivations for launching TICAD, Ampiah seeks to tie it to Japan's 
national economic agenda, and Japanese business interests. As mentioned previously, he 
emphasizes the influence of Japanese business on the formation of Japan's foreign policy. 
Ampiah begins by highlighting the system of tied aid, in which  Japanese ODA projects come 
with preconditions mandating the use of Japanese businesses and supplies. In effect, this 
results in development projects subsidising Japanese corporations instead of assisting 
businesses in recipient countries. Consequently, "a substantial amount of Japanese grant aid to 
the African countries creeps back to Japan" (Ampiah 2005: 111). Concerns such as these, of 
course, were part of what brought the Mandela aid package to grief. 
 
Of particular interest is a sidenote in which Ampiah mentions that an African request for 
assistance with a major internal transport network to facilitate African integration was turned 
down, allegedly on the grounds that Africa has inadequate population density to warrant such 
an initiative (2005: 111).  Ampiah mentions that : 
 
"many African diplomats in Tokyo seem hopeful that the restructuring of the JICA as 
an autonomous institution will relieve it from the pressures that the questionable 
relationship between Japanese private companies and aid policy-makers brings to bear 
on the country’s ODA programme" (Ampiah 2005: 111). 
 
It would appear that JICA's reorganization has borne fruit in this regard, since JICA has in 
fact reversed this earlier decision
13
.  
 
Continuing with this theme of economic self-interest, Ampiah argues that in the early 1990s 
Japan was  in search of new markets for its corporations, which would help it recover from its 
economic woes following the contraction of its economy in the 1980s. A stable and friendly 
Africa would constitute a valuable market for Japanese corporations. 
 
                                                 
13 JICA was reorganized in 2008, and has been funding a major internal SADC transport network, including 
One Stop Border Posts intended to facilitate internal trade in Africa. Although not a major part of this 
thesis, see Chapter 4, p 110 - 112 for more on this.  
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In a similar vein to Lehman, Ampiah also notes the value of the African bloc to Japanese 
initiatives in the UN. He particularly highlights Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council (2005: 110). 
 
Discussing TICAD II, Ampiah writes that:  
 
“In the main, the agenda concerned itself with three broad areas: (i) social development 
(education, health and population, and other measures to assist the poor); (ii) economic 
development (private sector development, industrial development, agricultural 
development, and external debt); and (iii) the basic foundation for development (good 
governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict development)" (Ampiah 2005: 104). 
 
In the process, Ampiah emphasizes the importance of inter-session meetings and conferences, 
as part of its drive towards the concept of 'ownership' in development: 
 
“The extent and depth of these working level meetings in between the conferences are 
also indicative of Japan’s attention to detail, with a view to avoiding the mistakes made 
by other donor countries. They are also a demonstration of Japan’s determination to 
fulfil its commitment to the idea of African ‘ownership’ of their development processes 
as well as evidence of the international community’s support of such ownership” 
(Ampiah 2005: 105 – 106). 
 
Ampiah links this to Japan's involvement in the Bandung Conference in 1955, seeing the 
TICAD initiative as an “extension of the spirit” of that process (Ampiah 2005: 107).  
 
Similarly, Lehman notes the importance of the concept of ownership at TICAD II. Citing the 
Tokyo Agenda for Action, he notes that “the underlying principles of TICAD II were 
ownership and partnership” (Lehman 2005: 428) but argues that it later became problematic, 
because it meant that “Japan waited for those governments to take “ownership” of their 
development needs, decide on targeted projects, and then approach the Japanese aid agencies” 
(Lehman 2005: 428). 
 
This emphasis on the importance of ownership can be traced back to the early stages of 
Japanese ODA in Asia. According to Sato (2005), Japanese aid to its neighbours was 
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particularly contentious following World War 2, due to the violent and ugly history of 
Japanese imperialism in South East Asia. As a result, MOFA developed the principles of ‘on-
request’ aid and ‘self-help’ in order to maintain its aid programmes without attracting 
backlash by appearing intrusive. ‘On-request’ aid requires that recipient countries approach 
Japan with their own proposals and projects, to which Japan assigns aid. ‘Self-help’: 
 
 “implies that, although Japan gives assistance financially and technically at the initial 
stage, once the project is started, the recipient countries themselves assume all the 
responsibilities not only for economic management but also for social, political and other 
related matters, which may happen thereafter” (Sato 2005: 72).  
 
In any event, Ampiah argues that by the end of the third conference, the TICAD process had 
largely been a triumph of style over substance, with much talk and little action. Criticising the 
amount of financial support for TICAD projects, he points out that Asia still attracts the 
plurality of Japanese Official Development Aid, concluding that “there is as yet no 
convincing evidence that the TICAD is a serious commitment to the development of Africa” 
(Ampiah 2005: 110). Furthermore, he notes that Japanese FDI, which was one of the major 
promises of TICAD, has remained concentrated in South Africa. Indeed, “the trend in 
investment appears to be downwards, with 2000 an outlying and exceptionally low year” 
(Ampiah 2005: 112).  
 
Lehman's assessment of TICAD at the same point in its existence is mixed. He acknowledges 
that TICAD has significant problems, noting that: 
 
“Ten years of the TICAD process have also revealed a pattern of shortcomings. In most 
of the documents written over the last decade, the goals of TICAD are decidedly broad, 
ambitious and unclear" (Lehman 2005: 441 – 442). 
 
Additionally, Lehman criticises TICAD for failing to produce concrete financial commitments 
from donor countries. The concurrent crisis in the Middle East, in the form of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq exacerbated this problem. 
 
However, despite these problems, Lehman argues that TICAD “offered many contributions to 
African development,” (2005: 440) largely at the conceptual and public relations level. It 
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increased awareness of African development issues, and it “jumpstarted greater and more 
effective international coordination amongst multilateral aid agencies, non-governmental 
organizations and African governments” (Lehman 2005: 440). 
 
Perhaps most importantly, he claims that it allowed Japan to develop and articulate an 
alternative development discourse to the existing one. This development discourse included 
concepts such as ownership and partnership, managed to enter the mainstream development 
discourse at events such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and multiple 
consecutive G8 meetings. Finally, it managed to re-introduce the concept of the state as a 
central role player in development (Lehman 2005: 440 - 441). 
 
By the end of TICAD III, it is clear that TICAD had managed to contribute to development 
discourses, and had allowed Japan to articulate its vision of development issues in Africa. 
However, there had been little concrete action, and there was serious doubt as to whether their 
would be another TICAD conference. Interestingly, Ampiah and Lehman offer a similar 
prognosis, although they approach it from different directions. Lehman believes that despite 
its failings, TICAD I - III was a valuable process. Ampiah is more pessimistic, arguing that 
despite its value, TICAD I - III suffered from severe shortcomings. 
 
Things changed significantly with TICAD IV. The African nations involved pushed for the 
inclusion of measurable, solid objectives, and for the speedy implementation of projects. 
These efforts were rewarded. TICAD IV is generally seen as the TICAD of delivery, in which 
grant aid, yen loans and infrastructure projects were given high priority, and substantive, firm 
commitments were made (Ampiah 2012: 176 - 177) . 
 
Indeed, as Ampiah notes in the same paper, Dr Jean Ping, then-Chairman of the African 
Union, stated in a key-note address at a symposium in Tokyo that "[t]he 5-Year Yokohama 
Action Plan to emerge from TICAD IV, together with the TICAD Follow-Up Mechanism, 
served to distinguish TICAD IV from all its predecessors in terms of providing concrete, 
time-bound and measurable outcomes" (Ping 2010: 9). Similarly, Cornelissen notes that 
TICAD IV was a significant break from earlier iterations in the process due to its creation of 
tangible structures for implementation of its promises (Cornelissen 2012: 201 - 202). 
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However, Cornelissen goes somewhat further, and argues that one of the main directives that 
emerged from TICAD IV was that of resource driven development. This is particularly 
pertinent in Southern Africa, which already has a special relationship with Japan, due to the 
size and breadth of the South African economy, but also due to the abundance of valuable 
mineral resources in South Africa. Cornelissen argues that Japan is particularly interested in 
maintaining access to strategic raw materials such as rare metals, particularly due to the 
emergence of China as a major rival on the African continent. Interestingly enough, although 
he does not engage in an extensive discussion of  China's role in Africa as a rival to Japan, 
Hirano (2012) believes that China's use of rare metal resources in a political fashion – ie, its 
tendency to use the threat of discontinuing supply in order to gain concessions – has helped 
spur Japan's engagement with South Africa. This would provide Japan with an alternative, 
politically reliable supply of rare metals.  
 
In any event, JICA has been collaborating with regional organizations such as COMESA and 
SADC in constructing infrastructure. This infrastructure project has a heavy emphasis on 
transport links, with new roads, rail links, port facilities and improved border posts, all of 
which are intended to boost regional trade. A good example of this is the Nacala Corridor, 
which begins in Zambia, and runs east and then south through Malawi. In central Malawi it 
branches and the main line runs east through Mozambique, terminating at the port town of 
Nacala, in northern Mozambique. 
 
Primarily consisting of upgraded roads and rail links, the Nacala Corridor involves large sums 
of money being disbursed to improve the infrastructure. This project is by no means 
exclusively funded by JICA, with multiple donors, including the World Bank, European 
Union and the Danish International Development Agency all helping to finance the project 
(Weidner et al 2010). As of 2009, the African Development Bank was the largest financier, 
driving the project with a loan of US$ 181mn. At the same time, JICA contributed some US$ 
63mn (Business Monitor 2009), in addition to financing studies on upgrading Nacala port. In 
early 2012, Japan and Mozambique announced that they were discussing the possibility of 
JICA funding the Nacala port construction itself (Reuters 2012). 
 
As Cornelissen explains, Japanese corporations have embarked on numerous resource 
extraction and processing projects in Southern Africa, including manganese mining in South 
Africa, aluminium smelting in Mozambique and a major nickel mining project in Madagascar 
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(Cornelissen 2012: 207). Additional port facilities and transport infrastructure would naturally 
be of great value to projects like these.  
 
Although Nacala port is in the wrong location to affect most of these projects, Tete province 
in northern Mozambique is home to the Moatize deposit, a massive coal formation. Northern 
Mozambique has become the target of major exploration and resource mining efforts by 
multinational corporations. Two of these corporations are Japanese: Nippon Steel Corporation 
is currently exploring for coal in Tete Province, while Mitsui Corporation has discovered the 
“second-largest natural gas reserve in the world” at the Rovuma basin, off the coast of 
northern Mozambique (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012, Nederlandse Ambassade 2011).  
 
In a news report from 2012, the managing director of Vale Mozambique, a local subsidiary of 
a major international mining corporation, is quoted as saying that the Nacala rail link was the 
best option for exporting coal mined in Tete province, and that it in fact “makes the project 
viable and allows for expansion of coal mining activities in Moatize” (Transport World Africa 
2012a).  
 
From this evidence it is quite clear that the Nacala Corridor will significantly facilitate the 
exploitation and export of local natural resources. 
 
In terms of the relative distribution of ODA, Hirano (2012) also provides a brief but useful 
and up-to-date assessment of the level of Japan's engagement with Africa in this regard. By 
appeal to historical statistics he demonstrates that historically, East Asia took up the vast 
majority of Japan's aid disbursements, but that recently this has changed, with Africa now 
receiving more ODA from Japan than any other region. Additionally, Japan has shifted the 
emphasis of its ODA from loans to grant aid. These changes have brought Japan's aid levels 
and configuration into line with “Germany, France and the UK” (Hirano 2012: 196). 
 
This formulation should be read in conjunction with Cornelissen, who notes that 
 
“Although Japan was at one point the top aid donor to sub-Saharan Africa, since the late 
1990s there has been a steady decline in Japanese aid disbursements to the continent, 
which paralleled trends in Japan’s global aid contributions” (Cornelissen 2012: 203). 
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In addition to these trends, Hirano traces the rise of the Private Public Partnership (PPP) in 
Japan's ODA, another 'traditional donor' trend that he sees as developing in Japanese ODA 
practises (Hirano 2012). 
 
Turning from these aid issues to economic ties, Hirano notes that South Africa has been 
Japan's largest trading partner on the African continent. As of 2008 this trade was largely 
dominated by automobiles and platinum. This trend has continued, although the volume of 
trade has decreased dramatically as a result of the economic crisis. 
 
In a discussion of Foreign Direct Investment trends, Natasha Skidmore notes a significant 
increase in Japanese FDI since 1994, but argues that there are some key obstacles to greater 
Japanese investment. These include the usual problems: HIV/Aids, crime, poor public service, 
low productivity and the Zimbabwean crisis, which was in full swing at the time. However, 
she also highlights the amount of FDI that is being drawn to China, arguing that South Africa 
needs to become a more competitive investment destination if it is to attract Japanese 
investment in the face of China’s popularity as an investment capital (Skidmore 2004: 20). 
 
Similarly, Philip Rudolph Nel considers South African – Japanese economic relations, and 
gives a prognosis of possible future prospects for investment in South Africa by Japanese 
firms. Nel largely comes to the conclusion that despite plenty of positive pronouncements 
from political leaders, South Africa has not generally seen a massive surge of FDI from 
Japanese businesses, with the exceptions of the automotive industry, and a major joint 
investment in aluminium smelting in Mozambique (Nel 2005: 1, 28 – 29, 31). He argues that 
the situation is not likely to change, unless South Africa and Japan focus on developing long 
term ties, through mechanisms such as TICAD, as well as bilateral trade forums (Nel 2005: 
45–47). 
 
More recently, Fiona Dwinger (2010) reviews the recent history of South Africa and Japan, 
providing some helpful context. Dwinger is focused on geopolitical issues and jockeying for 
United Nations Security Council seats and in this vein she notes that “some critics assert that 
[Japan] is actively utilising its foreign aid policy and TICAD to entice African states into 
supporting Japan's bid - in exchange for economic and technical assistance” (Dwinger 2010). 
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3.4 Continuations and departures 
 
Perhaps the largest overall shift in Japan's stance towards Africa lies in the implementation of 
TICAD, as Ampiah argues, stating that “The transformation in Japan’s relations with Africa 
since the 1990s manifests a clear departure from the nature of Japanese foreign policy towards 
the region in the previous decades” (2012: 171).  Evidence from the field also suggests that 
TICAD is seen as a significant and original achievement, in that it involved a significant 
departure from the earlier, Cold-war dominated aid structures
14
. Within the TICAD process, 
perhaps the largest shift was during TICAD IV, with the implementation of concrete projects 
finally dominating the agenda. Having said that, much of the discourse of TICAD has 
remained consistent, with the notion of 'ownership' and the 'Asian experience' remaining as 
insistent themes throughout the conferences. 
 
It cannot be denied that TICAD has significant links to Japan's national interest. Furthermore, 
although Japan is no longer attempting to confront and contain the Communist 'threat' in 
Africa, it is still very much aware of its own status as a resource-poor nation, and the value of 
Africa as a valuable supplier of resources. Indeed, TICAD IV represents an increased 
emphasis on this perspective, as both Cornelissen and Hirano suggest. (Cornelissen 2012, 
Hirano 2005) 
 
However, it can definitely be seen that Japan's ODA in Africa has moved away from its Cold 
War roots in a very real fashion.  
 
The emphasis on ownership throughout TICAD, and the fairly serious implementation of this 
creed as evidenced by Japanese support for NEPAD infrastructure projects is particularly 
interesting. The One Stop Border Post project is not designed to support resource exports: It is 
intended to facilitate trade between African countries. Japan's robust support for this project 
suggests that current Japanese aid schemes, while laid out with an eye to self-interest, are also 
greatly informed by the plans, demands and policies of the recipient countries. The NEPAD 
infrastructure development project was previously dismissed by JICA officials as 
unnecessary, but is now apparently being championed by JICA. Furthermore, Japan is no 
                                                 
14 In an interview a Dirco official remarked that TICAD was one of the first uses of aid in a "political but not 
ideological" fashion (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). This is suggestive of a perception of TICAD 
as a departure from Cold War era aid patterns as well as the Washington Consensus.  
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longer obliged to mollify African states in order to contain diplomatic fall out from supporting 
the Apartheid government. Despite this, Japanese aid to Africa is greater than its aid to any 
other region. 
 
It is clear that there has been a shift in Japanese-South African relations, occasioned by the 
end of the Cold War and the fall of the apartheid regime. However, although Japan no longer 
acts on the basis of a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', it was still wedded to the 'key states' 
strategy post-1994, as well as the importance of South Africa as a source of strategic 
resources. One sign of this continuation can be seen in the way in which Japan offered ODA 
packages of such significant size to South Africa, immediately following the fall of apartheid. 
Clearly, South Africa was still a critical element of Japan's strategy in Africa, and this resulted 
in its ODA distribution being weighted accordingly. The way in which the first package was 
so clearly linked to resource extraction also strongly supports the notion that at the time the 
Japanese state was still invested in South Africa as a source of strategic resources. Nearly 20 
years after the first ODA package and 40 years after the resource crisis of the 1970s, Japan 
remains eager to maintain a steady stream of natural resources from South Africa. Japan is 
fundamentally a resource-poor, import dependent nation, and South Africa is still a provider 
of resources that are critical for Japan's industry, and consequently its economic survival. 
 
It is possible that Japan's ODA patterns have shifted somewhat, however. The 'rebuilding' of 
the second package in 1999 is particularly interesting, and suggests a modest departure from 
the earlier strategy of using ODA as merely being direct support for the extractive industries, 
or as a corporate welfare scheme for Japanese conglomerates. Admittedly, this shift was in 
response to South African complaints about the first package, which would suggest that Japan 
had fallen back into the mould of the reactive state and was simply acting under external 
pressure. However, JICA's involvement in African regional infrastructure initiatives suggests 
that this trend continued, and that Japanese ODA is becoming more responsive, and more 
oriented towards the needs of recipient nations.  
 
This falls in line with the emphasis on 'ownership' during the TICAD process, and may be 
linked with the way in which TICAD IV finally resulted in a flurry of implementation and 
delivery. This trend is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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3.5 Limitations and Gaps 
 
Considering this body of literature, it is clear that the history of the relationship is fairly well 
covered, although not in exhaustive detail. Some of this may be related to the fact that the 
relationship is limited, as bilateral relationships go. For example, Japanese – US ties are 
extensive and deep, and there is a staggering amount of literature available on this, working at 
all levels of analysis. On the other hand, South African – Japanese relations are rather less 
extensive, and there is consequently less to research and write about.  
 
Within the historical corpus of work, the role of the bureaucratic organizations is subjected to 
a fairly comprehensive treatment. For example, Osada acknowledges bureaucratic relations as 
an analytical issue in her history of South African-Japanese relations and discusses the 
historical aspects of both South African and Japanese foreign policy making systems. Osada 
argues that historically, South African foreign policy has been dominated by the executive, 
with Prime Minister or President “holding overwhelming executive power” (Osada 2002: 6-
23). By contrast, the Japanese foreign policy was dominated by bureaucrats. In the Japanese 
system, progress through the ranks of the ruling party is only made by allying with local 
interest groups, which militates against foreign policy expertise or decision-making becoming 
a priority for Japanese prime ministers (Osada 2002). Additionally, the general weakness of 
Prime Ministers in Japan and a very high turnover rate in Japanese Prime Ministers tends to 
prevent them from becoming experts on foreign policy issues or making close connections 
with foreign leaders (Osada 2002: 12). 
 
Similarly, Morikawa devotes multiple chapters of Big Business and Diplomacy to a discussion 
of Japanese foreign policy making structures, and in particular the various contests between 
MOFA and MITI. Additionally, he discusses the influence of the keidanren in some detail. 
 
In contrast to this fairly well-documented history, analysis of this aspect of contemporary 
South African - Japanese ties is still inadequate, with little being written since Alden's work. 
Of this work, almost all of it is written using a state centred level of analysis. Skidmore's 
analysis of the ODA package is a good example of this: She considers the situation in terms of 
'Japanese' and 'South African' actions, with little reference to the fact that both governments 
consist of multiple departments and agencies that may have different agendas, cultures and 
priorities. Alden certainly speaks to this aspect, which is why his arguments have more 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
 
explanatory vigour, but he does not thoroughly explain the basis for his conclusions. Alden 
explains the 'why' of the ODA package failure (misunderstandings between bureaucracies) but 
he does not greatly speak to the 'how' of these failures. How did these misunderstandings 
arise? What were the exact miscommunications or misperceptions that led to them? How did 
these arise from the different organizations agendas, interests and organizational cultures? 
These are the kinds of questions that could have been addressed through a bureaucratic 
analysis of such an issue. 
 
It should also be noted that even this work is somewhat dated. A Distant Mirror was 
published in 2002, while The Protea and the Chrysanthemum was published in 2003. A 
decade has elapsed since then, and fresh work on the field, taking into account the most recent 
developments, is definitely called for. These recent developments include the re-organization 
of JICA and the introduction of the TICAD process (entering its 5
th
 iteration in June 2013). 
Japan has also embarked on a strategy of seeking trade deals with strategically chosen 
countries around the world. 
 
South Africa, meanwhile, has embarked on a new strategy of regional integration and 
fostering South-South relations, culminating in its entry into the newly formed BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) coalition in 2011
15
.  The current South 
African administration is focused on developing value added industries in South Africa, 
particularly through the development of the mineral processing industry
16
, which will 
undoubtedly impact on the way in which Japanese resource extraction corporations will do 
business.  
 
These major policy thrusts are all relatively recent, and will likely have a significant impact 
on the relationship between Japan and South Africa.  
 
In conclusion, the major historical questions in Japanese African relations lie around the 
Japanese role in Africa, and its moral expediency. The end of the Cold War and the resultant 
                                                 
15  Dirco’s 2010 strategic plan emphasises African integration, regional integration and South-South 
cooperation. See Chapter 4.1 for more on this. 
16  Mineral beneficiation was referenced in both the 2012 and 2011 State of the Nation speeches by President 
Jacob Zuma. Its importance was underlined in interviews with both DTI and Dirco representatives 
(Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012; Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). Again, Chapter 4.1 discusses 
this in greater detail. 
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shift in aid patterns have brought about a new regime which came to be exemplified in 
TICAD. TICAD, while initially failing to deliver on concrete projects, helped to popularise 
and mainstream concepts such as 'ownership' and 'self-help'. The value of this at least partially 
tempers the criticisms of TICAD as a mere talk-shop. A talk-shop can have value, even if 
only in that it can lay the foundation for effective future action. To some extent this has been 
realized with TICAD IV being seen as the TICAD of delivery. In this TICAD, the general 
discussion was around Japan's national interest, and what this said about Japan's commitment 
to ODA in Africa. However, self-interest is a necessary element of most aid programmes, and 
it is also possible that Japan's self-interest has managed to result in speedier action on earlier 
promises. It is possible that TICAD IV's success was also partly caused by Japan's desire not 
to continue losing ground in the face of China's diplomatic initiatives in Africa, such as 
FOCAC, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  However, it is also important to consider 
that if TICAD is a process, then TICAD IV may well represent one of the more recent 
products of the process. Thus, viewed broadly, TICAD can be said to have moved from 
discussion to action in a 'mere' 20 years. 
 
Additionally, there is some contemporary evidence that the concept of recipient 'ownership' of 
aid has indeed borne fruit. This is further addressed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis - Recent bureaucratic-level engagements 
between Japan and South Africa 
 
As the culmination of the thesis, this chapter lays out the various findings of the field 
research, coupled with an analysis of these findings. To contextualise these results, the chapter 
begins with a discussion of the various organizations that were selected for examination, 
including a review of the official mandates and stated priorities of these bureaucracies. It then 
presents the major outcomes of the interviews and goes on to discuss the themes and issues 
that emerged during this process. 
 
By way of review, these interviews involved inquiry into the different perceptions, 
connections and stated priorities of some of the various government agencies involved in 
Japan-South African relations. As explained previously, the rationale behind this method of 
inquiry is that in the field of Japanese-South African relations, understanding of the different 
bureaucracies and their impact on the relationship is lacking. In order to rectify this matter, a 
bureaucratic analysis was deemed necessary.  This would help develop a better understanding 
of the different bureaucracies and their roles in the relationship. 
 
On the South African side, the key concern of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
was found to be regional integration and job creation, primarily via mineral beneficiation 
projects. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) was also 
concerned with finding trade partners to support beneficiation, as well as fostering greater 
regional integration and forging partnerships with strategic countries. This concern for 
regional integration can be linked with the broader drive for integration by the African Union, 
and the various African Regional Economic Communities, such as the South African Customs 
Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
 
From the Japanese side, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) both seemed to be concerned with maintaining Japanese 
competitiveness through signing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) or Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) with selected countries. This would maintain market access for Japanese 
products and ensure the supply of raw materials for the Japanese economy. 
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The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was primarily concerned with 
maintaining its relevance in the South African donor 'marketplace', but it was also focused on 
supporting regional integration efforts through providing financial support for regional 
infrastructure programmes. At least some of these infrastructure programmes would also 
assist in the export of materials to other nations, including Japan. 
 
The results of the interviews were examined via two particular avenues or themes. These 
avenues of research emerged during the research process as a means of interrogating the 
various elements of how Japanese and South African bureaucracies have interacted, and how 
this has impacted on the relationship. Both of these themes have been emergent, in that they 
appeared as significant factors or issues worthy of discussion during the field work phase. 
This was largely determined by noting which issues seemed to emerge during multiple 
interviews, and how different organizations seemed to speak to these same issues in different 
ways. 
 
The first theme was a discussion of South Africa as an operating environment for Japanese 
agencies, in particular the way in which the interplay of South African assertiveness has 
impacted on JICA's activities. This is considered in conjunction with the principle of 
'ownership', which has been a consistent theme in Japanese aid discourse in the context of 
Africa and TICAD. It became apparent that South Africa presents unique challenges to 
Japanese agencies, largely due to the greater assertiveness and independence of the various 
South African government agencies, by comparison with other African countries. JICA has 
responded to this environment by altering the scope and nature of its operations to conform to 
this environment. 
 
The next theme for interrogation was the history of the proposed South Africa – Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement, and the possible causes of its failure. The EPA is read as a 
departure from the much touted 'reactive state', and represents an element of a broader 
Japanese thrust for increased bilateral agreements, in order to maintain its global economic 
competitiveness.   
 
While the negotiation process did suffer from issues caused by bureaucratic misperceptions or 
miscommunications, the true reasons for the EPA's failure were found to be largely bound up 
in concerns over the value of the trade deal for South Africa, and the complexities of 
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negotiating such an agreement within the context of SACU and SADC. Additionally, SACU 
capacity constraints contributed to the demise of the EPA. 
 
4.1 Mandates and priorities, strategies and programmes 
 
Within the South African government, Dirco operates as a facilitating and intermediary 
organization, with the responsibility of articulating South African policy to foreign groups, as 
well as arranging meetings between South African government organizations (such as the 
DTI) and relevant external parties (such as potential investors). Additionally, Dirco is 
responsible for organising structured bilateral meetings between the South African and 
Japanese governments. Ministerial visits and meetings, however, are organized by the 
Ministry of the Presidency (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). 
 
Internally, Dirco is separated into Branches, which are broken down into Chief Directorates, 
which subdivide into Directorates. Directorates are organised geographically. For example, 
the Central and East Asian Directorate handles issues involving the various "-stans" 
(excluding Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Korea and Japan. Naturally, a large amount of the 
substantive work is handled by missions abroad. Dirco offices in South Africa provide support 
for this work (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). 
 
Inter alia, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's general strategic 
priorities as laid out in their 2010 strategic plan are to “promote programmes aimed at 
regional economic integration, prioritise the implementation of NEPAD...strengthen the AU 
and its structures [and] continue to invest...in the promotion of peace, stability and security 
among countries of Africa” (Dirco 2010:2).  
 
In relation to Asia, Dirco's stated policy is to "place [a] high priority on the strategic 
partnership between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and intensify economic relations 
with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as selected countries of Central Asia" (Dirco: 
2010: 14 - 15). 
 
In the context of aid: 
  
"South Africa will also continue to engage these countries to direct development 
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assistance to the national priority areas of the South African Government. The emphasis 
in bilateral  and multilateral engagements within the context of the Forum on China-
Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD) and the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) will be on the 
implementation of the various development initiatives for Africa, particularly to ensure 
that they are aligned to the NEPAD and REC priority programmes" (Dirco 2010: 15). 
 
During interviews, a Dirco representative indicated that two major issues that Dirco was 
concerned with were maintaining South Africa's international economic competitiveness, and 
seeking out partners who would facilitate beneficiation projects.  He indicated that they were 
highly interested in encouraging trade and investment that would support beneficiation 
efforts. This links with the emphasis placed on beneficiation by the DTI, but Dirco was also 
particularly concerned with maintaining issues of market access and competitiveness. 
Australia was specifically mentioned as a potential rival to South Africa, in the sense that 
Australia sold large amounts of raw resources to Asian countries, although Australia had 
specifically steered clear of any beneficiation strategies (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 
2012). 
 
Meanwhile, the Department of Trade and Industry's priorities, as laid out in their medium 
term strategic framework for 2010 – 2013, are articulated through multiple projects intended 
to generate employment and alleviate the effects of the global financial crisis. The DTI 
derives this mandate from the government's Medium Term Strategic Framework, "which 
identifies the creation of decent work as the primary objective of South Africa’s economic 
policy" (Department of Trade and Industry 2010). 
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In this vein, beneficiation and the subsequent development of manufacturing has been a 
major priority for the DTI. DTI Minister Rob Davies, in a press conference held in Tokyo, 
made the argument that: 
 
“while we've been growing, we also need to develop...And I think we know that there's 
been no case anywhere, at any time in economic history, of any country that has gone 
from being poor to rich without developing value added products, that we cannot 
continue to grow just on the basis of producing and exporting primary products, and 
importing and consuming products that are made elsewhere” (Japan National Press Club, 
2012:  8:29). 
 
These beneficiation efforts are clearly explained in a strategy document released by the 
Department of Minerals and Energy, entitled “A beneficiation strategy for the minerals of 
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South Africa” (2011). 
  
Although released by the Department of Minerals and Energy, this document “was a product 
of an interdepartmental task team consisting of representatives from the DME, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Science and Technology, the 
Department of Public Enterprises, the National Treasury, and the Presidency – highlighting 
the need for a collaborative effort to successfully implement this strategy” (Van Der Merwe 
2009)
17
. So, while an interdepartmental initiative, the beneficiation strategy is clearly a major 
part of the DTI's priorities and strategic thinking. This was confirmed by DTI officials 
(Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012). The final beneficiation strategy document states that, 
"The beneficiation strategy provides a framework that seeks to translate the country’s sheer 
comparative advantage inherited from mineral resources endowment to a national competitive 
advantage" (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011: iii). Briefly stated, beneficiation 
involves attempts to boost the local economy and generate employment by encouraging local 
processing of raw materials and subsequent manufacture of goods from those raw materials. 
For example, instead of exporting raw platinum ore to be processed abroad, beneficiation 
would see the platinum being processed locally and then made into car components or 
jewellery in South African factories. Currently precious metals comprise South Africa's 
largest export to Japan
18
. As Figure 4.1 clearly shows, of these precious metals, platinum is by 
far the greatest. Other precious metals and gemstones are exported in virtually negligible 
quantities. 
 
As part of this beneficiation strategy, specific sectors have been identified for interventions, 
including automotive components such as catalytic converters, which are produced using 
platinum (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011:18). This element of the beneficiation 
strategy would have implications for Japanese automotive corporations such as Toyota and 
Mitsubishi, and by extension, broader trade with Japan. The beneficiation strategy also 
explicitly mentions Japan as a target for jewellery manufacturing, in which the same strategy 
of encouraging the local manufacture of finished products would be implemented 
(Department of Minerals and Energy 2011: 18). It should be noted that despite the DTI's 
support for this programme, South Africa has struggled with the beneficiation process, and 
has had to resort to various measures in an attempt to support it. For example, in 2007 the 
                                                 
17  Van Der Merwe is discussing the 2009 draft strategy. The final strategy is dated June of 2011. 
18 See Chapter 1, Figure 1.1 for general exports from South Africa to Japan. 
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South African government proposed banning the export of raw chrome ore in an attempt to 
prop up the local ferro-chrome industry, which was suffering heavily from competition with 
Chinese ferro-chrome manufacturers (Hill 2007). As of 2012 the chrome processing industry 
was still struggling, with "raw chrome ore exports smashing the chrome industry" (Creamer 
2012). 
 
Significantly, the beneficiation strategy states that "South Africa’s trade agreements, both 
current and future, must seek to support the beneficiation policy of government" (Department 
of Minerals and Energy 2011: 11). This position has been reiterated in a speech by Mineral 
Resources Minister Susan Shabangu (Sabinet 2011). As is discussed later, this position may 
have had implications for the proposed Japan – South Free Trade Agreement.  
 
Another key priority that the DTI articulates is the development of South-South relations, 
specifically with China, India and Brazil. Within Africa, "efforts will continue to consolidate 
the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC’s) Free Trade Area (FTA) as the 
anchor of regional economic integration, while also pursuing integration with the African 
continent and the Trilateral FTA between  SADC, the East African Community and Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa" (Department of Trade and Industry 2010). 
 
At least one of the strategies for fostering regional integration has been through improving 
transport infrastructure that will assist in regional trade. South African Trade and Industry 
Minister Rob Davies also discussed this at the press conference in Tokyo, during which he 
said, in reference to the COMESA-EAC-SADC region, that “We need to build infrastructure 
that connects our countries so that we can trade, one with another” (Japan National Press Club 
2012:  11:55). 
 
In another statement from the same press conference, Minister Davies was asked about what 
the South African government expected from Japanese companies in the realm of 
infrastructure. In his response the Minister emphasised the importance of “the infrastructure 
that is going to link up our countries”, explicitly contrasting this with the extant infrastructure, 
which primarily facilitates the export of resources from the African continent (Japan National 
Press Club 2012:  27:45). 
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These statements strongly support the contention of analysts such as Skidmore (2004) that, at 
the rhetorical level at least, South Africa's economic diplomacy remains focused on South-
South diplomacy and regional integration. 
 
This quest for integration is largely premised on the notion that better connectivity will foster 
regional integration, and assist in increasing regional trade. Khandelwal explains that: 
 
“Regional integration has long been seen in Africa as a means of achieving 
industrialization and modernization through encouraging trade and securing economies 
of scale and market access...Several studies (see Iqbal and Khan, eds.,1997) have 
pointed out that African trade has been hindered by distorted trade regimes and high 
transaction costs owing to inadequate transport, information, and communications 
infrastructure” (Khandelwal 2004: 6). 
 
These notions are by no means peculiar to the South African government. Rather, this can be 
seen as a persistent and continuous theme, laid out in policy statements and founding 
documents from the African Union, as well as RECs such as COMESA and SACU. 
 
For the AU, this integration drive is underpinned by the Treaty of Abuja (1991), which set the 
ground for these integrative efforts. As a recent Status of Integration in Africa report explains 
 
“The Abuja Treaty lays the ground work for the creation of the African Economic 
Community (AEC), whereby the economies of the Member States of the AU will be 
fully integrated. The goal of the AEC is to transform the fifty three economies of Africa 
into a single economic and monetary union, with a common currency, free mobility of 
capital and labour. It is the desire of the leadership of the continent as stipulated in the 
Constitutive Act to have an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Fund and an 
African Investment Bank in place when the AEC is fully functional” (African Union 
Commission 2009: 8). 
 
The report goes on to note that:  
 
“Regional integration in Africa has been the main focus of African Countries since the 
establishment of the then Organization of the African Unity (OAU). A number of 
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declarations have been made by Member States to move the integration process in 
Africa forward. Similarly, the Abuja Treaty, Lagos Plan of Action, African Private 
Sector Forum among others, emphasize the need to promote regional integration in 
Africa” (African Union Commission 2009: 11). 
 
In line with this goal, the various RECs that fall within the AU have all generated their own 
plans and schemes for furthering regional integration. As COMESA's strategy website 
explains: 
 
“COMESA's ultimate objective is to create a fully integrated and internationally 
competitive and unified region in which goods, services, capital and persons move 
freely. The principal route that has been chosen in order to realise this goal is 
development integration through development of trade and investment. The primary 
instrument for achieving trade development is trade liberalisation and the freeing of 
market forces” (COMESA, no date). 
 
Similarly, the SADC Treaty explains that SADC has been founded to “promote regional 
economic welfare, collective self-reliance and economic integration” (SADC Treaty 1993: 1). 
This is informed by the notion that: 
 
“Integration is fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe 
are organising themselves into closer economic and political ties. These movements 
towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world, both economically and 
politically. Firms within these economic blocs will benefit from economies of scale 
provided by large markets, to become competitive both internally and internationally” 
(SADC Treaty 1993: 2). 
 
The South African thrust for regional integration has clearly not developed in a vacuum. The 
SADC treaty hearkens back to 1993, and it references an even older declaration made by 
then-member states in 1980 (SADC Treaty 1993: 1). A clear link can be seen between this 
broader programme, and the DTI and Dirco's stated mandates to further integration. 
 
Recently Japanese government agencies have begun placing significant emphasis on Africa as 
a resource provider and potential market. In relation to South Africa, Japan's interests also fall 
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under their broader economic diplomacy strategy of signing EPAs and FTAs with foreign 
nations. The Ministry of Foreign Affair's Blue Book outlines Japanese foreign policy priorities 
and positions from year to year. Although it often lacks detail, it is an excellent indicator of 
Japan's public, considered positions on a range of topics. 
 
The 2011 Blue Book's section on Africa is not extensive, but it does state that "Africa is 
becoming increasingly important for Japan’s diplomacy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 
16). Among other reasons, the Blue Book mentions that "it is also important for Japan’s 
economy to strengthen economic relationship with Africa, a potentially huge market which is 
endowed with abundant natural resources" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 16). 
 
The document goes on to state that "Japan continued to actively advance its policy on Africa 
in 2010", emphasising its developmental and humanitarian activities on the continent 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 16). 
 
This Blue Book also lays out broad Japanese external economic policy as follows; 
 
"Japan needs to actively advance economic diplomacy to strengthen its economy as the 
economic conditions inside and outside the country become increasingly severe, with a 
more fluid international situation, declining population, ageing society with a low 
fertility rate, and large fiscal deficit. Specifically, Japan will actively advance efforts in 
the fields of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), natural resources, energy and food, international promotion of infrastructure 
systems, and inbound tourism and Japan Brand”  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 
24). 
 
Finally, the Blue Book states that: 
 
"Actively supporting Japanese enterprises has become particularly important in recent 
years, with the advance of economic partnership worldwide and the rising demand for 
infrastructure" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 29). 
 
The Ministry of Economy, Training and Industry's 2012 White Paper supports this notion, 
with the role of EPAs/FTAs being highlighted. This comes in a context of increased 
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international competition, and an increase in the number of FTAs with high levels of trade 
liberalization. Among others, the White Paper cites the US-Chilean Free Trade Agreement of 
2004, and the US-Australian FTA of 2005 (METI White Paper 2012: 637). 
 
The White Paper goes on to warn that: 
 
“If Japan falls behind in taking initiatives toward EPA and if Japan’s trade and 
investment environment should pale compared to those of other nations, the locational 
competitiveness and export competitiveness of Japan will be damaged, bringing loss of 
employment opportunities. In particular, the lagging of Japan in taking initiatives will 
cause significant impact on Japanese companies’ competitiveness in correlation with 
South Korea” (METI White Paper 2012b: 641). 
 
This notion is not original to the 2012 White Paper. For example, in 2010 the Japanese 
Cabinet released the “Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships”, which states, 
inter alia: 
 
[I]f Japan’s trade and investment environment becomes less  
attractive than the environment in other countries, there is a possibility that future 
employment opportunities will be lost. In order to achieve the “strong economy” 
described in Japan’s New Growth Strategy (endorsed by the Cabinet on 18 June 2010), 
it is necessary to deepen economic relationships with Asian and emerging countries 
whose markets are expected to grow, and with Western and resource-rich countries 
(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2010). 
 
From this, it appears that Japanese economic priorities in South Africa will encompass greater 
resource access and promoting Japanese business interests. Japanese policy makers appear to 
have been infected with a sense of urgency. They believe Japan needs to sign EPAs and FTAs 
in order to maintain its competitive edge against other manufacturing economies such as 
South Korea.  
 
The value of the MOFA Blue Book, the METI White Papers and the Basic Policy on EPAs is 
that they consist of high level, carefully considered policy statements, which gives them 
particular value in drawing conclusions about Japanese mandates and overt priorities. Field 
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research in the form of separate interviews with DTI, Dirco and Japanese Embassy officials 
indicates that at least one of these stated agendas has clearly been acted upon, in the form of 
the proposed EPA
19
 between Japan and South Africa (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012; 
Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). 
 
Current Japanese strategy involves an integration of efforts between different Japanese 
government agencies. During the Mining Indaba in February of 2012 METI Senior vice-
Minister Tadahiro Matsushita gave a speech entitled "Kizuna
20
 – New Ties between Japan and 
Africa". In this speech he highlighted Japanese aid initiatives in Africa in the context of 
corporate social responsibility, and the potential benefits of Japanese corporations investing in 
Africa. He also pledged Japanese government support for Corporate Social Responsibility 
initiatives, stating that "The Japanese government will be pleased to support [CSR] projects 
through the utilization of ODA and other aid measures" (Matsushita 2012: 4).  
 
Another example of this integration of developmental initiatives with economic agendas can 
be seen in the joint statement released by Japan and South Africa DTI Minister Rob Davies' 
visit to Japan. In a joint statement with METI Minister Yukio Edano, both countries 
emphasized the facilitation of trade and developmental initiatives, particularly "supporting 
Africa's development plans, [and] preparing for the fifth Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICADV)" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012). In 
conjunction with Matsushita's speech at the Mining Indaba, this statement suggests that while 
METI's focus is naturally on economic and trade issues, it is clearly aware of the importance 
of developmental and aid issues in the South African context (Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry 2012; Matsushita 2012). 
 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (Dokuritsu Gyousei Houjin Kokusai Kyouryoku 
Kikou, "Independent Administrative Institution for International Cooperation") is the key 
mechanism by which Japan dispenses humanitarian aid abroad. Previously the overseas 
cooperation arm of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, it has been spun off into its 
own entity. Assigned in 2008 as an umbrella body for Japanese aid initiatives, JICA claims to 
be the world's largest bilateral aid agency, with a budget of over 10 billion dollars (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency 2008). A report by Africa-Asia Confidential explains that 
                                                 
19  See 4.3 for a more detailed discussion of this proposed agreement. 
20 Kizuna is a Japanese word meaning close bonds or ties between people or a group of people. 
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"In October 2008, the whole aid system was reformed with JICA now handling yen loans and 
much of the grant aid," (Africa-Asia Confidential 2008). Prior to this the responsibility for 
technical cooperation, Official Development Assistance loans and grant aid were  spread 
between JICA, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Ministry for Foreign Aid 
(Interview, JICA Representative, 6 June 2012).  
 
The Japan External Trade Organization (Nihon Boueki Shinkou Kikou, “Japan Foreign Trade 
Promotion Organization)” is another independent administrative agency. It is primarily funded 
by METI, with some additional funding from the Japanese Ministries of Finance and 
Agriculture (Interview, JETRO Representative 6 June 2012; Ministry of Trade, Economy and 
Industry 2012a). 
 
According to JETRO's official website, "Originally established in 1958 to promote Japanese 
exports abroad, JETRO's core focus in the 21st century has shifted toward promoting foreign 
direct investment into Japan and helping small to medium size Japanese firms maximize their 
global export potential" (Japan External Trade Organization 2012). 
 
In South Africa, JETRO's mission is to increase trade and investment between South Africa 
and Japan. Allegedly, this is bilateral in direction, with JETRO supporting both Japanese 
companies seeking to invest in South Africa, and South African companies looking to invest 
or trade with Japan. The specific ratio of Japanese to South African companies that JETRO 
assists is unknown, however, and it would be somewhat surprising if JETRO did not, in fact, 
direct most of its assets towards assisting Japanese companies with market access in South 
Africa. Of late, as commodity prices have increased, JETRO has prioritised the promotion of 
market access for Japanese companies in South Africa (Interview, JETRO representative, 6 
June 2012). 
 
JICA has some level of organizational independence, while JETRO is rather more dependent 
on the Japanese embassy for diplomatic and organizational support. This is not due to 
differing levels of legislative autonomy, but rather due to their different sizes and capacities – 
within South Africa, JICA is somewhat larger than JETRO, and consequently has more 
organizational capacity. In particular, when it comes to matters of access to South African 
government officials and agencies, JETRO tends to rely on the Japanese Embassy to assist it 
with access, whereas JICA usually handles its own liaison activities. JICA and the Japanese 
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Embassy do still coordinate closely however, with regular meetings.  
 
Within South Africa, almost all Japanese policy is coordinated through the Japanese Embassy. 
The Embassy acts as a “gate-opener” in South Africa. It assists Japanese businesses and 
government agencies such as JICA and JETRO in gaining access to government officials and 
in resolving issues such as problems with permits and other bureaucratic processes (Interview, 
Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). 
 
The Japanese Embassy is well suited to assisting JETRO by liaising with the South African 
government, since it also helps individual Japanese businesses with navigating the South 
African government bureaucracies. This assistance becomes necessary when, for example, a 
mining business has applied for an exploration permit but has not received any response from 
the government. Generally, although JETRO could be involved in such matters, Japanese 
corporations often prefer to approach the Embassy directly, in order to maintain 
confidentiality when it relates to matters such as exploration permits (Interview, Japanese 
Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). 
 
Internally, the Japanese Embassy hosts staff members from the Japanese MOFA, METI, the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and MEXT, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Science and Technology (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012). 
As a result of this integration, it was decided to treat the Japanese Embassy as a singular 
entity, which can be expected to take its cues from the stated objectives of both MOFA and 
METI. 
 
In Cape Town the Japanese Consulate operates as a satellite organization. However its 
distance from Pretoria results in the Consulate receiving some de facto autonomy, although it 
is still very definitely a subordinate entity to the Japanese Embassy. Staffing and resource 
constraints affect the Japanese Consulate significantly. Combined with a limited mandate, this 
results in the Consul generally confining itself to three areas: offering consular assistance to 
Japanese visitors, promoting Japan as a tourism destination and implementing cultural 
exchange programmes (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012). 
 
As part of this public diplomacy the Japanese Consulate has arranged exhibitions of art by 
Japanese school children at locations such as George Museum in the Western Cape, and at the 
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Japanese Consulate in Cape Town (George Museum 2012). 
 
Due to Parliament being located in Cape Town, however, the Japanese consul also meets with 
Members of Parliament (MPs) in order to discuss South African - Japanese relations, and to 
provide MPs with information on Japanese topics, such as reconstruction efforts following the 
March 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Higher level meetings, such as with Ministers, take 
place exclusively through the Japanese Embassy, although the Japanese Consul may meet 
with provincial officials. When the Japanese Ambassador visits Cape Town to meet with MPs 
or other high level officials the Japanese Consul usually sits in on those meetings (Interview, 
Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012). 
 
The Japanese Consulate has a very limited amount of engagement with trade issues. 
Occasionally the Japanese Consul meets with JETRO at business forums hosted in Cape 
Town, but it is clear that JETRO's primary relationship is with the main Embassy in Pretoria 
(Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012). 
 
4.2 South Africa as an Operating Environment for Japanese Agencies 
 
Japanese agencies in the study consistently reported adjusting their operations to suit South 
African conditions. For example, the Japanese Embassy restructured their internal 
organization to mirror the South African structure at the departmental and ministerial levels, 
in order to facilitate bilateral communication and cooperation. Additionally, JICA has had to 
significantly adjust the nature and type of its operations 1) to meet its internal mandates in 
relationship to South Africa's nature as a middle income country, 2) as a result of specific 
issues raised by the South African government (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 
2012; Interview, JICA Official, 6 June 2012). As mentioned earlier, METI has also clearly 
internalised the importance of at least making positive statements on aid and development 
issues in relationship to South Africa, and integrating these notions into its economic 
diplomacy. (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012)  
 
These adjustments have been made necessary by the peculiar demands and circumstances of 
South Africa and its development trajectory, as expressed by the vigorous and assertive 
responses of the South African government to Japanese projects and actions. It is also possible 
that the relative distance of the two countries, and the limited size of the Japanese community 
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in South Africa has had an effect on Japanese operations: Officials at JETRO felt that the 
Japanese government had a limited footprint in Africa, with insufficient resources and few 
organizations to promote Japanese interests. The Japanese Embassy also cited resource 
constraints as impacting on their operations (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 
2012; Interview, JETRO Official, 6 June 2012). 
 
South Africa's relative wealth compared to its neighbours (and indeed, most of sub-Saharan 
Africa) also means Japanese aid agencies have had to engage South Africa in a significantly 
different fashion to that of other African countries. As mentioned previously, assertiveness, 
relative bureaucratic complexity and a tendency to challenge perceived North-South patterns 
of development, trade and aid have been hallmarks of the South African approach to ODA 
from Japan (Alden 2002, Skidmore 2004).  
 
Additionally, South Africa's political location within SADC and SACU has presented specific 
challenges for the Japanese diplomatic community in their quest to deepen economic ties 
through the signing of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). This was demonstrated by 
the foundering of the EPA initiative, which is discussed in some detail later on. 
 
In ODA matters, JICA has experienced South Africa as being a significantly more challenging 
operating environment than its neighbouring countries, and as a result, has had to adapt quite 
significantly to South African conditions. (Interview, JICA official, 6 June 2012). Financially, 
of course, South Africa is quite a different case to its neighbours. It is categorised as a Middle 
Income country by JICA
21
, which affects the nature of aid that is provided. Specifically, direct 
grant aid of the type disbursed to countries like Mozambique is no longer generally 
sanctioned, in favour of loans and technical cooperation (Interview, JICA official, 6 June 
2012). These loans, however, are also restricted. They are only permitted in cases where the 
host government (South Africa) provides a loan guarantee, which further complicates matters. 
According to at least one source, the SA government has been traditionally reluctant to 
provide loan guarantees, unless the loans were made to government parastatals such as Eskom 
(Interview, TICAD advisor, 5 June 2012). 
 
                                                 
21 JICA takes its cue in determining this from the World Bank and the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)  
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In this vein it is instructive to compare recent JICA funding profiles for South Africa and 
Mozambique. In FY 2010 JICA made grant payments of 48.91 million USD to Mozambique. 
In the same year South Africa received grant aid payments of a mere 1.21 million USD. 
Technical cooperation to Mozambique in 2010 cost 13.28 million USD, while technical 
cooperation to SA totalled 7.13 million USD (JICA 2012; JICA 2012a). These statistics would 
suggest that JICA disburses significantly more money in Mozambique than South Africa. This 
spending is largely driven by regional infrastructure projects including road and rail links, 
such as the Nacala Corridor, mentioned in Chapter 3. 
 
By contrast, JICA's projects in South Africa have been built around skills transfer and training 
projects. Education has been of particular centred on assisting with teacher training, and 
providing volunteers to assist in skills transfer in areas such as agriculture and Small, Medium 
and Micro Enterprises. JICA has held workshops and training programmes featuring 
programmes in areas such as nutrition and education. HIV/Aids has featured prominently, but 
as noted earlier, JICA has focused on developing niche capabilities in HIV/Aids work, 
primarily in the fields of monitoring, evaluation and training officers (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 2012. Interview, JICA Official, 6 June 2012). 
 
These differences are almost certainly largely driven by the fact that South African 
infrastructure is currently developed to a significantly greater extent than its neighbours. 
However, JICA has demonstrated some appetite for funding infrastructure inside South 
Africa, as shown by their apparent interest in funding a high speed rail system
22
. Admittedly, 
it is quite unclear why JICA is interested in this particular project, and it is equally unclear 
how advanced any discussions around this project are. Although JICA co-hosted a conference 
with JETRO on improving rail systems in South Africa, it is not evident that this has resulted 
in any real momentum. As a result, it would be unwise to place too much emphasis on this 
initiative. JETRO's involvement in this rail system suggests that it may have something to do 
with simply marketing Japanese rail systems to South Africa, as opposed to any form of 
integrated development scheme. 
 
The construction of regional infrastructure however, is clearly in line with the priorities of the 
AU and RECs, such as SADC and COMESA, who have been prioritising infrastructure that 
                                                 
22 See page 117 – 118 for more details on this proposed rail project. 
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will support integration. As noted earlier, integration is a major issue for the RECs, and they 
seek to support these efforts with the construction of transport infrastructure. The construction 
of One Stop Border Posts, which lower waiting times at borders and facilitate transnational 
trade, can be seen as supporting this drive for integration. It is certainly true that 
developments such as the Nacala corridor would have direct benefits for Japanese 
corporations seeking to extract and export mineral products and natural gas. However, 
improving links between SADC countries will also assist in developing regional trade and 
transport. A better, quicker border post between Zimbabwe and Zambia cannot really be seen 
as merely a tool for hastening resource extraction and the export of Africa’s mineral wealth. 
Rather, it appears to be an earnest effort to assist the region with one of its key priorities, 
namely, better regional integration. This is particularly interesting given the long history of 
‘ownership’ as an element of Japanese aid discourse  
 
4.2.1 Assertiveness and ownership 
 
As mentioned previously, one of the key phenomena that emerged during the interview 
process is that South Africa is seen as having a more assertive, independent attitude than other 
sub-Saharan African countries in which JICA operates. This is particularly interesting in light 
of the observation by Alden that "post-apartheid relations with South Africa have been 
marked by dispute, disregard and controversy" (Alden 2002: 366). In particular,  Alden notes 
that South Africa has a record of not uncritically accepting aid offers from Japan, but rather 
having quite an independent approach to development and aid programmes (Alden 2002: 
379). 
 
Similarly, Skidmore argued that "South Africa is also trying to use Japanese ODA to 
change the fundamental, typically North-South pattern of the economic relationship" 
(Skidmore 1999: 3).  
 
Discussions with JICA and Dirco officials suggest that this pattern is still in place, with one 
JICA official complaining that South Africa demanded 'complex' bureaucratic procedures be 
followed, and had a very independent attitude. South Africa was contrasted with other African 
countries which apparently accepted aid offers with much less demur and with fewer 
complications (Interview, Deputy Representative, JICA, 6 June 2012). 
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For example, the DTI has engaged vigorously with JICA over skills transfer programmes. 
Initially, these programmes did not included agri-processing training, and this was one of the 
DTI's key priorities. The DTI raised these issues with JICA, and convinced JICA to send 
experts in agri-processing to South Africa to assist with skills development in this field. There 
have been further complications, due to the fact that Japanese agri-processing expertise is not 
always entirely suitable for South African agriculture. However, DTI officials very clearly felt 
that convincing JICA to send agri-processing experts was a significant 'win' for South Africa 
in this matter, largely because it dovetailed with DTI's goal of prioritising beneficiation 
projects (Interview, DTI Official, 2012).  
 
It is valuable to compare the notion of South Africa as 'difficult' with the view at Dirco. An 
official from Dirco, during a discussion around TICAD, stated that South Africa was 
particularly good at contributing to and engaging in the TICAD process, by contrast with 
other African states that, in his view, had a more passive approach to the situation (Interview, 
Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). 
 
This is a curious notion, given the long history of Japanese aid in Africa. As is explained 
below, Japanese aid discourse has a long history of valuing ownership, self-help and request 
based development, in which recipients are ostensibly responsible for determining priorities 
and making decisions about what kind of aid is needed, and how it should be delivered. Given 
South Africa's late entry as a recipient of Japanese aid, it is worth considering that some of the 
difficulties may have arisen as a result of insufficient experience on the part of both parties. 
South Africa may be inexperienced at handling Japanese aid, due to insufficient familiarity 
with the self-request system and ownership. Japanese aid agencies may have been more 
familiar with modalities and patterns of aid that, while appropriate in the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa, are not suited to South Africa. Indeed, as was mentioned by one interviewee 
(Interview, TICAD advisor, 5 June 2012), South Africa is no longer eligible for the kind of 
direct financial assistance that has been provided to other sub-Saharan African countries, by 
virtue of its position as a middle income country. Consequently, this limits JICA's activities to 
technical assistance, as opposed to direct grant aid. 
 
It must, however, be considered that nearly 20 years have elapsed since the original Mandela 
aid package. Of course, the second aid package of 1999 was rebuilt based on lessons learnt 
following the failure of the first package, but it is unclear how much has been learnt following 
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that. It certainly appears that JICA has responded by redirecting its energies into lower profile 
aid initiatives. This is also partly driven by financial constraints (Interview, JICA Official, 6 
June 2012). 
 
In relation to ownership, TICAD places a lot of emphasis on the importance of recipient 
countries taking 'ownership' of aid processes (Interview, TICAD Advisor, 6 June 2012). 
Official TICAD documentation supports this notion, with ‘ownership’ featuring prominently 
in TICAD’s rhetoric. 
 
The 10
th
 anniversary TICAD Declaration by MOFA, following TICAD III, states that:  
 
“the TICAD process has consistently promoted African development from the 
standpoint of African countries and peoples by assisting Africa to enhance its ownership 
of its development programs and reviving international partnership in support of such 
programs” (MOFA 2003). 
 
Morrissey and Verschoor (2003) argue that ownership has a venerable history in development 
literature, citing extensive literature as supporting the necessity of ownership in development 
processes. Ohno and Shimomura also discuss the concept of ownership in aid process at 
length, depicting two different pertinent scenarios (Ohno and Shimomura 2005: 3 – 5). They 
first deploy a scenario of strong ownership, in which the recipient country generates its own 
development plan, decides on priorities and liaises with donors in order ensure that their 
programmes fit in with the overall thrust and priorities of the national development scheme. 
This is by contrast with weak ownership, in which the recipient country lacks planning 
capacity and is forced to share planning and priority allocation functions with donors. In this 
scenario, “Development management increasingly becomes a process of donor coordination, 
rather than government coordination of aid resources” (Ohno and Shimomura 2005: 4). 
 
Renzio, Whitfield and Bergamasachi argue that ownership is a term that is often abused by 
donors, who claim great interest in ownership at the outset of projects, but in practice tend to 
begin sliding away from it as soon as they encounter difficulties:  
 
“Ownership is often used by donors to mean commitment to policies, regardless of how 
those policies were chosen. This contrasts with ownership defined as the degree of 
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control recipient governments are able to exercise over policy design and 
implementation...while many aid agency officials start out with a commitment to 
ownership defined as control over policies, as soon as there is some disagreement over 
policy choices they tend to fall back on a definition of ownership as commitment to their 
preferred policies” (Renzio, Whitfield and Bergamaschi 2008: 1). 
 
This concept of ownership is readily apparent in the TICAD literature and discussions. As is 
mentioned in the background chapter, both Ampiah (2005) and Lehman (2005) see ownership 
as being a significant and enduring part of the rhetoric around TICAD, starting back in 
TICAD II. 
 
This concern for ownership appears to be replicated in the Japanese aid community in South 
Africa. A TICAD advisor and expert on Japanese aid and development went to great lengths 
in the interview to emphasize the importance of ownership in Japanese aid in Southern Africa 
(Interview, TICAD Advisor, 5 June 2012).  This concept of ownership must be understood 
within the longer history of ownership and self-help within Japanese aid discourses. As 
Ampiah argues, the notion of 'self-help' has a long history within Japanese thought, dating 
back to the Meiji Period (Ampiah 2012: 168), and it can easily be ascertained in both Japan's 
ODA charter, and in various TICAD declarations and papers (Ampiah 2012 168 - 170).  
 
However, as Ampiah shows, this notion of self-help has been conflated with concepts of 
ownership in Japanese aid discourses. Furthermore, Ampiah is unconvinced that the value of 
self-help in the context of national development has been demonstrated (Ampiah 2012: 170). 
 
Having said that, Ampiah still sees Japanese ODA as clearly contrasting with Western 
approaches. Ampiah writes that: 
 
“In regards to Africa, however, broadly speaking Japan has operated within the 
framework of the luminaries of the donor regime, and therefore has largely subscribed 
to the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, especially in the 1980s. Essentially, 
the policymakers behind Japanese ODA to Africa endorsed demands of the World Bank 
and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAP), good governance, and human rights in the African countries (as a condition for 
economic assistance). All the same, operating in the interstices of such prescriptions 
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Japan tended to offer a different kind of economic assistance to the African countries.” 
(Ampiah 2012:  168) 
 
For Ampiah, this “different kind of economic assistance” is readily visible in Japanese aid 
programmes in Ghana, where “Japan (as a donor) was less intrusive in policy matters” 
(Ampiah 2012: 169). 
 
References to this notion can be found in MOFA's official ODA Report from 1997, which 
states that: 
 
“The goal of development is "people-centered"; in other words, the goals of 
development must be focused on improving the quality of life for individual human 
beings. This requires stress on both "ownership" - i.e., the primary responsibility of the 
developing countries themselves to seek to improve their own status - and 
"partnership" - i.e., ties with industrialized countries that support developing countries 
in these efforts. In particular, the idea that serious self-help efforts by developing 
countries are the most important element in development's success is based on Japan's 
own postwar experience and on the experience of the Asian countries that primarily 
Japan has supported in their development efforts. ” (MOFA 1997: 8) 
 
This section of the report concludes by stating that “The most important key to the NDS is 
respect for the developing countries' "ownership." ” (MOFA 1997: 8) 
 
Clearly, there is a dialectic emerging from South Africa's assertive posture towards JICA and 
the TICAD process. It would appear that JICA sees South Africa as being an assertive and 
possibly even difficult partner. On the other hand, when questioned, a Dirco official saw 
South Africa as being much more effectively 'engaged' in the TICAD process, by contrast 
with other African countries which were less inclined to 'take ownership' of projects, and 
occasionally unfortunate tendency to merely accept what was given and then make further 
demands (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). 
 
This view should be considered in the light of Ampiah's discussion of ownership in Japanese 
aid discourses, as mentioned above.  
Additionally, as Ampiah notes: 
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“the African Diplomatic Corps (ADC) in Tokyo formed a TICAD IV Committee in 
October 2006 in an attempt to calibrate the TICAD process by bringing more African 
agency into it, since they felt the African voice could be more effectively represented in 
its operations...[c]onsequently, in its proposals for TICAD IV the ADC affirmed the 
twin concepts upon which TICAD is based, namely ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ but 
then questioned the ownership ideal enshrined in it.” (2012: 176). 
 
In other words, Ampiah documents a significant push for increased ownership from the 
African Diplomatic Corps. It is entirely possible that the Dirco official was not aware of this, 
or simply had a different perspective on these events. 
 
In any event, from Dirco's perspective, South African engagement with Japanese aid 
processes would appear to be a positive and necessary trend, with South Africa taking an 
active role in aid-related decisions – the very 'ownership' that TICAD calls for. However, this 
does not mean that the process becomes easier for JICA. By demanding more engagement 
from aid recipients, TICAD aspirations could in fact make aid processes more demanding for 
the giver as well as the receiver, since instead of merely handing over aid as usual, they are 
drawn into a much more complex, contested relationship.   
 
It would appear that the South African government takes the concept of ownership very 
seriously, and has adopted it with significant effect. Aid proposals from JICA are evaluated in 
terms of South Africa's developmental priorities and agendas. Where they are deemed 
inadequate or ill fitting, they are rejected, or JICA is pressured to alter them. It is unknown 
how deftly or otherwise this is expressed, and how this kind of engagement is handled. It is 
also unclear precisely how much of this phenomenon simply arises from South Africa's vigour 
in taking ownership of the aid process. If, as JICA reported, bureaucratic systems are 
impeding legitimate and valuable aid processes, this is a matter that would be worth looking 
into. 
 
Internally, JICA's general priorities in South Africa have been HIV/Aids, unemployment and 
regional infrastructure, but until now JICA has generally steered clear of or been unable to 
implement infrastructure initiatives. During August 2011 JETRO and the Japanese embassy 
hosted an information session in Gauteng about Japanese train systems, titled the "Japan – 
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Southern Africa Railway Conference", (JETRO 2011) and at the moment JICA is also 
involved in a mooted high speed rail project between Durban and Johannesburg, apparently 
through assisting with development planning or (potentially) offering loans (Interview, JICA 
Representative, 6 June 2012). However, there is no evidence that this rail project is in fact 
going to be realised, or reach a serious planning stage. Additionally, it is unclear how much 
institutional muscle JICA has managed to bring to the project. 
 
Such a project would represent a significant deviation from JICA's previous activities in 
South Africa and would be worthy of scrutiny. Quite why JICA would be interested in taking 
on such a project is unclear, although the involvement of JETRO in hosting the conference 
suggests that it was seen as an opportunity for Japanese corporations and contractors to do 
business on the continent. This could be facilitated by offering tied loans, so that the trains 
and/or infrastructure were supplied by Japanese corporations. 
 
In relation to HIV/Aids JICA has generally been forced to seek niche projects, where it can 
make a difference through monitoring and evaluation programmes. This is partly due to 
funding constraints, and partly because JICA has had to navigate a larger and more 
'competitive' aid sector in South Africa (Interview, JICA Representative 6 June 2012). If we 
conceptualise the HIV/Aids oriented humanitarian aid systems and programmes within South 
Africa as an ecosystem, it appears that JICA has had to adapt to this ecosystem as a non-apex 
donor.  
 
Beyond JICA's experiences it is clear that South Africa has presented some specific and 
particular difficulties to the Japanese diplomatic establishment. As mentioned earlier, the Free 
Trade Agreement was significantly complicated by issues surrounding the involvement of 
SACU, and South Africa's seeming reluctance to sign any agreements without SACU's 
involvement. 
 
4.3 The Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
In February of 2011 Japan sent a formal proposal to South Africa for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement
23
, which would include a Free Trade Agreement. The story of this FTA and how it 
                                                 
23 It's worth noting that most of the interviewees seemed to use the phrases “FTA” and “EPA” 
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came to be perceived by different groups and was ultimately declined is particularly 
interesting because it sheds light on the differing perceptions, priorities and relationships 
among the agencies involved. This narrative was, at times, fragmented and even contradictory. 
This reflects the differing perceptions, priorities and explanations given by the various actors 
involved. 
 
The offer for the FTA originated on the Japanese side. According to at least one Japanese 
official there was a lengthy period of silence before it was formally declined in November 
2011 (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). This was quite possibly because of 
an extensive consultation process that had to take place on the South African side, involving 
Dirco, DTI and the South African Customs Union. It is not clear if the Japanese Embassy was 
aware of this process. 
 
At least some voices within Dirco were quite positive about the prospect of an FTA, largely 
on the grounds that it would help secure market access for South Africa within Japan, and by 
extension, ASEAN+3 or any future Asian trading blocs that include Japan. South Africa faces 
significant competition within the SEA region from countries like Australia and Chile 
(Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). Australia exports significant amounts of raw 
materials, particularly minerals, to Japan and is currently negotiating a trade agreement with 
Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs 2012). Chile has a similar export profile to South Africa
24
 and signed an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Japan in 2007 (Xinhua.net 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2012, Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). 
 
Seen in this context, it would appear that signing a trade agreement to maintain market access 
is an important part of maintaining South Africa's competitiveness. South Africa would be 
able to maintain its access through this trade agreement and compete effectively with its 
rivals. 
 
However, there are differing perspectives on and analyses of the situation. Opposing views on 
                                                                                                                                                        
interchangeably. The clearest statement on this was from a Japanese Embassy official who stated plainly 
that it was an FTA, rather than an EPA (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). For a brief 
discussion on the difference, see MOFA 2003: III. 
24 Minerals (primarily copper) and agricultural products. This is not congruent to South African exports, but it 
bears enough similarity that it is worth making the comparison. 
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the FTA usually approach this from a cost-benefit approach at the level of specific exports. In 
other words, regardless of the broader context, the concern is that South Africa will lose out 
due to its relative disadvantages in various economic sectors. 
 
Initially, it was unclear who made the ultimate decision to reject the EPA
25
, or even what the 
decision-making process looked like. The Japanese Embassy's perception was that the DTI 
had analysed the results of a Free Trade Agreement and had decided that it was not in South 
Africa's best interests (Interview, Japanese Embassy official, 5 June 2012). Similarly, there 
was a belief at Dirco that the rejection of the trade deal had been engineered by the DTI 
(Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). However, officials at Dirco were under the 
impression that this was a result of the DTI's concern that any FTA would harm mineral 
beneficiation efforts, which have been a key part of recent economic strategy (Department of 
Minerals and Energy 2011). 
 
This is not inconsistent with Allison and Halperin's (1974) theoretical notions of decision-
making as a contested bargaining process between different organizations or agencies. The 
chief difficulty is that the initial narrative as to the bargaining or discussion process was 
somewhat confused. 
 
Curiously enough, the Japanese Embassy believed that beneficiation was a non-issue when it 
came to the proposed FTA, largely on the basis that tariffs were not levied on mineral exports 
in any case. If (and only if) the FTA contained a clause banning export taxes that might create 
problems, but the Japanese Embassy believed that such a clause could be dealt with, and was 
not necessarily fatal to the prospect of an FTA between South Africa and Japan (Interview, 
Japanese Embassy Official, 6 June 2012).  
 
Ultimately, the precise implications of the beneficiation strategy for South African trade deals 
are not clear, largely because the government has not clearly articulated (in a public forum) 
what precisely the impact of the beneficiation strategy on trade deals might be. It is 
reasonable to assume that this would probably entail avoiding signing onto any regimes that 
would increase exports of raw materials at the expense of manufactured goods. Having said 
                                                 
25 This statement assumes, of course, that there was a single, ultimate deciding agency. Without making this 
claim specifically, there were conflicting reports as to which organisation(s) vetoed or opposed the FTA. 
Ultimately it was a larger issue than any one organisation. 
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that, the fact that the SA government has explicitly articulated this as a strategic element when 
considering trade deals makes it puzzling that the Japanese Embassy discounted it so readily. 
It is possible that the Japanese Embassy were simply unaware of the importance of this 
element of the South African government's thinking, or, more likely, that they felt that the 
proposal as presented steered clear of such issues. This was not an entirely unreasonable 
proposition, since any threats to beneficiation could be dealt with in bilateral negotiations. 
However, in the long run it appears that beneficiation was not the only problem with the Free 
Trade Agreement, and broader concerns around regional integration and SACU were also 
deciding factors. 
 
As it turns out, there had been at least one South African analysis of the impact of a trade 
agreement with Japan. However, according to the DTI this analysis was performed by the 
SACU Secretariat, and not the DTI. The DTI contacted and consulted with them, but claim 
that it was the SACU Secretariat who conducted the cost-benefit analysis and effectively 
vetoed an FTA. Additionally, concerns were apparently raised about the difficulty of 
implementation of an FTA by SACU members. The EU-South African TDCA was specifically 
mentioned as an example of the difficulties in implementing an EPA (Interview, DTI 
representative, 7 June 2012). Interviewees at the DTI specifically cited the length of time that 
it took many SADC and COMESA countries to implement EPAs, with some of them taking 
“years” (Interview, DTI representative, 7 June 2012).   
 
An interesting issue that arises from this discussion lies in the way that different sectors of 
government perceived the potential costs and benefits of FTA. Dirco saw it as an issue of 
market access and trade relations, in a context of competition with other potential trading 
partners. The DTI, by contrast, was interested in the immediate impacts on local 
manufacturing and the South African economy. In interviews DTI officials explicitly raised 
concerns around vulnerable sectors, such as paper and textile industries (Interview, DTI 
Representative, 7 June 2012). This approach apparently discounts Dirco’s more international 
strategic approach, focusing on the specifics of how such an agreement would affect the 
immediate competitiveness each South African economic sector. However, DTI concerns are 
clearly linked with those of the Department of Mineral and Energy, who have developed the 
beneficiation strategy.  
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In order to examine SACU's perspective on the potential Japanese-South African EPA, it is 
necessary to interrogate SACU's history and perspective on trade affairs. In order to address 
this matter, it is very important to understand the patchwork of regional organizations in 
Southern Africa. It is also important to understand how previous EPAs and FTAs have related 
to this, and the dynamics that have arisen. From this brief history, it will hopefully become 
possible to understand the regional dynamics that may have impacted on the Japan – South 
Africa FTA. 
 
4.3.1 Regional Organizations and trade agreements: Additional complications 
 
Lorenz and Cornelissen discuss the history of SACU, SADC and the EU EPA negotiations in 
detail. In a separate paper, Lorenz discusses the way in which regional dynamics affected the 
negotiated EPAs between the EU and SADC, and the EU and EAS. Indeed, Lorenz argues 
that "the different outcomes in the EPA negotiations are rather determined by regional 
dynamics instead of by the EU’s role in the EPA negotiations" (Lorenz 2012: 24). This 
argument emphasizes the importance of SACU and SADC, noting that despite the best laid 
plans of the EU, the key determinant in these trade deals is the complex interplay between the 
different countries in the regional bodies of Southern Africa. 
 
Lorenz and Cornelissen seek to reconceptualise SADC and SACU beyond the traditional 
notions of International Relations theory "as an institutionalised group of mutually exclusive 
territorial states with clearly demarcated geographical boundaries" (Lorenz and Cornelissen 
2011: 241). Rather, they recast regionalism as "a relational arena produced through 
interactions between various actors beyond fixed geographical, political, economic, or any 
other boundaries" (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 241 – 242). 
 
The value of this approach lies partially in the way that it attempts to comprehend the region 
and its integration as an on-going process that arises from interactions between a host of 
actors, including government ministries, NGOs, private business and labour organizations. 
Additionally, as Lorenz and Cornelissen explain, Southern Africa hosts a complex, 
overlapping set of economic organizations and groupings, including the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional 
Cooperation (IOR-ARC)  (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 245). Significant overlap exists 
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between these groups, and this highly complicated arrangement has been criticized as 
potentially hindering regional integration (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 247).  
 
BNLS is not a formal organization per se, but refers to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland and is usually considered in this light as the non-South African members of SACU. 
As Kirk and Stern note "The defining characteristic of the SACU is the economic dominance 
of South Africa in contrast to the size of the other four members" (Kirk and Stern 2003: 171 – 
172). In other words, BNLS are significant in terms of their relationship to South Africa and 
the operation of SACU, in which South Africa, as the regional hegemon, tends to be viewed 
as the dominant player. However, despite being grouped in this fashion, "the performance and 
management of the smaller SACU economies differs markedly from each other and South 
Africa." (Kirk and Stern 2003: 172) and it is important not to exaggerate their unity as a 
political bloc. 
 
One specific issue arising from this multitude of regional organizations lies in the 'spaghetti 
bowl effect', a term first coined by the economist Jagdish Bhagwati in 1995.This can be 
thought of as a trade distortion caused by rules of origin resulting in organizations such as 
corporations seeking to maximise their benefits by preferentially sourcing their goods from 
within the trade bloc. However, it is not merely corporations that are involved in this issue: 
Lobbyists, trade organizations and politicians spend an inordinate amount of time 
manipulating rules of origin in order to achieve their desired outcomes (Bhagwati 1996).  
 
As Akira Kotera (2006) puts it: 
  
“The presence of complex rules of origin (determining a country from which a product 
comes), would make it difficult to determine the country of origin, resulting in higher 
business and administration costs. When different complex rules of origin apply to 
different FTAs, things are even more complicated: both companies and governments 
would find them more difficult to understand and more costly to use.”  
 
According to Fergin, this notion has been expanded beyond rule of origin issues and has 
spawned several related concepts, all under the umbrella of the 'spaghetti bowl' term. These 
include overlapping agreements complicating trade (Fergin 2011: 12). 
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Tavares and Tang discuss this problem in detail, noting that “Indeed, African countries that 
belong to more than one regional institution find themselves burdened with the technical, 
administrative and financial challenges of multiple memberships” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 
224).  An AU audit is cited as arguing that “multi-membership in different regional 
organizations leads to ‘irrational configurations, negotiating positions, and inconsistencies in 
harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation’” (Tavares and Tang 
2011: 32). 
 
According to Tavares and Tang, “The several drawbacks of overlapping membership in 
African regional integration arise from the contradictory or conflicting obligations that 
numerous memberships entail for countries and regions.” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 224) 
They go on to document this overlap thoroughly, noting that “On average, 95% of the 
members of a regional economic community belong to another community” (Tavares and 
Tang 2011: 225). 
 
One of the most useful examples of the way in which these regional complexities impact on 
South Africa signing a trade deal is probably the EU – South African Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). This must not be confused with the European Union's 
proposed EU-Southern Africa EPA, which is a separate multilateral agreement between the 
EU and Southern Africa that comes with its own set of important complications and issues.  
 
In the wake of the signing of the SA-EU TDCA, SACU's non-South African members 
suffered quite significantly, and felt rather aggrieved by the process and the outcomes. Palollo 
Michael Lehloenya's discussion of SACU's reaction to the TDCA with the EU is instructive. 
As he points out, "Right from the start, however, some concerns were raised regarding the 
impact the TDCA would have on the BLNS countries, which effectively became parties to the 
agreement due to their economic integration with South Africa under SACU...Among the 
main setbacks experienced by the BLNS states after the signing of the TDCA was having to 
forgo an estimated 30 per cent of their tariffs on goods originating from the EU, while they 
received no new concessions from the EU in return" (Lehloenya 2009: 122). 
 
Lehloenya explains that due to the common external tariff, the TDCA improved the EU's 
market access to BNLS, while not providing as great a benefit to SACU members as intended. 
EU companies did not significantly relocate their production facilities to South Africa, as had 
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been hoped for, and investment into Southern Africa did not greatly increase. However, the 
BNLS countries lost customs revenue due to EU products entering the SACU marketplace 
tariff free. 
 
Additionally, they were exposed to increased competition with subsidised EU agricultural 
products.  
 
Finally, as Catherine Grant points out "In a further negative twist, due to the rules of origin 
provisions in the TDCA, the BLNS will not be able to take advantage of the preferential 
access to the EU market provided for South Africa.  The result of the TDCA could therefore 
be described as ‘lose-lose’ for the BLNS" (Grant 2006: 4). 
 
In response to these concerns, the EU and South Africa responded by making concessions to 
BNLS, largely in the form of financial aid (Lehloenya 2009: 122). 
 
In the case of the Japanese trade deal, an additional complication cited by the DTI lay in 
difficulties of implementation. As mentioned previously, DTI officials noted that SADC 
members had difficulties implementing earlier EPAs, such as the EU-TDCA.  
 
This perspective gels with SACU's own analysis of the situation. Apparently the "SACU 
Council previously made an in-principle decision not to enter into a new negotiations until the 
current negotiations (WTO, SADC-EC EPA, India
26
and COMESA/EAC/SADC Tripartite 
FTA) have been concluded" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 
2012). This was largely due to a lack of negotiation capacity. The proposed EPA did not have 
enough apparent upside to offset these concerns, and consequently SACU declined to enter 
into negotiations around an EPA (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 
2012).  
 
In this vein SACU, either in collaboration or in parallel with the DTI, made the calculation 
that the trade deal was not valuable enough to South(ern) African economic interests to make 
it worth further straining SADC negotiation capacities and rejected it.    
 
                                                 
26
 Early notification of the India-SACU Preferential Trade Agreement has been made to the WTO, and India 
and South Africa agreed to an early finalisation of the negotiations (Trademark Southern Africa 2013). 
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However, the nature of this calculation does depend on which specific benefits and losses are 
taken into account. In other words, the rationality of this calculation relates to a specific 
perspective in which broader strategic issues of market access are discounted in favour of an 
immediate cost-benefit analysis for individual market sectors. It could be argued that the 
importance of long term market access to any Asian trade blocs including Japan trumps the 
immediate downside of the EPA as presented. Indeed, as mentioned before, at least one 
official at Dirco emphasised the importance of market access as an issue for South Africa.  
These differences between the DTI and Dirco's approaches to this matter resonate strongly 
with Allison's perspective on policy as the outcome of a bargaining process between different 
bureaucracies (Allison and Halperin 1972: 43). 
 
SACU's influence on this process also supports this conception of the policy production 
process. In this case we can see that the response to the FTA was the result of a fairly 
complex process during which inputs arrived from the DTI, Dirco and SACU. 
 
It is plain that SACU makes South Africa's entry into new trade deals somewhat more 
complicated. Not only must South Africa consider the internal impacts of any new trade deal, 
but it is necessary for South Africa to consult with the other members of SACU as well, who 
must also develop their own positions, respond to any new deal, and then communicate these 
positions to South Africa. Following their experiences with the TDCA, it is doubtful if BLNS 
would be enthusiastic about a new trade deal, which could carry similar potential risks for 
them. 
 
Ultimately, according to the SACU trade negotiator, there were two reasons for not entering 
into negotiations around the EPA. The first was based on an analysis of the products currently 
being traded. This analysis "revealed that most products showing potential could already be 
exported to Japan at duty free levels" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat Official, 
7 September 2012). Agricultural products that did have potential and that were subjected to 
duties were also subject to other non-tariff barriers, such as strict phyto-sanitary regulations 
that would hamper exports.  
 
As a result of this analysis, "when looking at existing trade only and the tariffs applied, there 
is an imbalance of tariff concessions in favour of Japan that SACU would face should it enter 
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into an FTA with the former" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat Official, 
7 September 2012). 
 
The second issue was that SACU felt its negotiating capacity was severely strained. As 
mentioned previously, according to a SACU Secretariat official, "The SACU Council 
previously made an in-principle decision not to enter into new negotiations until the current 
negotiations (WTO, SADC-EC EPA, India and COMESA/EAC/SADC Tripartite FTA) have 
been concluded" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 2012).  
 
Evidently these regional complications and cross cutting loyalties and agendas extend beyond 
SACU. SADC presents an important additional layer of complexity and further problematizes 
trade issues. 
 
It is important to understand that this difficulty in signing an EPA with SACU is not unique to 
Japan. Aside from the experiences of the EU-TDCA and the mooted US-SA FTA, the 
example of the (very brief) discussions with Turkey regarding an FTA is instructive. In 
August of 2011 the Turkish Foreign Minister visited South Africa. As part of the activity 
around this visit, it was announced that there would be a discussion of a Free Trade 
Agreement (Trading Economics 2011). This was followed by a visit by the Turkish Prime 
Minister in October, but by November the South Africa Cabinet announced that a Free Trade 
Agreement would not be signed, due to the potential for "destructive competition". Rather, 
South Africa would work towards a "mutually beneficial, cooperative and balanced approach 
to building trade and investment relations with Turkey" (Manyi 2011). 
 
The phrase 'destructive competition' suggests that the chief concern among the Cabinet was 
damage to certain manufacturing sectors. Turkey is a major textile exporter
27 
and there may 
have been fears that an FTA with Turkey would exacerbate problems with the already 
weakened domestic textile industry, which has suffered greatly from Chinese exports. 
 
In conclusion, it is safe to conclude that SACU was a significant complicating factor in the 
South African – Japanese trade deal. When this notion was put directly to the DTI they denied 
it (Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012), but it is fairly clear from the evidence, and the 
                                                 
27 '[M]ajor exports are: textiles and clothing, automotive, iron and steel, white goods and chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals' (Trading Economics.com 2012). 
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example of the TDCA, that SACU does increase the number of actors that need to be 
consulted with and propitiated in the event of South Africa considering a new trade deal. 
 
4.3.2 Other actors: JETRO and COSATU? 
 
Curiously enough, JETRO perceived the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) as being a significant stumbling block in the process (Interview, JETRO 
representative, 6 June 2012). No one else in the entire research process mentioned COSATU 
in any way shape or form, and JETRO's worry about COSATU seemed completely singular. 
Quite why this is the case is not perfectly clear. In fact, it is not clear that COSATU made any 
specific representations during the negotiations around this EPA. 
 
JETRO representatives did point to COSATU's opposition to the Wal-Mart/Massmart merger 
as being evidence of COSATU being likely to oppose the FTA. It would appear that JETRO 
perceives COSATU as being generally against free trade and consequently a likely opponent 
of any free trade agreement involving Japan.  
 
A review of COSATU's position on other trade agreements suggests that JETRO's fears may 
have some validity. As far back as 1999, during discussion of the SADC protocol on trade 
COSATU made calls to the DTI to "urgently conduct impact analyses which quantify the 
projected effects of the Protocol on specific sectors of our economy, both in terms of negative 
effects and possible job losses, and expansion opportunities" (COSATU 1999). In addition, 
they also stated that "As a trade union federation we cannot support job loss for South African 
workers, particularly given the extremely high unemployment rate we are currently faced 
with" (Ibid). 
 
On the EU-SA TDCA, COSATU stated that "We are not convinced that jobs generated from 
increased exports to the EU will outweigh job losses from increased imports, although we do 
indeed hope that this will be the case" (COSATU 1999a). In addition, COSATU stated that 
"While it would be simplistic to reduce [job losses] to the only benchmark for evaluating 
policy, COSATU asserts that job creation and the prevention of job losses needs to be the 
primary criterion informing policy" (COSATU 1999a).  
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From these, JETRO could have come to the conclusion that COSATU has a tendency to be 
cautious towards trade deals. However, this has also been emphasized by COSATU's 
tendency to stress the importance of integrated regional development, as opposed to separate 
bilateral trade agreements. Going back to 2009, COSATU has vigorously criticised so-called 
'breakaway' trade agreements, in which individual SADC members sign trade agreements 
with external nations, saying that "Cosatu condemns these countries for sacrificing regional 
integration and the future of African integration in return for short-term benefits by increasing 
their exports to the [European Union]" (South African Press Agency 2009). 
 
Despite all of this speculation and extrapolation, when contacted directly, COSATU denied 
making any inputs on (or even being aware of) the Japanese trade deal, and made the 
comment that it would probably hold the same stance on such a deal that it would on the 
Chinese trade deal (Personal communication, COSATU Official, 27 August 2012). 
 
Quite where JETRO got their information from is still not plain, but it is clear why JETRO 
would have come to the conclusion that COSATU would not be particularly amenable to a 
South Africa – Japanese FTA. It is also possible that JETRO simply does not have good 
information about specifics of the political situation, due to not having a strong inside 
perspective on the progress of the trade agreement. Indeed, JETRO representatives indicated 
that they had difficulty gaining access to representatives of South African government 
(Interview, JETRO Official, 6 June 2012). 
 
To sum up, JETRO was in favour of the FTA provided that there was an FTA, but JETRO 
also believed that the political environment was not conducive to the success of such an 
initiative. They saw COSATU as being opposed to the FTA, but it is unclear that COSATU 
had formulated any such position (although it was not impossible that they might). 
 
One issue of significance was the question of an FTA's impact on South African 
manufacturing. Both JETRO and the Japanese Embassy were cognizant of this. JETRO saw it 
as a process that would result in some short term losers, but believed that the benefits of 
additional collaboration between Japanese and South African companies would more than 
offset this, arguing that an FTA represented an opportunity for increased joint ventures, 
greater collaboration and additional investment to flow into South Africa. On the other hand 
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the DTI were not as sanguine, perceiving the FTA to be a potential threat to both beneficiation 
and local manufacturing. 
 
In summary, we can see at least three different extant perspectives on the proposed EPA. 
These are Japan-positive, SA-positive, and SA-negative. From the Japanese side, both JETRO 
and the Japanese Embassy were in favour of an FTA. Since the Japanese Embassy proposed 
the EPA, it is quite understandable that they would be in favour of it. JETRO can best be 
dubbed broadly trade-positive – they exist to promote trade between South Africa and Japan, 
and they are clearly in favour of increased investment and pro-business policies. 
Consequently, it is fairly clear why they are in favour of the EPA. 
 
On the South African side matters become somewhat murkier. The pro-EPA arguments are 
largely around maintaining market access in a strategic context. The anti-EPA position is 
partially driven by concerns about the value of the proposed EPA, and partially by the 
complexity of entering into trade agreements as a member of SACU. However, there are at 
least two separate but abutting reasons for suspicion of the EPA. The first lies in SACU's 
analysis, which holds that in most areas where Southern Africa holds a competitive advantage, 
tariffs are not an obstacle. The second is specific to the DTI, and lies in concerns around how 
South African industry, particularly the manufacturing sector, will fare in the face of increased 
Japanese competition. It is possible that memories of the severe damage dealt to South 
African textiles by Chinese imports have helped inform this position. 
 
The problems with the FTA must be seen in the context of SADC and SACU as a trade bloc, 
and the way in which they impact and complicate South Africa's priorities and operations.  
 
These complications are significant. When considering the Japan FTA, any analysis must take 
into account not just the effects of the FTA on local manufacturing, but the possible effects on 
South Africa's relationship with its neighbours in SACU. In addition, it is clear that signing 
external FTAs and EPAs can significantly complicate regional integration, which South Africa 
is (allegedly) committed to. 
 
It is not clear that the Japanese Embassy could have achieved a different outcome from the 
EPA proposal. SACU's involvement in so many negotiations is clearly straining its negotiating 
capacity, and its principled decision to not enter into additional negotiations is a significant 
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obstacle.  
 
It is possible that if the EPA had been proposed at an earlier date, before SACU became 
enmeshed in other negotiations, SACU would have been more amenable. Additionally, if the 
EPA had come with better conditions attached, SACU may have been more inclined to 
consider it. However, this is all largely speculative. What is clear is that the Japanese Embassy 
would have had to present a highly effective diplomatic offensive in order to push an EPA 
past SACU's objections. As has been mentioned previously, SACU is wary of entering any 
FTA or EPAs at this point in time. An additional source of worry for any potential Japanese-
South African EPA is that some of the areas of greatest interest to SACU, such as agriculture, 
are subjected to serious non-tariff barriers in Japan, including government subsidies
28.
 This 
would increase the difficulty of convincing SACU to endorse any FTA with South Africa. 
 
On the South African side, the desire to protect the local manufacturing sector is another 
initial complicating factor. None of these issues are unique to the Japan-SA FTA, and in 
retrospect, it would have been surprising if they had in fact managed to resolve them and 
come away with a comprehensive EPA. Indeed, other countries such as Turkey and the US 
have struggled to conclude a fully-fledged FTA with South Africa for many of the same 
reasons. 
 
In ODA matters, it is clear that Alden and Skidmore's accounts of dissension and difficulty 
have not been entirely resolved. As one interviewee noted, ODA is a “difficult matter” about 
which “much is said but little is done” (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). However, 
JICA is still carrying out projects in South Africa in accordance with its priorities, and while it 
has been obliged to adapt significantly, it has become cognisant of this challenge and has 
managed to adapt to local conditions.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that some of Alden's points about bureaucratic misperceptions 
continue to have relevance, although this must be heavily contextualised. Admittedly, it 
appears that in preparing the EPA the Japanese embassy had either imperfect information, or 
did not manage to adequately communicate the value of the EPA to South Africa. However, 
                                                 
28 Japan protects domestic agriculture through a blend of tariffs and subsidies, as Marcus Noland (1993) 
explains. For a more recent evaluation, see the USDA's report on Japanese agricultural policy (2012). 
Recent discussions over a mooted Trans Pacific free trade agreement have been hampered by farmers 
concerned over the potential loss of their subsidies (Tabuchi 2010).  
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this cannot be considered the ultimate cause of the EPA's failure. Rather, this is eclipsed by 
the greater complexities and regional dynamics of SADC, as well as a lack of capacity and the 
unfortunate history of the EU TDCA. 
More prosaically, simple concerns about the welfare benefits of an EPA with Japan assisted in 
its demise. 
 
This project began premised on the notion that the literature on South African – Japanese 
relations has limitations which needed to be addressed in some fashion. It has done so, in a 
modest fashion, by attempting to understand the bureaucracies involved, and their impact on 
this relationship. 
 
The literature review covered the major dimensions of this historical relationship, while the 
theoretical section reviewed the chief theoretical claims about and models of Japanese foreign 
policy. It also examined the bureaucratic policy process, and how it has been used in the past 
as a tool to analyse decision-making and policy formation within states. 
 
What was not foreseen, and what had some notable implications, was the way in which the 
SACU secretariat would impact on this relationship. This was perhaps the most significant 
new variable, and it serves to highlight the growing importance of regional organizations and 
regional integration in modern politics and trade. Japanese South African relations are 
undoubtedly complicated and are mediated through their relative positions, both within the 
world economy, but also within their regional structures. Japan has begun a major economic 
offensive, seeking to regain lost ground in Africa, and to restart its once vibrant economy. 
This initiative can be seen as another of the departures from the reactive state discussed by 
Calder (2003) and more recently, Cornelissen (2012). The EPA proposal was a part of this 
offensive, but it fell victim to SACU's lack of interest in further EPAs/FTAs, and a simple lack 
of welfare benefits for the South African economy. This lack of interest can be traced to the 
problematic results of the EU TDCA, and worrying internal capacity issues. While addressing 
the effects of the TDCA would be difficult at best, the internal capacity issues should be 
addressed by the SACU secretariat as a matter of urgency. An inability to negotiate potentially 
valuable deals is a problematic state of affairs, since it may prevent SACU from taking up or 
properly considering valuable opportunities. 
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Japanese-South African ODA relations have been troubled. This is unsurprising, given their 
history. JICA has, however, managed to adjust fairly successfully to the realities of the South 
African aid environment, through focusing on specific areas within which it can be effective. 
This is a good example of the kind of thinking that is needed in the Japanese aid community. 
If JICA cannot compete in terms of sheer resources, concentrating on quality of aid may be a 
way of staying relevant. 
 
Disseminating information on the successes of past Japanese aid efforts, and the Japanese 
dedication to self-help and ownership may be one path by which JICA can continue to 
improve its position in this sphere. Another approach would lie in showcasing JICA's support 
for AU and REC efforts towards regional integration, with the understanding that regional 
integration is a key priority for the South African government as well. The work that JICA has 
done on One Stop Border Posts is laudable, and should be highlighted as a case of JICA's 
operations dovetailing well with the priorities of host countries. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter will review the trajectory of the thesis, discussing the key questions that 
emerged, the central findings and the implications of said findings for understanding the 
relationship between South African and Japan. This will be followed by a brief discussion of 
the theoretical implications of these findings, and will conclude with a description of potential 
areas for future investigation. 
 
5.1 Key issues for investigation 
 
This thesis has investigated how certain bureaucratic dynamics have impacted on the 
relationship between Japan and South Africa. After investigating the stated priorities and 
strategies of the various organizations, the relationship between these bureaucracies was 
examined via two thematic ‘lenses’ or perspectives. The first consisted of an inquiry into how 
factors peculiar to South Africa have affected Japanese government agencies. The second part 
involved an investigation into the history of the proposed EPA / FTA, and discussed the 
reasons for its ultimate failure, and how bureaucratic arrangements, perceptions and 
organizational dynamics affected this agreement. 
 
5.2 Summary of the key findings 
 
In relation to the first issue of investigation, the central finding was that South Africa has been 
a challenging environment for Japanese government agencies. The South African 
government’s assertiveness and perceived willingness to challenge extant systems and aid 
modalities has been a challenge for JICA. JICA has also had to adapt its operations to South 
Africa’s relative wealth vis-a-vis other African countries. Within a context of general distance 
between South Africa and Japan as well as resource constraints, these factors have all resulted 
in JICA having a relatively low profile presence in South Africa. 
 
JICA has responded to this by seeking to develop specific competencies and niche sectors 
within which it can fulfil its mandate. Currently, it specialises in training officers in HIV/Aids 
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projects.  
 
Regionally, it has funded infrastructure development programmes, which has assisted 
Southern African countries in developing regional transport infrastructure in their quest to 
further regional integration and increase internal trade.  
 
The Japanese Embassy has also faced challenges during its work in South Africa. Again, some 
of this is the result of resource constraints.  
 
The Embassy’s greatest test was in the form of the proposed EPA/FTA, which it pursued as 
part of Japan’s broader strategy of signing Free Trade Agreements with various countries 
around the world in order to expand market access and support Japanese economic growth. 
 
In the case of the EPA / FTA the proposal was largely defeated by welfare concerns, 
particularly on the part of the DTI, as well as broader issues of regional integration. These 
welfare concerns can be seen against the backdrop of a general reluctance on the part of the 
South African government to enter into new trade deals. This general reluctance appears to be 
at least partly informed by the difficulty of simultaneously managing regional (SADC/SACU) 
integration with external free trade agreements. 
 
Importantly, these issues transcended and were of fundamentally greater importance than 
questions around bureaucratic dynamics and (mis)communications. In the final analysis, it is 
doubtful that an alternative bureaucratic arrangement or a differently couched EPA/FTA 
proposal would have altered the outcome of this affair. 
 
5.3 Theoretical implications 
 
In relation to the theoretical issues, it can be seen that Allison's model of a contested 
bargaining process has definite merit. The process of discussion over the EPA/FTA is an 
excellent example of this, with not only different ideas, but a contested narrative emerging, 
suggesting that interviewees from different organizations had different perspectives on and 
information about the EPA/FTA decision. 
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As noted previously, the different organization's positions on the EPA abutted on their 
broader mandates and perspectives. For example, Dirco was interested in maintaining South 
Africa's broad, global access to trade blocs and competitiveness. The DTI, which naturally is 
involved in the specifics of local production, manufacturing and domestic industry, was quite 
clearly concerned about the specific and immediate impacts of any FTA on local industry. 
 
This would appear to support Allison and Halperin's assertion that different agencies “come to 
see different faces of the issue” (1974: 48).  
 
The DTI saw the 'face' of local employment and manufacturing. Dirco saw the 'face' of trade 
access and international competition with nations such as Australia and Chile. They were both 
cognizant of issues such as supporting mineral beneficiation processes, but the extent to 
which they weighted these issues in importance varied. 
 
Consequently, there was a decision-making process that involved inputs from these different 
perspectives. However, the SACU Secretariat's involvement in the EPA issue is of particular 
interest, because it diverges slightly from the original Bureaucratic Policy Process as put 
forward by Allison, Halperin and Hilsman. Their discussions of bureaucracies and agencies 
exclusively involved internal organizations. Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison 
was concerned with how American agencies related to other American agencies. Similarly, 
Hilsman discusses how the different internal government agencies of the US defence 
establishment made the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
 
However, in the EPA negotiations, the pertinent organizations were not merely national, but 
extra-national, in the sense that the SACU secretariat cannot be thought of as part of the South 
African government. Despite this, the SACU secretariat's perspective on this trade deal was 
still a significant factor, as can be seen by the way in which the DTI took care to consult them, 
and the fact that their analysis was clearly taken seriously by the DTI.  
 
The relevance of “supranational” or “extra national” bureaucracies in the form of the SACU 
Secretariat is a new and intriguing factor, which needs to be considered in discussions of trade 
issues involving South Africa. This may suggests that in cases where the bureaucratic policy 
process model is adopted, it may also be necessary to consider external organizations such as 
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RECs and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) as additional variables, if they 
are pertinent to the topic at hand. 
 
In terms of the three models of Japanese foreign policy (neo-mercantilist, reactive and middle 
power), no evidence was found to strongly confirm or refute any of these three approaches. 
However, it is possible that the findings can be used to add nuance or depth to any one of 
these three views. 
 
In relation to Cox’s notion of Japan as a middle power, it is worth noting the way in which 
Japan has sought to use TICAD, particularly TICAD IV, to popularise and develop notions 
such as ownership and self-help within international aid regimes. Cox' notion of the way in 
which middle powers attempt to generate new regimes and international law in order to 
provide them with space in which to operate resonates with the way in which Japan has 
sought to exert influence via the TICAD process. 
 
Linking notions of middlepowership to Japan’s drive to sign trade agreements is a challenging 
proposition, however, and it is unclear how one would go about such a proposition. 
 
If one applies a narrow reading of the reactive state model, it is plausible to read Japan’s 
recent drive to sign EPAs and FTAs as a departure from Calder’s reactive state. In effect, 
Japan is being pro-active rather than reactive – it is taking the initiative in order to further its 
economic agenda. However, as Hirata (1998) argues, one of the major limitations of the 
reactive model is that it does not explain Japanese foreign policy in situations where “Japan 
does not face gaiatsu, particularly from the United States” (Hirata 1998: 7).  The US has no 
apparent input on Japan’s general drive for EPAs/FTAs, and as a result, it may be unwise to 
attempt to construe this as a departure from the reactive model. Instead, this EPA/FTA can be 
seen as highlighting the limits of the reactive model, in that it fails to explain Japanese policy 
in matters removed from US influence. 
 
In terms of the neo-mercantilist model, it is certainly possible to see the EPA/FTA as part of a 
drive to secure market access and sources of raw materials. This is particularly important if 
Japan is to stay economically relevant in the face of heated competition from South Korea and 
China. While Japan enjoyed a long period of growth and prosperity following World War 2, 
observers generally agree that its economy has failed to impress in recent years, and Japanese 
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policy makers are likely to keenly feel the need to restart its growth. To this end, aggressive 
resource and economic diplomacy would appear to be one way of supporting efforts to revive 
the moribund Japanese economy. 
 
5.4 Implications for future Japanese - South African relations 
 
At the outset, it should be noted that material from TICAD V was not included in this study, 
and as a result, the resolutions, dialogue and decisions made at that conference may impact on 
this relationship. However, there are many aspects of the study that are still relevant. 
 
Bureaucratic 'misunderstandings' have been cited in South African-Japanese relations, going 
back to Alden's work and the Mandela - Mbeki aid packages. However, although the EPA did 
not ultimately fall prey to these, it is not clear that enough institutional 'learning' has taken 
place since then to avoid future misunderstandings. Certainly, there were indications that 
Japanese – South African aid relations are not entirely harmonious, and this has to do, at least 
in part, with the differing expectations of and attitudes towards the aid process. Curiously 
enough, although South Africa's 'aggressive' attitude was noted by various Japanese 
respondents, it would appear that, in principle at least, there could be room for this within the 
logic of TICAD and the 'ownership' discourse. It is worth noting that although Japanese aid 
discourse stresses ownership, there was very little awareness of this commitment to ownership 
by the South African interviewees within the study. Quite how this dynamic has developed is 
unclear, and it is also unclear if the interviewees quite understood this, given the significant 
differences in their explanations of the situation. Sustained and intense dialogue on this matter 
would appear to be in order.  Whether TICAD V will have had any impact on this situation is 
also unknown. 
 
It became clear throughout the research phase that beneficiation was a major part of the 
thinking of South African officials, particularly at the DTI. Proposals for economic 
partnerships, new initiatives and closer linkages are all likely to be assessed in the light of 
how well they align with beneficiation projects. As a result, future Japanese policy makers 
may get better results if they couch their proposals in a way that they will align effectively 
with beneficiation projects, or at the very least, not be seen as a threat to beneficiation. 
Similarly, large auto manufacturers such as Toyota should keep a close watch on beneficiation 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129 
 
issues related to the extraction and processing of platinum and other relevant metals, such as 
chrome. While the beneficiation projects have not been uncomplicated, the South African 
government’s continued insistence on the importance of future economic projects aiding in 
the mineral beneficiation process should be taken into account by other roleplayers in this 
sector. 
 
From the South African perspective, more attention should be made to ‘marketing’ 
beneficiation effectively to potential partners in Japan, both at the government and corporate 
levels. Perhaps one of the most important elements of this is demonstrating to potential 
partners that beneficiation does in fact make economic sense, and that South Africa is a cost-
effective location to process minerals and manufacture components. While chrome 
beneficiation has been beset with difficulties, there have been some successes in South 
African manufacturing, particularly in the automotive industry. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to assess the plausibility of South African beneficiation efforts, but it may be worth 
examining whether the successes within the motor industry can be exported to other parts of 
the economy. Furthermore, if beneficiation is going to be such a major linchpin of South 
African economic policy, very serious consideration needs to be given to the question of how 
local manufacturing can be made into an attractive proposition for foreign investors. 
 
Another issue that arose during the investigation is the impact of South Africa's regional 
integration on trade deals. It is clear that South Africa's position in SACU complicates its 
accession to free trade deals. At a minimum, it increases the number of organizations that 
need to be consulted (the SACU secretariat, for example, was consulted during the 
consideration of the Japan-SA EPA). However, it also means that South Africa must pay 
particular attention to how its trade deals will impact upon its neighbouring countries. The 
fallout from the EU-South Africa TDCA is a powerful object lesson. Not only did it take an 
extremely long time to implement, due to capacity constraints in SADC countries that were 
involved, but it resulted in a significant backlash from the BNLS countries, who felt that their 
economic interests had been significantly affected by the simultaneous loss of customs 
revenue, increased competition from EU goods, and a lack of reciprocal market access to the 
EU (Lehloenya 2009; Grant 2006). 
 
As a result of these complexities, organising future trade deals is likely to be a complex affair, 
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and one that will not meet with easy success. In response to this issue, South African policy 
makers should seriously apply themselves to creating a framework or process that will a) 
streamline policy decisions around free trade deals and b) take into account the concerns of its 
regional partners, and effectively address them. Quite how such an arrangement would work 
is a complex matter, but at a minimum, it might be worth considering the formation a working 
group that considers each potential trade deal and liaises with organizations such as the SACU 
secretariat and other affected parties in making a decision. 
 
If Japanese policy makers wish to remain relevant in the African context, they will need to 
increase the capacity of their agencies on the continent, both in the shape of JICA and JETRO. 
Increasing the size and resources of their diplomatic corps will also be necessary. All of the 
Japanese agencies polled stressed their limited capacity and resources. While this may be 
simply part of a general feeling that 'more is always' better
29
, it is worth taking this claim 
seriously, particularly given that all of the Japanese respondents brought this up in their 
interviews. 
 
5.5 Areas for future investigation 
 
This investigation was a limited one, as has been noted in the first chapter. It was subjected to 
logistical constraints and specific delimitations, including a decision to exclude certain 
government organizations (such as the Treasury), and to avoid making certain organizational 
distinctions (such as between MOFA and MEXT). 
 
However, despite these (de)limitations it has managed to expose certain issues for further 
investigation, and discussion. 
 
Given that it was unsuccessful, the outcome of the EPA/FTA proposal, gives rise to the 
question of whether there is any future prospect of Japan and South Africa entering into a 
trade agreement. At the time of the study, this appeared unlikely, but this could change, if 
South African officials were to alter their opinion on either the welfare implications of such an 
agreement, or were to shift to a more ‘pro-trade’ stance, such as that held by certain officials 
                                                 
29 Allison and Halperin (1972:48) argue that bureaucracies tend to continuously seek greater resources for 
their organization, since they see their mission as vital to their country's interests. 
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at Dirco, who were generally in favour of the FTA/EPA on the basis of market access to any 
potential future Japan trade-bloc being a goal worth working towards. 
 
More broadly, it is worth asking what are the key determinants of SA entering (or not) into a 
Free Trade Agreement or an Economic Partnership Agreement? What kind of deals will SA 
accept, and what will it reject? This is complicated by the issue of South Africa’s regional 
integration, and how this would affect potential FTAs and EPAs. 
 
Another question worth investigating is that of the impact of SADC on South African trade 
with the rest of the world. Given that South Africa had to consult extensively with SADC 
while considering the trade deal, it is worth inquiring into whether regional integration is a 
complicating factor for South African bilateral FTAs, and to what extent this should be 
ameliorated or ignored. 
 
An additional avenue for investigation lies in the DTI’s prioritising of regional integration and 
local mineral beneficiation, and how this aligns with JICA’s work on regional infrastructure. 
Can Japanese technology and infrastructure expertise be synergised with the regional 
transport integration initiatives? Is it possible to align the Japanese desire for closer trade ties 
with South Africa’s insistence on developing local beneficiation projects?  
 
A topic that may well re-emerge in the future is that of South African high speed rail. At this 
point in time, it is an extremely vague notion, but if it were to move towards fruition, it would 
be worth examining what strategies Japanese companies (assisted by the Japanese 
government) use in order to attempt to secure tenders for rail infrastructure and rolling stock 
(Smith 2013). The involvement of JETRO and JICA in hosting a conference on high speed 
rail shows that they are proactively preparing the ground for such a process. 
 
5.6 Japan and South Africa: The road ahead 
 
By the time this thesis is published, the 5
th
 iteration of TICAD will have been completed. No 
doubt there will have been an outpouring of documentation, statements and resolutions, all of 
which will be subjected to scrutiny by academics and researchers. However, the fundamental 
shape of South African – Japanese relations is likely to be much the same, based on the 
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continuity of their respective mutual interests and priorities. Similarly, the bureaucratic 
arrangements on both sides will endure, and will continue to affect the relationship in various 
subtle, but noteworthy ways. As a result, analysis of the bureaucratic dimension of this 
relationship will continue to have relevance for the future of the relation between these two 
countries. 
 
Japan is seeking to maintain its competitiveness, and position itself in a favourable location 
vis-a-vis future trade partners. Given the rise of China in the background, and the continued 
economic competitiveness of South Korea, it would appear that this is a wise decision. Japan's 
continued location as the most advanced economy in Asia is certainly in doubt, and this is 
exacerbated by internal economic woes, and demographic shifts within its population. 
However, despite these serious issues, the Japanese economy is still of an extraordinary scale, 
and cannot simply be dismissed. Furthermore, Japanese elites have shown an abiding ability 
to reinvent their country. In 50 short years – from 1853 to 1905 – Japan moved from being a 
closed off, technologically backward country, to a regional power. Similarly, Japanese society 
was able to rebuild in an incredible fashion after WW2, and by the 1980s Japan was a major 
world economic power. As these events indicate, 'writing Japan off' is never a safe exercise. 
 
However, in a world where China continues to grow, and the Japanese economy remains 
moribund, Japan's diplomatic and development communities will need to adapt and improvise 
to remain relevant in Africa. Greater flexibility, adaptation and better communication of 
Japan's values, goals and strengths will be needed. 
 
South Africa is at an entirely different location on its development trajectory, and has a vastly 
different economy. However, South Africa has an urgent need to develop an economy that can 
generate employment and wealth for its people. Failure to do so will risk severe social unrest. 
This need is reflected, both in the drive for beneficiation, and in the caution around signing on 
to trade deals that could impact on the already fraught local manufacturing industries. 
 
However, beneficiation cannot be imposed by fiat. Local manufacturers must, at some level, 
be competitive if the government wishes to bank on them to create employment. In this 
regard, it would be worth revisiting the historical trajectory of nations that have rapidly 
industrialized – such as Japan - and seeing what lessons can be gleaned from their 
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experiences. Closer ties can help, not just in learning such lessons, but also through 
technology transfer and the development of deeper economic ties. 
 
Furthermore, while trade deals can have a negative impact on local employment, trade access 
is an important element of staying competitive. States that wish to export need to have 
markets to export to. Consequently, it is important for South Africa to maintain its ties with as 
many potential markets as possible, including Japan. 
 
As a result of these intersecting priorities, it is important that both states develop their ability 
to understand and respond to each other's concerns, approaches, and proposals. Allowing the 
possibility of mutually beneficial economic ties to 'fall through the cracks' of bureaucratic 
misunderstanding or misperceptions would be a disservice to the people of both South Africa 
and Japan. While bureaucracies are not glamorous or high powered, they are essential to the 
smooth working of states, and the broader machinery of international relations and commerce. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
South African interviewee  
 
<Start with pleasantries and an explanation of the research project. Check if using a tape 
recorder is acceptable.> 
 
Hello, it's good to meet you. My name is Mayibuye Magwaza. 
 I wanted to ask you some questions about your job, about South African-Japanese relations, 
and particularly how your organization works with other organizations. You see, I'm trying to 
understand more about how the structure and relationship of different government 
organizations affects South African-Japanese relations, and it would be very helpful to hear 
about your perspective on this, since you're working in the field. 
 
Basic information 
  
Just for the record, could you tell me your name again, and your job title? 
Could you tell me about your job? What exactly do you do? 
Who do you report to? How do you fit into Dirco/DTI's structures? 
 
Organizational priorities  
 
What are your organizations's priorities when it comes to relations with Japan? (What are you  
hoping to accomplish?) 
Does your organization have any specific strategies for this? 
Is this going well? 
I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade 
agreement with Japan – do you know anything about that? (If no) Who would be able to tell 
me about that? 
 
Linkages and organizational structure 
 
Does your organization work with people from other organizations in the South African 
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government?   
Can you tell me more about this? Which organizations do you work with the most? (Eg, 
Dirco/DTI/Office of the Presidency etc) Do you have regular meetings? Do you ever 
personally work with people from these other agencies? 
 
(Ask for concrete examples, based on 1) the free trade agreement discussions and 2) their job 
description and title.) 
 
If no – Why not?  How do you coordinate strategy? Are there any liaison structures or 
forums? 
 
On the Japanese side, who does your organization usually work with the most? If 'no one' – 
Does anyone else meet with them regularly?  
 
Do you work with anyone else? Are there any regular forums or meetings to discuss issues 
with the Japanese? 
 
Additional people for interview (snowball sampling) 
 
Do you know of anyone else who works in the field that I should I talk to? Can you suggest 
anyone else I should interview?  
 
<Get contact details, thank them for their time. Ask if it's OK to send further questions or 
issues of clarification to them.> 
 
 
Japanese interviewee 
<Start with pleasantries and an explanation of the research project. Check if using a tape 
recorder is acceptable.> 
 
はじめまして、ﾏｲﾌﾞｲｴﾏｸﾞﾜｻﾞです。ｽﾃﾚﾝﾎﾞｽ大学の研究者です。質問があります。 
すみません、日本語はちょっと弱いですねー英語もいいですか？ 
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I wanted to ask you some questions about your job, about South African-Japanese relations, 
and particularly how your organization works with other organizations. You see, I'm trying to 
understand more about how the structure and relationship of different government 
organizations affects South African-Japanese relations, and it would be very helpful to hear 
about your perspective on this, since you're working in the field 
 
Just  for the record, could you tell me your name again, and your job title? 
Could you tell me about your job? What exactly do you do? 
 
(If it is not immediately clear from the discussion or arrangements for the meeting.) 
So, which Japanese government agency do you work for? MOFA/METI 
 
How did you come to do this job? 
 
Priorities and goals 
 
What are your organization’s main priorities when it comes to relations with South Africa? 
(What are you hoping to accomplish?) 
Does your organization have any particular strategies for this? 
Is this going well? 
 
I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade 
agreement with Japan – do you know anything about that? (If no) Who would be able to tell 
me about that? 
 
Linkages 
 
Who do you usually work with, on a day to day basis? 
 Do you ever personally work with people from other agencies?  
Does your organization work with people from other parts of the Japanese government?  How 
do you work with them? Do you have regular meetings with them? 
 
 Potential followup: What can you tell me about these other agencies? 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 157 
 
 
Which South African government organizations do you work with? 
 - Which agencies do you work with the most?  
- Do you have regular meetings?  
- Can you tell me more about this?  
- What about non-governmental organizations?  
 
 
 
<Get contact details, thank them for their time. Ask if it's OK to send further questions or 
issues of clarification to them.> 
 
 
Additional questions (Varies depending on the person being questioned): 
 
 
EPA: 
I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade 
agreement or EPA between Japan and South Africa – do you know anything about that? (If 
no) Who would be able to tell me about that? 
 
TICAD: 
Is your organization involved in the TICAD process? How are you involved? How important 
do you think TICAD is, in South African – Japanese relations? 
 
 
Loans: In the context of TICAD, JBIC has been involved in a lot of loans and projects. Do 
you know a lot about this? Where could I find out more about this process?  
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
 
 
Primary Interviews 
. 
Organization Japanese 
Consulate 
DIRCO Japanese 
Embassy  
 
DBSA
30
 JETRO JICA DTI 
Date 15 May 
2012 
 
 4 June 
2012 
5 June  
 
5 June  
 
6 June  
 
6 June  
 
7 June 
2012 
Number of 
Interviewees 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Interview 
Method 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
In person 
– semi-
structured 
 
 
Auxiliary Interviews 
 
                                                 
30
 The Development Bank of South Africa was not an organization of interest, but an advisor seconded from 
METI to the DBSA was interviewed based on recommendations from other interviewees, and was able to 
provide insights into issues surrounding various Japanese – South African issues.  
Organization SACU 
Secretariat 
COSATU 
27 August 
2012 
7 September 
2012 
27 August 
2012 
1 1 1 
Interview 
Method 
Email – brief 
questionnaire 
 
Email – brief 
questionnaire 
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